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ABSTRACT
This thesis is motivated by the belief that it would be desirable to know if the Canadian
Chemical Producers' Association's "Responsible Care®" initiative is reflected in the
cultures of chemical companies. The thesis proposes a methodology for assessing the
organizational culture of a chemical company, and analyzes the cultures of two
Canadian chemical companies to determine if they support or contradict Responsible
Care.
The Responsible Care initiative is reviewed. The organizational culture literature is
reviewed, and different definitions of "organizational culture" are presented. The text
of the Responsible Care initiative is analyzed sentence-by-sentence for cultural beliefs,
'values and assumptions. A detailed description of the beliefs, values and assumptions
that one would expect to find at the "perfect" Responsible Care company is provided.
]Different methodologies for assessing organizational cultures are discussed with
reference to the literatures of organizational culture and qualitative research, and in the
context of the purposes of this thesis. A hybrid methodology, based upon ethnography
and Schein's "clinical research," is proposed and discussed at length. The cultures of
two Canadian chemical companies are analyzed for consistency with the beliefs, values
and assumptions one would expect to find at the "perfect" Responsible Care company.
Results suggest that several of Responsible Care's beliefs, values and assumptions are
supported at both companies, others are partially supported, and only a handful are
contradicted.
Based on the experience of this thesis, modifications to the hybrid methodology are
recommended.
Thesis Supervisor: John R. Ehrenfeld
Title: Senior Research Associate,
Center for Technology, Policy and Industrial Development
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Directly or indirectly, the chemical industry provides many of the chemicals
and products that we associate with modern living, products that most of us
"couldn't live without" - in some cases literally. But as public awareness of
the environment grew through the 1970's and 1980's, the chemical industry
found itself increasingly on the defensive. As more and more negative
impacts of the industry's products and wastes became understood, the
industry's public image deteriorated, and it became the target of more and
more government regulation.
And the chemical industry did not enjoy being regulated. It felt that
regulation slowed the industry's progress, cut its profits, and reduced its global
competitiveness. The proliferation of regulations was particularly intense in
the United States. Canadian chemical industry leaders saw what was
happening to the US industry and concluded that they in Canada would not
avoid a US-style regulatory climate unless they improved their public image.
Thus in 1985 the Canadian Chemical Producers' Association (CCPA) devised
its Responsible Care® initiative, "designed to reduce the public's perception
that it has been unwillingly put at risk by the industry" (CCPA 1992a p. 1). But
the CCPA felt that public perceptions could not be changed through mere
public relations; instead, visible improvements in performance were
required. The chemical industry needed to demonstrate to the public (and its
elected legislators) that the industry could control its environmental impacts.
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If the industry could show that it could "voluntarily put measures into place
for the effective management of chemicals, chemical products and processes,"
(CCPA 1992a p. 1) then perhaps the pressures for regulation would ease.
On paper, the Responsible Care initiative seemed to contain all the right
ingredients. But "effective management of chemicals, chemical products and
processes" has not been sufficient to convince a skeptical public. After all,
actual environmental performance (as measured by environmental releases
and accidents) improved considerably throughout the 1970's and 1980's, with
no corresponding improvement in public opinion. In fact, public opinion of
the chemical industry has deteriorated.
Why does the public still distrust the chemical industry? This thesis is
motivated by the hypothesis that public perceptions of the chemical industry
will not improve until the public believes it can trust the industry's motives.
The public (and its elected legislators) must be convinced that the chemical
industry has internalized Responsible Care, that it believes Responsible Care,
that Responsible Care is part of the culture.
But how would one assess if Responsible Care were part of the cultures of
chemical companies? The purpose of this thesis is to answer this question.
The establishment of public trust is not the only motivation for wanting to
assess the consistency between the cultures of chemical companies and
Responsible Care. This thesis is also relevant to the question of whether
chemical companies can be expected to continue their voluntary Responsible
Care efforts if (or when) public attention turns from the environment to
other issues. If the industry's public image problem goes away, will it quietly
forget its commitments? One possible answer is that companies will only
continue those efforts that are of direct benefit or entrenched in the culture.
Once again this leads to the questions: Is Responsible Care part of the culture
of chemical companies? and, how would we know if it were?
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1.2 Thesis Ouestions
To summarize, the goal is to be able to answer the question:
Do the cultures of chemical companies reflect Responsible Care?
But in order to even attempt this question, first one must ask:
How would one assess if Responsible Care were part of the
organizational culture of a chemical company?
In this thesis I answer the second question, and I take some preliminary steps
towards answering the first.
1.3 Why Canada?
No place could be more appropriate for such an analysis than Canada.
Canada's Responsible Care initiative was the first of the now 36 Responsible
Care initiatives worldwide. And, knowing the importance of culture,
Responsible Care's founders deliberately sought to elevate the Canadian
initiative to cultural status:
"The codes, like the guiding principles, reflect an ethic, an attitude, a
method of thinking about the way in which member companies do
business and their role in society." (CCPA 1992a p. 11) (emphasis mine)
"Responsible Care is an ethic, or philosophical belief, rather than
simply a set of codes and specific detailed obligations - it is something
we believe, which influences what we do." (CCPA 1992b p. 1) (emphasis
mine)
13
1.4 Technology and Policy
In response to the negative impacts of the technology of the chemical
industry, governments subjected it to ever-increasing regulation. Policy
attempted to change technology. But these attempts were not completely
successful. The chemical industry became disgruntled, perceiving regulation
as not only ineffective and inefficient, but also as harmful to competitiveness.
"Responsible Care" is a new type of policy. It is a self-imposed program of
principles, codes and evaluations aimed at improving the chemical industry's
performance. But what truly makes this policy different is that it is cultural.
It explicitly aims to change the cultures of chemical companies.
The new attention to culture is a result of the recognition that the technology
of the chemical industry cannot be considered to be separate from the
organizations that develop and use it. A chemical company's technology
shapes its culture, and its culture shapes its technology.
Thus culture links technology and policy. This thesis contributes to
increased understanding of the dynamics of this linkage.
1.5 Overview
It would be difficult to address this subject without a good understanding of
Responsible Care itself. Therefore Chapter 2 presents a description of the
initiative, including a brief history of its development, and some notes on the
current compliance verification process. The reader familiar with
Responsible Care in Canada may wish to skip this chapter. Note that
Responsible Care in Canada is quite different from the Responsible Care
initiatives in the US and elsewhere.
It would also be unwise to delve into the cultures of chemical companies
without a good feeling for what "organizational culture" is. Chapter 3
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surveys the many different conceptions of culture in the literature and
presents a few definitions.
Chapter 4 uses fundamental "components" of organizational culture to
analyze the Responsible Care initiative for its cultural content. A list of the
cultural implications of Responsible Care is generated. This list corresponds
to the culture one would expect to find at the "perfect" Responsible Care
company. If one went looking for evidence of Responsible Care in the culture
of a chemical company, this is what one would look for.
The next question to address is then: how would one go about looking for the
things identified in Chapter 4? Chapter 5 draws upon different
methodologies for assessing organizational cultures from the literatures of
organizational culture and qualitative research and proposes a methodology
to answer this question.
Chapter 6 describes the results of applying this methodology at two Canadian
chemical companies. Their cultures are analyzed for consistency with the
culture one would expect to find at the "perfect" Responsible Care company.
Aspects of Responsible Care culture that seem to be supported by the cultures
of these companies are identified, as well as aspects that do not seem to have
yet been internalized, and aspects that seem to be contradicted.
Conclusions are offered in Chapter 7. Based on the experience of this thesis,
modifications to the hybrid methodology are recommended. Some
preliminary conclusions regarding Responsible Care and the companies'
cultures are presented.
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Chapter 2
The Canadian Chemical Producers'
Association's "Responsible Care®"
2.1 The Canadian Chemical Producers' Association
The Canadian Chemical Producers' Association (CCPA) consists of 63 member
companies who produce over 90 percent of the chemicals made in Canada.
CCPA members produce inorganic chemicals, petrochemicals, and other
organic and specialty chemicals. CCPA companies operate nearly 200
manufacturing and distribution facilities in approximately 150 communities
in Canada, employing 31,000 people. The CCPA was founded in 1962. (CCPA
1994a cover, CCPA 1992a p. 37)
2.2 Evolution
In the late 1970's, CCPA members developed a statement of principles
regarding the management of chemicals. But on the advice of their legal
departments, some member companies were reluctant to commit to the
statement, and it was never adopted. Concern for the issue continued,
however, and by 1983, the CCPA did adopt a formal statement of principles
concerning "Responsible Care". Whether to endorse this one-page statement
or not was entirely up to each member company (Blanger 1990 p.151).
The tragedy at Bhopal, India in 1984 forever changed the chemical industry.
After Bhopal, the Canadian and US industries began to investigate whether a
similar tragedy could occur in North America. The US Chemical
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Manufacturers' Association (CMA) discovered that 95% of its members had
emergency response plans at their plants, but that almost all dealt only with
response inside plant compounds. Co-ordination with local fire and police
departments had been neglected. In fact, this problem had also been present
at Bhopal, and had had devastating consequences: curious local residents had
rushed to the plant fences after they heard the plant alarm, and in so doing,
they had walked right into the path of the lethal cloud of methyl isocyanate
(Rayport & Lodge 1990 pp. 9-10).
The chemical industry was forced to acknowledge that the general public had
a legitimate role to play in its activities. The US CMA devised a "Community
Awareness and Emergency Response" program. The program stressed that
every plant manager had to get out from inside the plant and make contact
with the local community. It urged the development of an emergency
response plan in cooperation with local fire and police authorities, and it
advocated close relations with local political leaders and community groups
(Rayport & Lodge 1990 p. 11).
In Canada, the chemical industry found that it had a very bad public image
and decided that it would have to change that image if it wanted to stay in
business. The CCPA gauged that public perceptions could not be changed
merely through public relations; instead, visible improvements in
performance were required. The CCPA was impressed by the US Community
Awareness and Emergency Response program. It consisted of both principles
and management practices; and it had had positive impacts on company
performance and regulatory development1 (Rayport & Lodge 1990 p.15).
But the CCPA recognized an additional problem not addressed by the CMA
program. When Dow Canada measured public opinion as a function of
distance from its facilities, the results were instructive. Within about 6km of
the plant, people held specific opinions about Dow, which were different than
their opinions of the industry as a whole. But beyond 6km, people's image of
Dow was controlled by their opinion of the whole chemical industry. The
1When US legislators drafted Title III of the Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act,
they borrowed whole segments of the CMA's Community Awareness and Emergency Response
program, almost word for word.
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exemplary behaviour of Dow's individual plant was practically irrelevant.
Dow would be judged by the behaviour of its peers (Buzzelli 1991).
Thus, the CCPA wanted to go beyond the CMA's Community Awareness and
Emergency Response program (which was voluntary at the time), and include
essentially all the activities of the chemical industry in a mandatory program.
The association decided to put together a set of codes of practice that would
deal with all aspects of members' products - from cradle to grave. Even the
activities of so-called "third parties," such as suppliers, contractors or
distributors, were covered, because - in the words of CCPA President Jean
Blanger, "the mistakes of a third party can often reflect on the industry as a
whole." (Blanger 1990 p. 152)
The CCPA used the term "Responsible Care" to describe its initiative.
2.3 Purpose
The self-proclaimed purpose of Responsible Care is as follows:
"The Responsible Care initiatives are designed to reduce the public's
perception that it has been unwillingly put at risk by the industry, and
ensure that the industry shows it can voluntarily put measures into
place for the effective management of chemicals, chemical products
and processes." (CCPA 1992a p. 1)
Under the title "What Are We Trying to Achieve?", the CCPA Responsible
Care implementation guidelines points out that the initiative:
"grew out of public concern over the hazards of chemicals and the way
the chemical industry was run, and its aim is to dispel that concern by
addressing its root cause." (CCPA 1992b p. 1)
and concludes from this that the industry must do two things:
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* "improve the level of safety in all aspects of chemical operations, to
eliminate the basis for concern, and
* communicate this to the public, and to governments, and
demonstrate that the industry is sensitive and responsive to public
concern." (CCPA 1992b p.1)
The CCPA also identifies two additional objectives it is trying to achieve:
"A consistent approach throughout the CCPA membership in the
responsible management of chemicals based on the Responsible Care
codes of practice."
"CCPA confidence that it can speak externally regarding the responsible
nature of its membership." (CCPA 1992a p. 5)
2.4 Overview
Responsible Care in Canada2 consists of a statement of principles, six Codes of
Management Practice, two supporting policies, a chemical referral centre, a
public advisory panel, and a compliance verification3 process. The first
principle was written in 1985, and the last code was finished in 1989. The
most senior executive responsible for chemical operations in each CCPA
member company must accept and endorse the principles of Responsible Care
as a condition of membership.
As of December 1994, companies who had been CCPA members for three
years or more reported that 98% of the Codes of Management Practice
elements had been implemented (CCPA 1994a p. 10). The compliance
verification process was begun in 1994, and is scheduled for completion by
1996.
2
"Responsible Care" initiatives developed in different countries are quite different.
3Compliance with Responsible Care, not with government regulations.
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New companies joining the CCPA are given three years to achieve
Responsible Care compliance (CCPA 1994a p. 10).
Chemical industries in 36 countries have adopted "Responsible Care"
initiatives (CCPA 1994a p. 1).
2.5 Guiding Principles
Each CCPA member company subscribes to the following guiding principles
(CCPA 1992a p. 3):
* "ensure that its operations do not present an unacceptable level of
risk to employees, customers, the public or the environment
* provide relevant information on the hazards of chemicals to its
customers, urging them to use and dispose of products in a safe
manner, and make such information available to the public on
request
* make Responsible Care an early and integral part of the planning
process leading to new products, processes or plants
* increase the emphasis on the understanding of existing products
and their uses and ensure that a high level of understanding of new
products and their potential hazards is achieved prior to and
throughout commercial development
* comply with all legal requirements which affect its operations and
products
* be responsive and sensitive to legitimate community concerns
* work actively with and assist governments and selected
organizations to foster and encourage equitable and attainable
standards."
20
2.6 Codes of Management Practice
2.6.1 Preamble
(CCPA 1992a pp. 11-12)
The preamble to the Codes of Management Practice describes Responsible
Care as "an ethic, an attitude, a way of thinking..." The broad scope of the
initiative is underlined by affirming that Responsible Care applies inside and
outside Canada, to existing and new chemical products, uses, processes,
equipment, services and facilities; and that member company responsibilities
extend to suppliers, transporters, distributors, contractors and customers. The
preamble affirms companies' responsibility to stakeholders through a long-
term commitment to the community, to occupational health and safety, and
to the environment. The needs and concerns of all stakeholders, including
the public, customers, contractors, employees and others onsite, must be
understood and addressed. The preamble also requires that companies know
all relevant laws and regulations and meet or exceed them in letter and in
spirit. The necessity of continuous performance improvement is mentioned.
And the importance of integrating Responsible Care into corporate planning
and operations at all levels, so that the initiative is "everybody's job", is
underlined.
:2.6.2 General
(CCPA 1992a pp. 12-36)
There are six Codes of Management Practice. Five address individual stages
of the chemical life cycle (research & development, manufacturing,
transportation, distribution and hazardous waste management), and a sixth
addresses community awareness and emergency response.
]Each code includes a purpose, a set of guiding principles modelled after the
overall Responsible Care guiding principles, some general clauses and some
specific clauses.
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The general clauses of the five "life cycle stage" Codes (i.e. the R&D Code, the
Manufacturing Code, the Transportation Code, etc.) are very similar. All but
the R&D Code require "written policies, standards and procedures" governing
all aspects of the life cycle stage, while the R&D code requires "written
policies, protocols and methodologies." All five require that the
responsibility for generating, implementing, auditing and updating these
written systems, and for taking corrective action, be clearly assigned. All five
require that written systems meet or exceed all applicable laws and
regulations in letter and in spirit, and all five require members to ensure
equivalent performance by contractors.
All the Codes require that members actively assist governments in
developing public policies, legislation or regulations governing operations of
the particular life cycle stage. Members are to consult with other affected
stakeholders during this process if possible. Finally, all five of the "life cycle
stage" Codes require companies to cease activities that cannot be performed in
accordance with the Codes.
Other clauses in each Code are more specific each life cycle stage, however,
they contain several common themes. For example, all the Codes require
member companies to identify and evaluate the hazards and risks of their
various operations, communicate them to relevant stakeholders, and work to
minimize the risks.
2.6.3 Research and Development Code
(including Design, Construction and Start-up of New Facilities)
(CCPA 1992a pp. 16-19, 22-23)
The R&D Code requires member companies to identify and evaluate the
health, safety and environmental hazards associated with new products,
processes or applications as early as possible. The Code asks that particular
attention be paid to long-term health and environmental effects. Based on
the hazards they identify, companies must define operating standards, which
projects must achieve at periodical reviews or else be terminated. New
potential applications must be analyzed for hazards continuously as R&D
work proceeds.
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The Code requires "good laboratory practice," including hazard identification
and communication to employees, employee training, proper management of
lab waste, and accurate and ethical documentation of lab results. A "data
package" with information regarding potential hazards (including those of
associated wastes) must be prepared for every new chemical, chemical
product, process or application.
The R&D Code and the Manufacturing Code both address the design of new
facilities. The R&D Code requires that health, safety and environmental
standards for new plants be clearly defined and that the design achieve them.
Together the two Codes require that plant design include a hazard and
operability study and risk assessment. Hazards and risks must be minimized
and controlled. The Manufacturing Code requires that companies establish
criteria for site selection and buffer zones that minimize adverse impacts on
the community, the environment, industrial neighbours, utilities and
transportation routes. The design must also minimize effects manifested
after the closure or demolition of the facility. The Manufacturing Code also
requires members to provide information and respond to concerns raised
during the planning of new facilities.
Both Codes also address plant start-up. The Manufacturing Code requires
safety standards for employees, contractors, the public and the environment
during construction and start-up of new facilities, while the R&D Code
requires that operators be fully trained - including in emergency procedures -
prior to start-up. The R&D Code requires that material safety data sheets, that
include packaging, handling and disposal procedures, be available for all
materials prior to start-up.
The design and start-up provisions of the R&D Code apply to pilot plants as
well as full scale facilities.
The R&D Code also addresses market introduction of new chemicals,
chemical products, processes or applications. Even for small scale test
marketing, employees and contractors must be educated regarding handling
and transportation. Potential customers must be provided with information
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about hazards and risks, and assistance to ensure responsible handling, use
and waste management. Except in the case of small scale test marketing,
members must confirm that customers are indeed handling and using new
products responsibly, and managing associated wastes responsibly.
2.6.4 Manufacturing Code
(except Design, Construction and Start-up of New Facilities)
(CCPA 1992a pp. 20-23)
The Manufacturing Code applies during normal and abnormal operation of
manufacturing facilities, including start-up, shutdown and maintenance.
It requires members to regularly identify and evaluate environmental health
and safety hazards and risks, and work to minimize the risks by eliminating
or controlling the hazards. Safety and health performance and the working
environment must be monitored, so that potential occupational problems
can be minimized. An emergency plan must be prepared.
The Manufacturing Code requires documentation of written procedures
covering all phases of operation. Companies must be aware of all their
effluents and emissions, and where necessary monitor and/or control them.
Changes or modifications to equipment, processes, materials, hardware or
software must be controlled and recorded. Handling and storage of materials
must minimize environmental, health and safety risks. Companies must
also try to minimize the effects of accidental spills or releases.
The Code requires that companies regularly perform hazard analyses and risk
assessments on operating facilities, and take action to minimize risks. Injury,
damage or harm from explosion, fire or uncontrolled releases must be
prevented.
The Code also requires that appropriate security is provided for plants.
Manufacturing Code provisions concerning the design, construction and
start-up of new facilities are discussed in the previous subsection (R&D Code).
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Both the R&D and Manufacturing Codes require that hiring and training be
commensurate with Responsible Care, employee competence be maintained,
and that regular performance assessments be conducted.
2.6.5 Transportation Code
(CCPA 1992a pp. 24-27)
Transportation is part of the distribution process, but the CCPA felt it was
important enough to address via a separate Code.
The Transportation Code requires member companies to regularly identify
and evaluate the hazards and risks of transportation, and communicate them
to employees and transporters.
The Code requires that companies identify alternate transportation modes
and routes that minimize the exposure of humans or environmentally
sensitive areas to hazards. It requires that companies establish criteria for
transportation: mode, equipment, containers, inspection and maintenance.
Carriers must be selected based on their safety performance, their procedures
for equipment inspection and maintenance, and their drivers' training.
Companies must train and assess the people loading and unloading their
products, and must set standards for loading and unloading equipment -
including containment and emergency response standards. Container
contents must be clearly identified. The risks involved in returning,
cleaning, reusing, servicing, and disposing of containers must be dealt with.
The Transportation Code requires each member company to have an
annually field-tested "transportation emergency response plan". The plan
must identify the resources to be deployed in the case of an accident
involving company chemicals or chemical products, and must describe the
means to deal with hazards to people or the environment, and contain or
clean-up the release. At the scene, companies must cooperate with
government or other agencies. Companies must provide specialized
equipment and materials, and technical advisors to provide information and
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media relations. Companies must also evaluate the need for immediate and
short-term assistance to people who are dislocated by an accident.
The Transportation Code also requires companies to participate in CCPA
awareness-raising regarding transportation, and to identify and train
company people to respond to questions from people along transportation
corridors.
2.6.6 Distribution Code
(CCPA 1992a pp. 28-32)
The Distribution Code is the longest of the Codes of Practice. It requires that
member companies set standards for the siting and security of distribution
facilities. Also, companies must regularly evaluate storage and handling
hazards and risks. Companies must monitor their safety performance and
work environments to identify and minimize potential occupational health
and safety problems. The Code requires standards and procedures for bulk
and packaged storage that include: spill containment, product segregation,
labels and vehicles used. Member companies must provide to employees and
contractors information and training regarding: hazards, risks, handling,
container-to-container transfer, container cleaning, packaging and waste
management. Companies must also provide emergency support for incidents
involving company chemicals or chemical products. The Code applies to all
member company owned and contracted premises, in all geographic
jurisdictions.
According to the Code, member companies must supply customers with
material safety data sheets along with their first shipment of a chemical or
chemical product, including commercial samples. Companies must also
supply any other information they believe to be "vital to the health and safety
of the end-user", and require its communication to the end user as a
condition of sale. In addition, companies must provide information on the
management of waste and empty containers.
The Distribution Code requires CCPA members to impose certain conditions
upon both their suppliers and their distributors. Companies are required to
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ensure that their distributors understand Responsible Care. They must
establish criteria for the selection of their distributors, minimum standards
the distributors must meet, and assess distributor performance against those
standards. Member companies must cause their distributors to correct any
shortcomings or terminate supply. Likewise, CCPA members must establish
selection criteria and minimum standards for their suppliers, and cause
supplier performance to meet those standards or terminate purchases.
The Code requires companies to respond to requests for information or
assistance concerning their chemicals or chemical products (or services) from
any point in the distribution chain.
The Distribution Code is much more specific than the other Codes with
regard to member companies' relations with governments and the law. It
requires a program to meet or exceed the letter and spirit of all legal
requirements related to distribution, and communication to ensure that all
employees and contractors understand and comply with all legal
requirements. The Code also asks that member companies raise awareness of
chemical distribution practices in their communities, and encourage their
employees to "'speak out within their own communities to improve the
perception of chemical distribution." Companies are to choose organizations,
associations and governments with whom to advocate Responsible Care
policies. Companies should influence public policies, standards and
regulations concerning distribution, focusing on prevention and proaction.
According to the Code, the goal is to establish standards for continuously
improving chemical distribution activities.
2.6.7 Hazardous Waste Management Code
(CCPA 1992a pp. 33-36)
The CCPA's Hazardous Waste Management Policy establishes the following
hierarchy of preferred hazardous waste management options:
- reduction at source
- recycling, recovery or re-use
- destruction or treatment to render the waste non-hazardous
- secure containment and monitoring
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The Hazardous Waste Management Code of Management Practice reflects
this policy by requiring member companies to continually identify
opportunities to move up this hierarchy. In addition, it encourages
companies to apply the Code to wastes that are not legally classified as
hazardous.
The Code specifies actions for cases where reduction, recycling, recovery or
reuse are not possible. For hazardous waste treatment or disposal, companies
must record the volume, characteristics, location, and method used. The
Code requires that when treatment or disposal are available, companies reject
as unacceptable long-term storage or dilution of wastes to render them non-
hazardous. Waste that cannot be made non-hazardous must be contained in
secure landfills or geological formations.
Under the Code, companies are required to participate in the development of
(and continually evaluate) improvements in hazardous waste management
and disposal technologies. Companies must also promote the establishment
of hazardous waste treatment and disposal facilities.
The Hazardous Waste Management Code requires that companies define
criteria for the selection of hazardous waste management contractors and
disposal facilities and assess compliance periodically. Waste management
contractors in any country must be appropriately permitted and licensed and
must apply the Code to CCPA member company wastes. The Code requires
that members train employees, contractors and outside agencies in managing
company wastes. Companies must provide information, advice and
encouragement to customers and end-users on how to manage hazardous
wastes consistent with the Code.
With respect to past hazardous waste management practices, the Code
requires companies to develop and maintain records of the nature and
quantities of wastes sent to previously used sites and conduct environmental
studies on each site to the extent practicable. Regulatory agencies are to be
notified of any information or results collected, and members are to cooperate
with government agencies in any remediation activities.
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2.6.8 Community Awareness and Emergency Response (CAER) Code
(CCPA 1992a pp. 6 13-15)
The Community Awareness and Emergency Response (CAER) Code applies
to every member R&D, manufacturing, distribution and waste management
site.
Like the other Codes, the CAER Code requires that members meet or exceed
all applicable laws in letter and in spirit, train employees and assess their
performance, and actively assist governments in developing public policies,
legislation or regulations that govern community awareness or emergency
response. Unlike for the other Codes, companies are not required to cease
activities that cannot be performed in compliance with the CAER Code.
The site manager has primary responsibility for generating, implementing,
field-testing, auditing and updating the following CAER Code programs for
his or her site.
The CAER Code requires that every site manager have a community
awareness program consistent with the CCPA's Community Right-to-Know
Policy. The Right-to-Know Policy affirms that the public has "the need and
right" to know the risks associated with chemical operations and products,
including transportation risks. It states that the community is entitled to the
same health and safety information as employees; that companies have a
need to protect trade secrets; and that accurate hazard information shall
always be provided regardless of trade secrets. It states that communities
around facilities have a right to know the risks the facilities present and the
"corresponding" safeguards. Similarly it states that communities along
transportation routes have the right to access company information about the
risks, safeguards, and volume ranges of transported goods. Finally, the policy
promises that members will communicate to emergency response agencies
the nature, volume and location of materials on their sites.
In addition to the general requirement for a program consistent with the
above, the CAER Code specifically requires sites to list community rights,
responsibilities, concerns, needs and resources, and organizations and people
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who represent the community. These lists must be up to date. Sites must
identify and train people to communicate regularly with the community, and
develop information for them to use, in both responsive and proactive
situations. Sites must have a system to measure and assess the results of their
communication.
The CAER Code also requires sites to have an up-to-date, operational
"emergency assistance plan," which is documented, audited, field-tested and
updated annually; and communicated to the community regularly. In
developing the plan - and communicating it to the community - the site must
actively coordinate and cooperate with local officials and the media.
The plan must be based on a regular site-specific risk assessment and provide
information from the assessment to employees and people in the community
"who have an interest." The site must also assist authorities in emergency
planning for itself, for the community and for neighbouring industries. The
site's emergency response plan must be integrated into a community-wide
emergency response plan.
Like the Transportation Code emergency response plan, the CAER Code plan
must make expertise and specialized equipment and materials available in
the event of an emergency, and must evaluate the need for assistance to
persons dislocated.
2.6.9 Interpretation
The CCPA acknowledges that the Responsible Care Codes of Management
Practice still leave much up to the judgement of each individual member
company. Its guidelines for Responsible Care implementation advocate a
"basic approach" for interpreting the Codes. The CCPA suggests that
companies ask themselves three questions, "from the viewpoint of an
outsider rather than from within":
What could go wrong? (NOT What is most likely to go wrong?)
How could this affect others?
How might these potential effects be perceived?
(CCPA 1992b pp. 1-2)
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2.7 Public Advisory Panel
The Responsible Care initiative includes a community advisory panel4 ,
comprised of a cross-section of interest groups and concerned citizens. The
panel includes environmental activists, consumer advocates and educators,
as well as experts in ecological science, environmental economics, human
health and safety, farming, and chemical products retailing. The panel meets
regularly to discuss and evaluate matters on which the CCPA seeks comment
and advice, and which the panel identifies as requiring a response from the
industry. The panel reviewed the Codes of Management Practice line-by-line,
identifying ambiguities and "weasel words", before the Codes were formally
presented to the membership. The panel reviews planned CCPA activities
and is to identify emerging areas of concern before they become major public
issues (CCPA 1994a p.12-15, CCPA 1992a p. 10).
2.8 Compliance Verification
Under the title "How Will I Know if Responsible Care is Working?", the
CCPA's public Responsible Care pamphlet states:
"If Responsible Care achieves all the goals set for it, there will be fewer
and fewer environmental incidents involving chemicals. You will see
more and more chemical companies displaying the Responsible Care
symbol as a sign of their commitment to its promise. There will be
more and more reaching out to the community where the industry has
a presence."' (CCPA 1992c)
However, it would seem that fewer environmental incidents, more
Responsible Care symbols, and more reaching out to the community would
not be enough for the CCPA itself to be sure that Responsible Care was
4At the CCPA level. This subsection does not refer to local plant community advisory panels.
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"working," because in 1994, it began a Responsible Care compliance
verification process.
The compliance verification process intends to verify code implementation at
all member companies by 1996. The verification involves two steps: a
member company self-assessment, followed by an evaluation of the
company's management processes by an external verification team (CCPA
1994b p.1). The verification team consists of a public representative, two
industry representatives knowledgeable in Responsible Care, and a local
community representative.
The external verification process begins when a member company's senior
management - after a self-assessment - states to the CCPA that the company
has attained its Responsible Care commitment (CCPA 1994b p.3).
The CCPA describes the external verification as a process through which the
CCPA and the public can "fairly judge that the members of CCPA are in fact in
compliance with the intent of Responsible Care" (CCPA 1994b p.1) (emphasis
mine). One of the purposes of the external verifications is to "give the
Responsible Care initiative and its implementation credibility with internal
and external stakeholders" (CCPA 1994b p.3).
For the purposes of verifying Responsible Care compliance, the CCPA has
boiled all the requirements of the Codes of Management Practice down to the
following seventeen "management system categories" (CCPA 1994b
Attachment 2):
- "Set organization and responsibilities
- Meet or exceed laws
- Inform public and understand and respond to concerns
- Hire, train, assess and communicate to employees
- Collect hazard information and assess and minimize risks
- Identify, manage and minimize emissions and wastes
- Incorporate safety, health and environment into design stages
- Document standards and procedures
- Provide information to second parties
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- Assess second parties
- Manage changes
- Provide security
- Manage previous waste sites
- Measure and improve performance
- Manage emergencies
- Assist in public policy development
- Audit and follow up"
For each of these seventeen management system categories, the external
verification team visits the company and its sites to determine: how
responsibility for the process has been assigned, how the process was
determined to be acceptable, how the process is audited for acceptable results,
how the process is documented or updated, and whether the process is
provided with adequate resources (CCPA 1994b p.4).
Note that the external verifiers do not directly determine if the company is
meeting the Responsible Care Codes or not. Instead they "look for evidence
of effective management processes used by the company to ensure it is
meeting the guiding principles and codes," rather than "duplicating the
internal verification processes required by Responsible Care" (CCPA 1994b
p.4 ).
Among other things, the verification team can: request senior managers at
random to explain of Code principles and the methods or systems the
company has adopted to ensure compliance; look for the Responsible Care
insignia on documents; ask employees, contractors, suppliers, customers,
carriers, government agencies or the public if they see the company as
practicing Responsible Care; and confirm second party conformance to
Responsible Care. The team must "be satisfied that the Responsible Care
intent is being practiced" (CCPA 1994b pp. 10-11) (emphasis mine).
Once verified, companies must "proactively share the results with affected
communities using their community dialogue process," as well as with
anyone else who asks. The company is "solely responsible" for making
verification results public (CCPA 1994b p. 9).
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2.9 Culture
The preamble to the Codes of Management Practice affirms:
"The codes, like the guiding principles, reflect an ethic, an attitude, a
method of thinking about the way in which member companies do
business and their role in society." (CCPA 1992a p. 11) (emphasis mine)
Further, the CCPA's guidelines for Responsible Care implementation state:
"Responsible Care is an ethic, or philosophical belief, rather than
simply a set of codes and specific detailed obligations - it is something
we believe, which influences what we do." (CCPA 1992b p. 1) (emphasis
mine)
By using words such as ethic, attitude, method of thinking, philosophical
belief, and believe, the CCPA has deliberately undertaken to make
Responsible Care part of the culture of the chemical industry. This thesis
addresses the question of how to determine if the CCPA has been successful.
Before tackling this question, however, I must tackle the question: what is
culture?
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Chapter 3
What is 'Organizational Culture'?
"Culture is a blank space, a highly respected, empty pigeonhole.
Economists call it 'tastes' and leave it severely alone. Most
philosophers ignore it - to their own loss. Marxists treat it obliquely as
ideology or superstructure. Psychologists avoid it, by concentrating on
child subjects. Historians bend it any way they like. Most believe it
matters, especially travel agents." (Douglas 1982 p. 183)
3.1 A Brief History of Organizational Culture Research
'Culture' is a concept from the discipline of anthropology, and so it was
anthropologists who first studied the cultures of organizations. W. Lloyd
Warner of Harvard University's anthropology department and Elton Mayo of
the Harvard Business School performed the first systematic study of the
culture of a modem work organization in 1931 and 1932. Their study, of a
bank wiring room at the Western Electric Company in Chicago, provided the
management literature with its first well-publicized cultural explanations for
workers' behaviours (Trice & Breyer 1993 pp. 23-24). At Western Electric,
workers used their beliefs about fairness, a living wage and the right to work,
to explain and justify restricting output, pressuring others to withhold
production, and violating company rules (Roethlisberger and Dickson, in
Trice & Breyer 1993 p. 25).
A few years later, Warner moved to the University of Chicago, and along
with one of his students, began a consulting firm which used cultural analysis
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to advise clients on worker relations. In 1942 the student, Burleigh Gardner,
taught the first course in applied industrial anthropology at the University of
Chicago business school (Trice & Breyer 1993 p. 25). In 1945 he wrote the first
textbook that took a cultural perspective on work organizations (Gardner
1945).
But other anthropologists showed little interest in the workplace. In the
1950s, the availability of computers shifted the focus of much social science
research to quantitative, rather than qualitative, methodologies. Only a
trickle of organizational culture research took place through the 1950s and
1960s. The study of organizational culture staged a modest comeback in the
1970s, but its real boom began in the early 1980s (Trice & Breyer 1993 pp. 26-
30).
In 1981 and 1982, two best-selling books: Theory Z: How American Business
Can Meet the Japanese Challenge, by William Ouchi, and In Search of
Excellence: Lessons from America's Best Run Companies by Peters and
Waterman, suggested that a company's performance might be a function of its
culture. This suggestion struck a chord in American managerial thinking. At
the time, several US companies seemed to be losing in competition against
companies from Japan, a country with a very different culture. US managers
had begun to believe that their past management practices had discouraged
desirable behaviours such as innovation or attention to quality. Some
managers also saw controlling culture as a means of regaining control over
sour relations between workers and management (Trice & Breyer 1993 pp. 29-
30).
Some management scholars were also attracted to the culture concept because
they felt that the structural-rational approaches to organizational
management that were prevalent at the time, were missing important
realities of the functioning of an organization. Traditional quantitative
research results seemed to some to be too far removed from their context to
be relevant (Trice & Breyer 1993 p. 31).
And so, from 1981 to 1985, in addition to Theory Z and In Search of
Excellence, four other books on organizational culture were published,
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several business and trade magazines included articles on the subject, five
major conferences on corporate culture (and organ'zational folklore and
symbolism) were held within 19 months, and The Journal of Management
Studies, Administrative Science Quarterly, Organizational Dynamics and The
Journal of Management all published special issues on organizational culture
(Trice & Breyer 1993 pp. 29-30).
Since the boom of the 1980s, attention to "organizational culture" has
declined. Some have written it off as a fad; others feel a fundamental change
in the study and management of organizations has already taken place.
3.2 'Culture' and 'Organizational Culture': Many Definitions
But what is organizational culture?
Unfortunately, there is no single widely-accepted definition of 'organizational
culture'. This is for at least two reasons. First, there is no single widely-
accepted definition of 'culture' in anthropology - the discipline in which the
concept originated. In fact, in 1952 Kroeber and Kluckhohn identified 164
definitions of 'culture' used in anthropology. Second, the concept of
organizational culture has been used by people in several different disciplines
to help provide very different kinds of insight. For example, organizational
culture has been studied in attempts to understand different nations'
management styles, in efforts to improve companies' efficiencies, and in
attempts to learn about the subconscious of the human brain. The definition
used for the concept depends on the purpose for which it is being used:
"The concept of culture in an organizational context has proved a
useful device for differing orientations towards organizational activity.
For managers, it has served as a metatheory for the explanation and
prediction of corporate effectiveness. For academics, it has been
regarded either as a variable, dependent or independent, within a
functionalist, systems-oriented approach; or as a 'root metaphor' for
organization as a process." (Linstead & Grafton-Small 1992 p. 332,
references suppressed)
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It is perhaps not surprising, then, that there are several definitions of
organizational culture. Even Disneyland has a definition. As was done by
Maloney (1991 p. 44), I list several here:
Culture is
"A set of readinesses to distinguish some aspects of the situation rather
than others and to classify and value these" (Vickers 1985 p. 67)
"The amalgam of shared values, behavior patterns, mores, symbols,
attitudes, and normative ways of conducting business that differentiate
one company from all other companies" (Tunstall 1985 p. 45)
"A pattern of basic assumptions - invented, discovered, or developed by a
given group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation
and internal integration - that has worked well enough to be considered
valid and, therefore, is to be taught to new members as the correct way to
perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems" (Schein 1990 p. 111)
"The shared philosophies, ideologies, values, assumptions, beliefs,
expectations, attitudes, and norms that knit a community together... a
group's agreement, implicit or explicit, on how to approach decisions and
problems" (Kilmann et al. 1985 p. 5)
"An integrative framework for sensemaking, both a product and a process,
the shaper of interaction and an outcome of it, continually being created
and recreated through these interactions" (Jelinek et al. 1983 p. 332)
"A learned pattern of unconscious (or semi-conscious) thought, reflected
and reinforced by behavior, that silently and powerfully shapes the
experience of a people" (Deal 1985 p. 301)
"The way we do things around here" (Bower in Deal & Kennedy 1982 p. 4)
"What keeps the herd moving roughly west" (Deal & Kennedy 1982)
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"The set of values and assumptions that underlie the statement, 'This is
how we do things around here."' (Quinn 1988)
"A collective phenomenon that embodies people's responses to the
uncertainties and chaos that are inevitable in human experience" (Trice &
Breyer 1993 p. 2)
"The product of forms of social invention and interaction" (Diamond 1991
p. 510)
"The set of important assumptions (often unstated) that members of a
community hold in common" (Sathe 1985 p. 234)
"The conclusions a group of people draws from its experience, consisting
largely of what people believe about what works and what does not"
(Wilkins & Patterson 1985 p. 267)
"The shared and relatively enduring pattern of basic values, beliefs, and
assumptions in an organization" (Sethia & Gilnow 1985 p. 402)
"A set of solutions devised by a group of people to meet specific problems
posed by the situations they face in common" (Van Maanen 1985 p. 33)
"A relatively unique set of common understandings around which action
is organized, expressed in a language whose nuances are peculiar to the
group" (Becker & Geer in Louis 1985 p. 74)
"A set of understandings or meanings shared by a group of people. The
meanings are largely tacit among members, are clearly relevant to the
particular group, and are distinctive to the group. Meanings are passed
on to new group members." (Louis 1985 p. 74)
"The philosophy underlying all business decisions, the commitment of
top leadership and management to that philosophy, and the actions
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taken by individual cast members that reinforce the image" (Walt
Disney Co. in Van Maanen 1991 p. 65)
3.3 Classification of Conceptions of 'Organizational Culture'
The multiple definitions of organizational culture lead to second-order
complications. In their efforts to explain such a complex collection of
definitions, a handful of scholars have classified the different approaches to
organizational culture taken in the literature. So not only are there dozens of
definitions of organizational culture, there are also several ways to classify
these definitions.
Two such classifications are presented here. The first, by Allaire & Firsirotu,
is probably the most complete, but I find it difficult to understand. The
second, by Smircich, is more accessible. My purpose in presenting these
classifications is to give the reader some mental frameworks into which to fit
the many different conceptions of organizational culture. The details of each
classification system are - to me - not important.
3.3.1 Conceptual Ancestors in Anthropology
Allaire and Firsirotu (1984) review the literature of cultural anthropology and
divided it into eight schools of thought concerning the nature of 'culture'.
They then apply their typology of schools of thought regarding 'culture' to the
different approaches to 'organizational culture' in the literature of
management and organizations. Thus they relate conceptions of
'organizational culture' to their (unwitting) ancestors in cultural
anthropology.
Allaire and Firsirotu first divide the schools of thought regarding 'culture'
into those that view culture as a sociocultural system, and those that view it
as an ideational system. If culture is a sociocultural system, then it is part of
the social system. On the other hand, if culture is an ideational system, then
it is distinct from (though related to) the social system. Much of the
organization theory literature tacitly assumes that culture is a sociocultural
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system, i.e. that the social and cultural dimensions of organizations are
integrated.
Allaire and Firsirotu then divide the sociocultural schools of thought into
those that are synchronic and those that are diachronic. Synchronic schools
tend to study culture at specific points in time and/or space, while diachronic
schools study the development of culture over time. They identify two
synchronic and two diachronic schools of thought regarding culture. The
synchronic schools are the functionalist school and the structural-
functionalist school.
The functionalist school sees culture as an instrument through which
individuals improve their ability to satisfy their basic human needs. Thus
culture exists only insofar as it can deliver such needs. If a functionalist view
of culture is applied to organizational culture, then one sees organizations as
theatres in which individuals strive to satisfy their needs.
Structural-functionalists see culture as the mechanisms through which
individuals acquire beliefs and habits that equip them for the social system. A
structural-functionalist view of organizational culture holds that
organizations accept the values of the larger societal culture, because they are
merely a subsystem of the larger culture. Organizations reflect society's
values and myths to remain legitimate within society.
The diachronic schools are the historical-diffusionist school and the
ecological-adaptationist schools. Historical-diffusionists see culture as
produced by historical circumstances and processes and tend to study the
diffusion of different cultures to different societies. A historical-diffusionist
sees organizational culture as a function of its historical circumstances, i.e.
which cultural forms were characteristic of the times when the organization
was born and/or transformed.
The ecological-adaptationist school believes that culture relates human
communities to their ecological environments, in a process of continuous
feedback. Socially-learned behaviour patterns affect the environment, and, in
turn, the environment causes culture to change. According to an ecological-
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adaptationist view, organizational cultures take on various forms as they
continually adapt to, or are selected by, their environment. There is a never-
ending, and sometimes unsuccessful quest for fit between the organization
and its changing environment.
In addition to the four sociocultural schools of thought discussed so far,
Allaire and Firsirotu identify four ideational schools of thought. They divide
these four according to where each school believes culture is located. Three of
the schools believe that culture resides in the minds of the people bearing the
culture. These are the cognitive, structuralist and mutual equivalence
schools.
The cognitive school views culture as a system of knowledge, that is, ways of
perceiving, thinking and acting learned by individuals in order that they fit
into their society. The concept of organizational climate is consistent with the
cognitive school of culture. Organizational climate is the perception of the
character of the organization. It directs individual behaviour towards
meeting organizational demands. Another cognitive way of viewing
organizations is as frameworks for actions generated by members' shared
cognitive maps.
Structuralists believe that culture arises from the subconscious of the human
brain. Since all human brains are assumed to be alike, all cultures have
common features, and are different only due to "permutations." A
structuralist view of organizations would similarly hold that all
organizational cultures have common features due to common subconscious
processes of human minds.
To the mutual equivalence school, culture is a framework, or contract, that
allows different individuals to predict each other's behaviour. It allows the
coexistence of people with very different cognitive processes or beliefs. In a
mutual equivalence-school organization, individuals do not hold common
goals, but decide to participate in mutually predictable cognitive structures
because participation in the organization serves their personal motives.
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Allaire and Firsirotu also identify one school of thought believing that
culture resides in the shared meanings and symbols of the society, rather than
in the minds of individual culture-bearers. The symbolic school may be best
summarized by Geertz: "Man (sic) is an animal suspended in webs of
significance he himself has spun; I take culture to be those webs." (Geertz
1973 p. 5). Culture consists of the shared and public symbols and meanings
that people use to interpret experience and guide action. According to one
symbolic view of organizational culture, organizations create symbols which
interpret and give meaning to the experiences and actions of individuals.
Another interpretation of organizational culture consistent with symbolism
:is that organizations themselves are merely social constructions, or cultural
'symbols, through which individuals interpret and give meaning to their
experiences.
Allaire and Firsirotu conclude that different conceptions of organizational
culture "lead to divergent and mutually exclusive notions of what culture in
organizations might signify and portend" (Allaire & Firsirotu 1984 pp. 209-
210, emphasis in original). Thus the choice of a definition is an important
decision.
3.3.2 Culture as Variable vs. Culture as Metaphor
Another classification of conceptions of organizational culture has been
proposed by Smircich (1983), and is adopted by many other authors.
The concept of metaphor is central to Smircich's classification system. Lakoff
and Johnson (1.980) have pointed out that seeing and using metaphors is a
fundamental aspect of human thought; it is how we learn about our world.
Organizations are often described in terms of metaphors. For example,
organizations have been analyzed as if they were machines, or biological
organisms.
On one hand, if we see organizations as "little societies" of people (instead of
as machines or as organisms), this leads us to the notion that an organization
can have a culture, just like societies do (Allaire & Firsirotu 1984 p. 193).
Note the phrasing: organizations have cultures. On another hand, several
43
scholars have used culture directly as a metaphor for organization, i.e.
organizations are cultures. Smircich describes these two views of culture
(organizations have cultures and organizations are cultures) as "culture as a
variable" and "culture as a root metaphor."
When culture is viewed as a root metaphor for organization, it serves as an
epistemological device to frame the study of organizations as social
phenomena:
"The use of culture as a root metaphor is quite different from drawing
analogies between organizations and machines and organizations and
organisms. It represents a shift from comparison with physical objects
to comparison with another social phenomenon, an undertaking with
greater room for ambiguity because of culture's nonconcrete status...
Culture as a root metaphor promotes a view of organizations as
expressive forms, manifestations of human consciousness." (Smircich
1983 p. 347)
Another attraction of the culture-as-root-metaphor view is that if
organizations are like cultures, then organizing must be like culture forming.
Thus the analogy can lead to analysis of the dynamic process of creating and
maintaining organization.
Finally, note that the phrase 'organizational culture' can make the concept of
culture as a root metaphor (organizations are cultures), difficult to grasp.
Scholars use the phrase 'organizational culture' to refer to both the concept of
organizations having cultures and the concept of organizations being cultures
- often without explicitly stating which view is being used.
Scholars use different conceptions of culture because they have different
research questions and interests. Therefore Smircich's classification system of
conceptions of organizational culture corresponds to a classification of the
different purposes for which the concept is used.
Smircich lists two conceptions of culture as a variable and three conceptions
of culture as a root metaphor for organizations. On the culture-as-variable
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side, she places the 'comparative management' literature and the 'corporate
culture' literature.
In comparative management studies, 'organizational culture' is an external
background factor that explains different management practices in different
countries. Organizations have culture. It is an independent variable that is
imported into the organization via its members.
In the corporate culture5 literature, 'organizational culture' is something
produced in organizations, by organizations, so that they may achieve their
goals more effectively. It is a lever by which managers can influence the
course of their organizations. Students of corporate culture want to know
how they can shape and change organizations' cultures.
Smircich identifies three perspectives towards culture as a root metaphor for
organization: the cognitive perspective, the symbolic perspective, and the
structural or psychodynamic perspective. Each of these develops a cultural
analogy for organization based on a different view of culture from the
anthropology literature.
Scholars of organizational cognition aim to determine the structures of
knowledge or rules that are in operation within organizations. They note
that the branch of cultural anthropology known as ethnoscience defines
culture as a system of knowledge and beliefs or a system of shared cognitions,
and they see an analogy (a metaphor). The organizations they study seem like
culture as defined by ethnoscience. Thus, they view 'organizational culture'
as a "master contract" that includes the rules (constitutive and regulative)
that organize beliefs and actions consistent with the organization's self-image.
Symbolic organization theorists and practitioners are concerned with how an
organization creates and maintains common interpretations of situations.
5
'Corporate culture' is distinct from 'organizational culture.' 'Corporate culture' usually refers
to a culture devised by management and instilled in members of the rest of the organization.
The 'organizational culture' may even resist the 'corporate culture' of the same organization
(Linstead & Grafton-Small 1992 p. 333). The two concepts are interrelated, however. A
corporate culture may be devised to change or overcome an organizational culture; if it succeeds,
it will become part of a new organizational culture.
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They note that some anthropologists define culture as a system of shared
symbols and meanings, and they too see a metaphor. The organizations they
work with seem like culture as defined by this symbolic perspective. Thus to
them, 'organizational culture' is a pattern of symbolic discourse.
Finally, structural anthropology regards culture as the expression of
unconscious psychological processes. A structural or psychodynamic
perspective would view 'organizational culture' as organizational forms and
practices that reflect the unconscious processes at work in the minds of
organization members. The purpose of studying organizational culture with
this perspective would be to reveal the hidden universal dimensions of the
human mind. Few scholars are doing this.
Others have proposed other categorizations for the different conceptions of
organizational culture in the literature. Martin and Meyerson (1988) divide
research on organizational culture into three major perspectives: integrative,
differentiated and fragmented. These differ in the level of consensus or
dissensus that is assumed to exist within a culture. Sathe (1985) divides
culture researchers into adaptationists and ideationalists. Adaptationists
study the more evident manifestations of culture (later these will be referred
to as "shallower levels of culture"), while ideationalists search out its deeper
undercurrents.
3.4 Definitions of 'Organizational Culture'
I hope that these two typologies of different conceptions of organizational
culture have provided the reader with a mental framework in which to place
different definitions of organizational culture. Next I present several of the
more complete definitions of organizational culture found in the literature.
Of course, no definition of organizational culture is right or wrong;
definitions can only be appropriate or inappropriate to the particular use at
hand.
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3.4.1 Schein
Edgar Schein defines organizational culture and discusses its origins more
explicitly than most other scholars of the subject.
He defines "organizational culture" as:
"(a) a pattern of basic assumptions, (b) invented, discovered, or
developed by a given group, (c) as it learns to cope with its problems of
external adaptation and internal integration, (d) that has worked well
enough to be considered valid and, therefore (e) is to be taught to new
members as the (f) correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to
those problems." (Schein 1990 p. 111)
Schein sees three levels of culture: observable artifacts, values, and "basic
underlying assumptions." Artifacts include everything from the physical
layout of an organization, the dress code, the manner in which people address
each other, the smell and feel of the place and its emotional intensity; to more
permanent archival manifestations such as company records, products,
statements of philosophy, and annual reports. Artifacts are visible and easy to
observe, however, Schein cautions that they are hard to interpret without
first understanding the deeper levels of culture present (Schein 1990 pp. 111-
112).
Values explain why individuals behave the way they do. Schein believes that
while values can lead to behaviour, they are usually merely "espoused
values," and not the underlying reasons for behaviour. He attributes this role
to what he calls "basic, underlying assumptions." He defines the difference
between a value and an assumption as being that a value can be legitimately
debated within a culture, whereas an assumption is taken for granted, or
preconscious, and debating it is seen as 'insane' or 'ignorant' (Schein 1984 p. 3)
According to Schein, values and underlying assumptions can contradict each
other. This means that a group could reach consensus at one level of culture
(either values or assumptions), while still disagreeing at the other (Schein
1990 p. 112).
47
Schein describes basic underlying assumptions as learned responses (that may
have originated as values) whose success in solving problems caused them to
drop out of awareness. Thus culture exists because it helps the organization
to cope with its problems. However, once a group has learned to hold
common assumptions, the resulting automatic patterns of perceiving,
thinking, feeling and behaving provide meaning, stability, and comfort. This
reduces the anxiety that would otherwise result from inability to understand
or predict events happening around the group. Schein thinks of some aspects
of culture as being for the group what defense mechanisms are for the
individual. He sees the strength and tenacity of culture, as well as its
tendency to cover all aspects of human behaviour, as deriving in part from
this anxiety-reduction function. Therefore Schein believes that basic cultural
assumptions change only very slowly, even though he sees culture as
continuously forming as the group learns (Schein 1984 pp. 2, 8, 10, Schein
1990 p. 111-112).
Schein is unusual in including the passing on of solutions to new members
in his definition of culture. He feels that the decision to pass something on is
itself a very important test of whether a given cultural solution is shared and
perceived as valid (Schein 1984 pp. 10-11).
Schein feels that culture forms around the organization's problems of
"external adaptation" and "internal integration." Problems of external
adaptation include the organization's strategy, goals, means for accomplishing
goals, means of measuring performance, and correction mechanisms; in
short, the things that ultimately determine whether the organization
survives in its environment. Problems of internal integration include how
the organization handles: language, boundaries, power and status, intimacy,
rewards and punishments, and ideology (Schein 1984 pp. 9-10).
Schein believes that organizational culture is "embedded" by the following
mechanisms: what leaders pay attention to, measure and control; how
leaders react to critical incidents and organizational crises; deliberate role
modeling and coaching; operational criteria for the allocation of rewards and
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status; and operational criteria for recruitment, selection, promotion,
retirement, and excommunication (Schein 1990 p. 115).
He believes that organizational culture is articulated and reinforced by: the
organization's design and structure; organizational systems and procedures;
the design of physical space, facades and buildings; the organization's stories,
legends, myths and symbols; and formal statements of organizational
philosophy, creeds and charters (Schein 1990 p. 115).
3.4.2 Trice & Breyer
Trice and Breyer (1993) feel that culture consists of collective phenomena that
embody people's responses to the uncertainties and chaos that are inevitable
in human experience. It emerges from people's struggles to manage
uncertainties and create order in social life. It provides articulated sets of
ideas that help people individually and collectively to cope with uncertainties
and ambiguities.
Trice and Breyer define two levels of culture: substance and forms. The
substance of culture is made up of ideologies that tell people what is, how it
got that way, and what ought to be. These are shared, emotionally-charged,
taken-for-granted beliefs, values and norms. They are not rationally based
and are resistant to change. They channel actions to repeat apparently
successful behaviour. Cultural forms are accepted ways of expressing,
affirming and communicating these beliefs, values and norms (the substance
of culture). Forms are observable entities, including actions.
Trice and Breyer identify six "major characteristics of cultures": cultures are
collective, emotionally charged, historically based, inherently symbolic,
dynamic and inherently fuzzy. Cultures are collective because they arise as
individuals interact with each other. One individual is insufficient to adopt
and accept a behavior and have it become culture. Culture "Belonging to a
culture involves believing what others believe and doing as they do - at least
part of the time" (Trice & Breyer 1993 p. 5). Cultures are emotionally charged
because they help to manage anxieties, and therefore stem more from
emotional needs than from rational consideration. Cultures are historically
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based because they are functions of the histories that gave rise to them, even
historical circumstances that are no longer present. Cultures are inherently
symbolic. Symbols are the basic unit of cultural communication and
expression. Cultures are dynamic. They are always changing. New people
and technologies join and leave cultures. Individuals try to change cultures.
And communication of cultures to new members is imprecise, especially
given that much of culture is taken for granted. New members are provided
with clues to their cultures, not meanings. Finally, cultures are inherently
fuzzy because they incorporate contradictions, ambiguities, paradoxes, and
confusion. In fact one can define the core and peripheral values of a culture
based upon how contradicted they are by the rest of the culture.
Conversely, Trice and Breyer also identify concepts that they feel are not part
of the concept of culture. They feel that culture is not: climate, groupthink,
social structure or metaphor. Climate and groupthink are two concepts with
fairly specific definitions in the organizational literature that need not be
discussed here. Trice & Breyer come down on the ideational side of Allaire
and Firsirotu's typology. They explicitly state that the social structure and
culture are distinct; in fact they attribute much social change to the interplay
between the social structure and the culture. They also clearly reject the
culture-as-metaphor side of Smircich's typology. to them, organizational
culture is not simply a metaphor for describing organizations, in the same
way that an organization can be described as a machine. "Cultures exist," they
affirm.
Trice and Breyer identify five main consequences of culture, or "things we get
from having culture": management of uncertainties; social order; continuity;
collective identity and commitment; and ethnocentrism.
Culture is used to manage uncertainties. It has been said many times that
people do not enjoy change. Perhaps this is better said as "people do not want
everything in their worlds to change at the same time. They want to be able
to take some things for granted." (Trice & Breyer 1993 p. 9) Cultures supply
consistency and predictability. Consistent with this idea, Kluckhohn noted
that culture seems to develop especially fully around experiences humans
seem to have the least control over (Kluckhohn 1942 p. 68).
50
Independent behaviour by all the different individuals in a society could
potentially be chaotic. But cultures create social order by prescribing
predictable patterns of behaviour. "While...all cultures can be seen as
constraining individual freedom to some degree, people do not reach their
full potential as human beings nor live happily and contentedly without
cultures." (Trice & Breyer 1993 p. 9)
Cultures create continuity through the process of socialization of new
members of the group. If new members are not socialized, their beliefs will
eventually force the culture to change.
People tend to acquire their sense of identity from their place in the culture.
With time, different individuals tend to develop a sense of common identity
and emotional attachment to their group. With this attachment comes
commitment. They do not want to disrupt the culture and so become
committed to its continuation.
People with one set of ideas can come to dislike or fear people with other
ideas. Thus strong cultures can lead to ethnocentrism, where the members of
a group feel superior to members of other groups.
Trice & Breyer also point out that culture also often has 'dual consequences,'
i.e. that culture can lead to consequences with opposing effects. For example,
culture can often have both obvious consequences and hidden consequences,
or both beneficial consequences and harmful consequences.
3.4.3 Kilmann
Kilmann defines culture as
"the shared philosophies, ideologies, values, assumptions, beliefs,
expectations, attitudes, and norms that knit a community together... a
group's agreement, implicit or explicit, on how to approach decisions
and problems." (Kilmann 1985 p. 5)
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He also invokes (slightly modified) Bower's phrase: "the way things are done
around here."
Kilmann sees three "levels of depth" in which culture is manifest:
behavioral norms, hidden assumptions, and human nature.
His behavioral norms are the behaviors and attitudes that organization
members pressure one another to follow. Just below the surface, they are the
unwritten rules of the game. They are not written, but are transmitted by
stories, rites, rituals, and particularly sanctions. Kilmann finds that most
people can list their culture's norms with relative ease.
Below behaviors and attitudes lie hidden assumptions, the fundamental
beliefs behind decisions and actions. These assumptions pertain to: the
nature of the environment, what stakeholders want and need, how
stakeholders make decisions, and which actions stakeholders are likely to take
- both now and in the future. Assumptions are more difficult to examine and
change than norms because questioning them is more threatening to people.
Kilmann believes that at its deepest level, culture includes the "unconscious
dynamics of human nature in group settings," or the collective manifestation
of human wants, motives and desires in a group setting. Aside from such
(relatively) tangible individual characteristics such as mental capacity,
memory or objectivity, Kilmann lists things such as insecurities, desire for
power or control or security, ability to learn, fears, oversensitivity,
dependency and paranoia.
Despite the fact that Kilmann's levels of culture plunge deeper into the
human psyche than most, he actually advocates using a relatively shallow
definition when attempting to manage culture: "...although the deeper
approaches initially seem to be more penetrating, in practice they seem to be
impractical..."
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3.4.4 Dyer
Dyer (1985) feels that culture resides in four different places: artifacts,
perspectives, values, and assumptions.
Artifacts are tangible and overt. They can be verbal, behavioral or physical.
They include: language, stories, myths, rituals, ceremonies, art, attire, layout
and technology.
Perspectives are the rules and norms, both formal and informal, that give the
ways situations are defined and interpreted, and they establish the bounds of
acceptable behavior. They are the coordinated sets of ideas and actions used
in dealing with problematic situations.
Values are broader than perspectives because they apply in all situations.
They are the goals, ideals, standards and sins that are used to evaluate
situations, acts, objects and people.
Assumptions are tacit, unconscious, core beliefs about self, others and the
world. Assumptions form around: the nature of relationships, human
nature, the nature of truth, the environment, and universalism vs.
particularism.
Lundberg (1985 p. 171) also adopts Dyer's definition.
3.4.5 Sathe
Sathe (1985) adopts what he calls a modified version of Schein's three-level
model, except that to him, culture is to be found only in the deepest level.
His three levels are: organizational behavior patterns or behavior,
justifications and communications of behavior, and culture.
His first level is organizational behavior patterns, which include technology,
art, and audible and visible behavior patterns. His second level consists of the
communications used to describe behavior, and its explanations,
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rationalizations and justifications. These are how organization members
"make sense" of the first level.
To Sathe, only the third level is culture. Culture is the "set of important
assumptions (often unstated) that members of a community hold in
common." Culture consists of the actual, internalized beliefs and values
held. Internalizing them is not the same as merely being aware of them or
complying with them.
Beliefs are basic assumptions about the world and how it actually works.
They are based on personal experience and the judgement of trusted others.
Values are basic assumptions about what ideals, or ultimate end states, are
desirable or worth striving for. They are based on personal experience and
one's upbringing.
A person can be unaware of their beliefs or values until they are violated or
changed.
Sathe feels that culture has two major elements: content and strength.
Content comes mainly from the combination of prior assumptions and new
learning, although the business environment contributes as well. An
organizational culture's content gives the direction of behavior, while its
strength gives the intensity of behavior. Cultural strength is a function of
three things: the number of assumptions shared, how widely they are shared,
and the clarity of the ordering of the assumptions.
3.4.6 Deal
Deal and Kennedy (1982) take a very pragmatic approach to culture. Their
book is very testimonial and is meant to motivate managers to change their
corporate culture. Their preferred definition of corporate culture is the
common-sense "the way we do things around here," which they attribute to
Bower. In separate article, Deal (1985) also offers the following definition: a
"learned pattern of unconscious (or semi-conscious) thought, reflected and
reinforced by behavior, that silently and powerfully shapes the experience of a
people." He sees culture as "a concept that captures the subtle, elusive,
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intangible, largely unconscious forces that shape a society or workplace...a
social fiction created by people to give meaning to work and life." Culture
fosters stability, certainty, order, predictability and meaning.
Deal and Kennedy list the following "elements of culture": the business
environment, values, heroes, rites and rituals, and the "cultural network."
They feel that the business environment shapes culture the most. They see
values, which they define as the company's philosophy for achieving success -
as the "bedrock of any corporate culture."
3.4.7 Diamond
To Diamond (1991), "Culture is not simply another variable or isolable
component of organizations. It is what organizations are. Organizational
culture is the product of forms of social invention and interaction that
include:
· "artifacts, physical space, and architectural design
· degrees of formality and informality
* social control that involves professional and institutional modes of
socialization or indoctrination
· shared symbols and meanings found in rituals and myths
· espoused and practiced norms, values, and management
philosophies
· organizational leadership personalities
· groups (units, offices, divisions, etc.) as subcultures
* host cultures that include economic and political task
environments
* critical moments of organizational history"
3.5 No Definition is Best
Which definition is most appropriate for this thesis? Fortunately, one can
look for consistency between companies' cultures and Responsible Care
without having to explicitly adopt or renounce any specific definition of
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organizational culture. In the following chapter I draw heavily, though not
exclusively, on the work of Schein in analyzing Responsible Care from a
cultural perspective. This type of analysis tends to fit more easily into the
"culture as variable" school of thought, however there is no need to ignore
the useful insights from other perspectives.
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Chapter 4
The Cultural Elements of Responsible Care®
4.1 Which Cultural Levels to Analyze
The purpose of this thesis is to address the questions: Do the cultures of
chemical companies reflect Responsible Care? and if they did, how could we
tell?
As seen in Chapter 3, different authors define different "levels" of
organizational culture. These are summarized in Table 4.1. Therefore, a good
first approximation to answer the question "How could we tell if a company's
culture reflected Responsible Care?" would be: "Look at the things listed in
Table 4.1." Or in other words, look at the company's artifacts, behavioral
norms, perspectives, values, beliefs, assumptions, and human nature.
One of the motivations for this thesis is that it is important to be able to
determine if Responsible Care is truly penetrating the cultures of chemical
companies in a fundamental way. This is motivated by the presumption that
only deep changes in a company's culture can approach permanence. There is
no question that a deep penetration of company's cultures would be
accompanied by changed behavioral norms and artifacts. However, changes
in the visible, tangible aspects of company life may not necessarily indicate
changes in the deeper levels of culture. For these reasons, this thesis focuses
on levels of culture deeper than artifacts and behavioural norms. Therefore
artifacts and behavioural norms are not studied. This leaves me with beliefs,
values, assumptions and human nature from Table 4.1.
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Human nature is only listed as part of organizational culture by Kilmann. In
human nature he includes: mental capacity, memory, objectivity,
insecurities, desire for power, desire for security, ability to learn, fears,
oversensitivity, dependency, and paranoia. Though I can offer no proof, it
seems improbable that Responsible Care would attempt to change these
characteristics of human nature. In addition, it seems nearly impossible that I
could determine if such characteristics as found in a company were consistent
with Responsible Care or not. Therefore this thesis does not address human
nature, the deepest level of organizational culture. Note that Kilmann
himself would approve of this decision. He defines culture to include such
deep concepts, but he advocates the use of shallower approaches in practice
(Kilmann 1985 p. 9).
Thus this thesis will focus on the problem of how to determine if the beliefs,
values and assumptions within company cultures are consistent with
Responsible Care. Beliefs, values and assumptions are taken as culture.
4.2 What Types of Beliefs, Values and Assumptions Are Cultural?
The number of beliefs, values and assumptions at play in a chemical
company is probably quite large. To uncover them all seems unrealistic.
Fortunately, the organizational culture literature offers some hints as to
which beliefs, values and assumptions may be 'most' cultural.
As was presented in Chapter 3, Schein defines cultural assumptions as
solutions that the organization has discovered in resolving its problems of
external adaptation and internal integration. Regarding external adaptation,
the organization must develop consensus on its strategy, goals, means for
accomplishing goals, performance measurement and correction mechanisms.
Thus one class of cultural assumptions are assumptions that help the
organization develop consensus around these issues. A second class of
cultural assumptions are assumptions that help the organization solve its
problems of internal integration, that is, assumptions that help it to
determine its: language, criteria for inclusion, criteria for allocating power,
rules for intimacy, criteria for allocating rewards, and its ideology.
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Schein's problems of external adaptation and internal integration give an idea
of which subject areas to look around when searching for culture. But they
do not specify specifically what assumptions to look for. Fortunately, Schein
(1990 p. 114, 1984 p. 6) also identifies "Some underlying dimensions of
organizational culture," or "basic underlying assumptions around which
cultural paradigms form." He suggests that the organizational culture
researcher look for assumptions regarding: the organization's relationship to
its environment, the nature of human activity, the nature of reality and
truth, the nature of time, the nature of human nature, the nature of human
relationships, and homogeneity versus diversity. For example, an
assumption regarding the organization's relationship to its environment
might be that the organization assumes that it dominates its environment.
An assumption regarding the nature of human nature might be that humans
are basically good, or that humans are basically evil.
Schein's suggestions on where to find cultural assumptions are the most
comprehensive of the literature, but Kilmann and Dyer contribute some ideas
in addition. Kilmann et. al. (1985 p. 6) point out that cultural assumptions
can also form around the nature of the organization's environment itself.
For example, what do the stakeholders need? what actions are they likely to
take? And Dyer (1985 p. 205) adds to the list assumptions that are made about
the self, that is assumptions made about the organization by the organization.
He also raises the concept of universalism versus particularism: should
everyone be evaluated by the same standards, or should some be given
preferential treatment? The rest of the literature is largely silent when it
comes to being this specific about precisely what types of beliefs, values or
assumptions form organizational culture. Some may believe that all
organizational beliefs, values or assumptions comprise its culture.
Table 4.2 takes these contributions from Schein, Kilmann and Dyer, and
summarizes the types of questions which - when answered - can form the
basis of cultural assumptions. I have added one or two questions of my own
that seemed appropriate.
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Table 4.2: Cultural Assumptions
ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING:
The environment What is the organization's environment like? Hostile?
Friendly?
Who are the organization's stakeholders?
What do the stakeholders need? What do they want?
How do the stakeholders make decisions?
What are the stakeholders likely to do?
The organization What is the organization like?
What is the organization for?
The organization's Is the organization's relationship with the environment one
relationship with the of dominance, submission, harmonizing, finding an
environment appropriate niche, or what?
Human nature What human attributes are intrinsic?
Is human nature generally good, evil, or neutral?
Is human nature perfectible or not?
Human activity Is it 'right' for humans to be active, dominant, proactive,
passive, self-developmental, harmonizing, fatalistic, or
what?
What is work? What is play?
Human relationships What is the 'right' way for people to relate to each other?
How should power be distributed amongst people?
Are relationships primarily hierarchical, group oriented, or
individualistic?
How should affection be distributed amongst people?
Is life cooperative or competitive?
Should society be based on individualism, group
collaborativism, or communalism?
Is the best authority system autocratic, paternalistic,
collegial, participative, based on law, based on charisma, or
what?
Homogeneity vs. diversity Is the organization better off if it is highly diverse or highly
homogeneous?
Should individuals innovate or conform?
Universalism vs. Should everyone be evaluated by the same standards?
Pa rticularism or should some be treated differently?
Reality and truth What is real?
What is a 'fact'?
How is truth determined? investigation and testing, reliance
on wisdom, social consensus, revelation by authority?
The nature of time Does the organization look to the past, the present, or the
future?
What time horizon is appropriate to consider?
Is time linear or cyclical? monochronic or polychronic?
The nature of space Is space limited or infinite?
Is property communal or individual?
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4.3 Cultural Elements of Responsible Care®
The above discussion tells what types of beliefs, values and assumptions to
look at when looking for Responsible Care in a company's culture. But it
does not tell which specific beliefs, values and assumptions would be
consistent with Responsible Care. Thus the next step is to analyze the
Responsible Care initiative itself, asking the question: what beliefs, values
and assumptions would be present at the 'perfect Responsible Care company'?
Table Al (in Appendix A) presents my analysis of the cultural elements of
Responsible Care. The left hand column consists of the entire text (with two
small exclusions) of the CCPA's Responsible Care document (CCPA 1992a),
sentence-by-sentence. The right hand column includes all the corresponding
beliefs, values and assumptions I could conceive of, again sentence-by-
sentence. These are the elements of culture that Responsible Care implies
should exist within the cultures of chemical companies. Beliefs and values
are relatively easy to see in the Responsible Care text; cultural assumptions
are harder to divine. In divining the cultural assumptions implied by a given
sentence, I was guided by the questions listed in Table 4.2.
The process of generating cultural beliefs, values and assumptions underlying
each sentence of Responsible Care was time consuming, but it was nowhere
near as time consuming as the process of trying to categorize and sort the
results. The right hand column of Table Al contains 1,199 beliefs, values and
assumptions. Several very similar concepts appear several times throughout
the document. Other concepts appear only once in the whole table, implying
that these are not major themes of Responsible Care. After a few false starts,
and a tremendous amount of time and much despair, I distilled the right
hand column of Table Al into the major (and recurring) beliefs, values and
assumptions underlying the Responsible Care initiative. They are discussed
in this section, and summarized in Tables 4.3 through 4.20.
I have organized the major beliefs, values and assumptions of Responsible
Care according to what or whom they concern. For example, Responsible
Care implies certain beliefs, values and assumptions regarding the nature of:
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chemical companies (e.g. their relationship with society, their capabilities,
their effects on others), Responsible Care itself, chemicals, truth, emergencies,
wastes, employees, communities, other parties (e.g. contractors, suppliers,
distributors, customers), emergency response agencies, governments and the
environment.
The process of' distilling a few dozen key cultural elements from the 1,199 raw
beliefs, values and assumptions in Table Al was unavoidably subjective. I
spent an inordinate amount of time trying to make the process as objective as
possible. Nonetheless, several smaller and infrequently mentioned beliefs,
values and assumptions did not make the final cut in what was basically a
subjective decision as to what was most interesting and relevant to this thesis.
No doubt another researcher, with different preconceptions, a different
agenda, and a different cultural background, would have come up with a
different distillation.
The following description of the culture espoused by Responsible Care
includes beliefs, values and assumptions. Usually, the three types of
statements are related and difficult to distinguish. For example, the value:
"The public should know about hazards and risks," may be based upon the
beliefs: "The public deserves to know what hazards and risks companies
present it," "The public doesn't know the hazards and risks companies
present it," and the assumption: "The public can understand hazard and risk
information." It may also lead to the belief: "Companies should proactively
inform the public about hazards and risks." Fortunately there is no real need
to decide which statements are beliefs, which are values and which are
assumptions. All are part of the culture of Responsible Care.
I have used a different font for statements that represent my interpretation of
the culture of Responsible Care, as opposed to my own arguments. Think of
statements in this font as being the words of the fictitious "founder and chief
guru" of Responsible Care:
"So, founder and chief guru of Responsible Care, tell me, what is the world
really like?"
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Well, son, the world is a big place. Is there any specific part of the world you
would like to know about?
4.3.1 Chemical Companies Within Society
"Well, this Responsible Care stuff has me wondering about how chemical
companies fit into society. Tell me about chemical companies and society."
Okay, that sounds like a good place to start. Perhaps this table will help me to
summarize.
Allow me to explain in detail...
The company is the basic, autonomous unit of action in the chemical industry.
Companies have rights, responsibilities, concerns, needs and resources.
Most importantly, chemical companies have the right to exist. Companies will
exist for the long term, and consequently should consider the long term effects
of their activities. Information, methods, practices and feasibility are
fundamentally controlled and determined by each individual company, though
CCPA companies do help one another in some matters.
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Table 4.3 Responsible Care® Beliefs, Values and Assumptions concerning
Chemical Companies Within Society
1 The company is the basic autonomous unit of action. Things are controlled by
each company.
2 Chemical companies have the right to exist.
3 Companies should consider long term effects.
4 CCPA companies help each other in some matters.
5 All companies are subject to the same societal pressures.
6 Companies should all approach the management of chemicals similarly, and take
similar positions on issues.
7 Companies' performance need not be consistent.
8 Companies are distinct from the public.
9 Companies have a role in society to play.
10 Companies are part of, and should be in harmony with, their communities.
11 Companies have obligations to several stakeholders.
12 Stakeholders' views may differ from those of companies.
1 3 Companies should consult with, and understand the needs and concerns of, all
stakeholders.
14 Companies must consider stakeholder concerns and needs. Stakeholder
interests must be addressed.
Though chemical companies are independent, they are all subject to the same
societal pressures and should all respond similarly. They should all approach
the management of chemicals similarly, and take similar positions on political
issues (relating to Responsible Care). Companies' performance, however,
need not be consistent.
Fundamentally, chemical companies are concerned with their own sites, not
those of other chemical companies. Responsible Care cannot directly
address non-CCPA companies.
Chemical companies are a discrete part of Canadian society, distinct from the
public. They have a role to play in society. Companies are part of, and should
be in harmony with, their communities (although not physically: buffer zones
are required for safety).
Labour, interest groups, other business sectors, the public, the CCPA, the
community, employees, customers, contractors, and others onsite are
chemical companies' stakeholders. Other stakeholders may exist or arise.
Companies have responsibilities and obligations to several stakeholders,
including emergency response agencies, the communities in which they
operate, and society in general.
Other stakeholders' views may differ from the views of chemical companies.
Companies should understand the needs and concerns of all stakeholders,
especially the community. Consulting with stakeholders is good. CCPA
companies have done it in the past and advocate it.
Companies must consider stakeholder concerns and needs. Stakeholders'
interests must be addressed when planning minimization and protection
actions. Protection and minimization are more than just technical concepts;
they require the addressing of stakeholders' interests.
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4.3.2 The Responsible Care Initiative
Responsible behaviour is a necessary part of doing business in the chemical
industry, to respond to and address public and community concerns, needs
and expectations. With the Responsible Care initiative, the CCPA has
determined what actions will be necessary to gain public and employee
confidence in chemical industry operations. The initiative has clear intent,
expectations and meaning, though achievement of its goals is not guaranteed.
Responsible Care codes and practices are manifestations of deeper ethics,
values, beliefs and attitudes. The way chemical companies do business is
important, not just "objective" results. Some chemical company activities are
subject to generally-understood standards of acceptability. More and tougher
generally-understood standards for acceptable behaviour in the chemical
industry are necessary. Companies should go beyond the literal requirements
of regulations, laws, chemical lists or traditional definitions. Similarly,
companies are expected to comply with the intent of Responsible Care, not just
its literal meaning.
66
Table 4.4 Responsible Care® Beliefs, Values and Assumptions concerning
The Responsible Care Initiative
15 Responsible behaviour is a necessary part of doing business.
16 The CCPA knows what actions are necessary to gain public and employee
confidence.
17 Responsible Care has clear intent, expectations, and meaning.
18 Responsible Care is a manifestation of deeper ethics, values, beliefs, and
attitudes.
19 More and tougher generally-understood standards for acceptable behaviour in
the chemical industry are necessary.
20 Companies should go beyond the literal requirements of the law, regulations,
chemical lists, traditional definitions, even Codes of Practice.
21 Responsible Care includes all activities, no matter how central or peripheral to
the business, even those not traditionally thought of as risky, and even
those proceeding on a small scale.
22 Activities within and outside Canada are equally subject to Responsible Care.
23 Responsible Care applies to all facilities.
24 There are some limits to Responsible Care's applicability, e.g. small scale test
marketing, foreign suppliers, community awareness for offices.
25 Activities that cannot be done according to Responsible Care must be done at
all.
26 Community awareness is desirable but not essential.
Responsible Care includes all chemical company activities, no matter how
central or peripheral to the business. For example, it addresses mode of
transportation, successive stages of new products' lives, equipment and
containers, siting, closure of sites and "all decisions".
Responsible Care also includes company activities not always perceived as
risky. For example, Responsible Care addresses: new applications of existing
products, hazards of the wastes associated with products; revised processes;
and in-process materials; all items that could easily be missed.
Responsible Care includes activities that take place on a small scale, and
might otherwise be overlooked. For example, research & development, initial
use, lab waste, potential emergencies, small scale test marketing,
construction, commission, start-up, and commercial samples are all subject to
Responsible Care requirements. Actually, small scale test marketing is
addressed by Responsible Care, showing the comprehensiveness of the
initiative, but is subject to weaker hazard communication requirements than
normal sales are, showing, limits to the initiative's comprehensiveness.
Activities within and outside Canada are equally subject to Responsible Care,
with the exception of suppliers outside Canada. Responsible Care -
particularly those sections addressing community awareness, emergency
response and hazardous waste management - applies to all facilities, not just
plants, except that offices do not require community awareness.
Responsible Care is an essential part of doing business. Activities that cannot
be done in accordance with Responsible Care are not done at all. The only
exception is community awareness. It is appropriate to kill projects for
environment, health or safety reasons.
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4.3.3 Chemical Companies' Current Status and Capabilities
Some chemical companies would be inclined to behave irresponsibly without
Responsible Care. Not all companies would or could without industry support.
Companies' performance is not yet up to the standards of Responsible Care.
For example, they do not yet understand products, manage chemicals or
protect health to the degree that they should. Safety practices, performance,
and waste management practices need improvement.
Some of companies' past actions may also have been unacceptable. Not all
consequences of past waste management practices have been found yet.
The industry as a whole must improve, and in a timely manner. Ongoing
progress must be reported to the CCPA. Timetables and milestones are
appropriate. But companies only have to do what's practical.
Collectively, CCPA companies generally have the expertise necessary to
conduct business responsibly. For example, companies know how to
determine environmental sensitivity; companies know which emergency
planning, handling, transportation, cleanup and waste management practices
are responsible; companies can assess whether the capabilities and
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Table 4.5 Responsible Care® Beliefs, Values and Assumptions concerning
Chemical Companies' Current Status and Capabilities
27 Some companies would be inclined to behave irresponsibly were it not for
Responsible Care.
28 Not all companies would or could behave responsibly without industry support.
29 Companies' performance is not yet up to the standards of Responsible Care.
30 Past company actions may have been unacceptable.
31 The industry must improve, and in a timely manner.
32 Ongoing progress must be reported to the CCPA.
33 Companies only have to do what's practicable.
34 Collectively, CCPA companies have the expertise necessary to behave
responsibly.
35 Generally, companies control their products, uses, processes, equipment,
services and facilities, though sometimes not releases or risks.
36 Companies are generally capable of doing the things demanded of them by
Responsible Care.
37 Companies can communicate Responsible Care to others and assist them.
38 Companies do need help from others, especially in dealing with emergencies.
39 Companies can be trusted to make difficult judgement calls.
performance of distributors, suppliers, waste management contractors and
facilities are responsible; and companies can evaluate hazardous waste
management and disposal technologies.
Generally, companies control what goes on with their products, uses,
processes, equipment, services and facilities, although sometimes releases
and risks are not under chemical companies' control, for example
transportation incidents.
Thus, companies are capable of doing the things demanded of them by
Responsible Care. For example, companies can define appropriate
standards, train operators, assess carriers and customers, help carriers, and
participate in improving technology. Companies can also communicate the
importance and the requirements of Responsible Care to others. They can
assist others, such as suppliers, distributors, transporters and customers in
meeting Responsible Care requirements.
Companies do need help from others, especially in dealing with emergencies.
Companies should help each other with emergency response.
There are some things companies cannot do. For example, hazardous waste
cannot always be avoided, recycled, recovered or reused; complete information
concerning previously used disposal sites may not be practicable; and
chemical companies do not treat, dispose or clean up wastes.
Companies can be trusted to determine when actions are "appropriate," when
circumstances are "special," and when wastes are "hazardous."
4.3.4 Management for Responsible Care
'Table 4.6 Responsible Care® Beliefs, Values and Assumptions concerning
Management for Responsible Care
40 Senior management commitment to Responsible Care is important
41 Acceptance or adoption of Responsible Care are insufficient without
implementation and performance of specific practices.
42 Clear assignment of Responsible Care responsibilities is necessary.
43 Responsible Care must be part of planning and business processes and
operations.
44 Management systems are necessary, Activities should be "procedurized."
_ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - A,
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45 Writing policies, standards and procedures down makes them more effective
and responsible.
46 Programs should be kept active and up-to-date; they should change over time.
47 Programs, plans, procedures, policies and standards should be tested and
audited regularly.
48 Responsible Care programs are not always perfect at first; sometimes they
need correction.
49 Companies must improve continuously.
50 Chemical companies will never be perfect.
51 What might be "satisfactory" today will not be satisfactory in future.
52 Changes in company activities can cause new hazards or risks. They should
be recorded and managed.
Senior management commitment to Responsible Care is important because
senior management controls company behaviour.
Commitment is important in spurring action, but Responsible Care pledges
must be fulfilled. Acceptance or adoption are insufficient without
implementation and performance. Clear assignment of responsibilities to
specific people is necessary to ensure action. And specific practices are
necessary, not just general policies and principles. Responsible Care must
be considered in planning at all levels. It must become a part of business
processes and operations in order to be effective.
Responsible Care requires management systems. Activities are made safer
or more effective by planning, controlling and "procedurizing" them. Correct
procedures for all circumstances can be known in advance. "Procedurizing"
can minimize risks. Procedures must be clearly spelled out. Writing down
policies, standards, procedures and results of analyses makes them more
effective and more responsible.
Programs should be kept active. For example, hazard analysis should be
ongoing, and communication and training programs should be maintained.
Programs, plans, procedures, policies and standards must be tested and
audited regularly. Plans, practices, and programs should be updated regularly.
Chemical company Responsible Care programs are not always perfect at first;
they sometimes need improvement. Management systems may not achieve
their purposes. Corrective action is sometimes necessary. In some areas,
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improvement will be slow; continuous improvement is the only way to proceed.
In fact, chemical companies will never be perfect, so they must improve
continuously.
What might be "satisfactory" today will not be satisfactory in the future. New
knowledge and regulation change companies' ability and/or desire to perform.
Policies, standards, procedures and practices should change over time in the
effort to continuously improve.
Change in practices and procedures are necessary and desirable, but
changes to equipment, processes, materials, hardware or software can cause
new hazards or risks. Thus changes should be recorded and managed
carefully.
4.3.5 Chemical Companies' Effects on Others
Chemical companies affect others through their actions and their decisions.
For example, the selection of a site's location can affect the community, the
environment, other industries, utilities, and transportation routes.
'Companies should think about how their actions and decisions affect things
such as the community, the environment, their industrial neighbours, utilities
and transportation routes. Where possible, they should try to characterize their
effect, for example, companies should know what they emit to the environment.
Long-term health and environmental effects are worthy of special attention.
Many chemical industry operations could be hazardous or risky to the public or
the environment. In fact, many industry operations are inherently hazardous
and risky to the public or the environment. Risks arise from several sources,
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Table 4.7 Responsible Care® Beliefs, Values and Assumptions concerning
Chemical Companies' Effects on Others
53 Companies affect others through their actions and decisions.
54 Companies should think about how their actions and decisions affect others.
55 Companies should try to characterize how they affect others.
56 Many operations could be hazardous or risky to the public or the environment.
Many are inherently hazardous or risky.
including the chemicals themselves, the processes used to manufacture and
distribute them, and the wastes they generate.
4.3.6 Chemicals
Table 4.8 Responsible Care® Beliefs, Values and Assumptions concerning
Chemicals
57 Chemical compounds are borne of R&D and proceed through test marketing to
manufacturing.
58 Chemicals have linear lives: they are manufactured, distributed and used, then
they become wastes.
59 New applications for chemicals can arise.
60 Chemicals are inherently hazardous and can harm humans and/or the
environment.
61 Hazards and risks are part of a chemical's character. Chemical products are
not complete without hazard and risk information.
Chemical compounds tend to be born of the chemical industry's own research
efforts. They then proceed through development and test-marketing to full-
scale manufacturing. Once established, chemicals themselves also tend to
live rather linear lives: they are manufactured, distributed, and used. Chemical
products can be used for different applications, and new applications arise as
time passes. After use, chemicals become wastes, which can be managed in
a number of different ways.
Chemicals are inherently hazardous. Hazards pose corresponding risks.
Thus chemicals can adversely affect humans and/or the environment. A
chemical's associated hazards and risks are part of its character. In fact,
chemical products are not complete without information about their hazards
and risks. These hazards and risks depend upon the application to which the
chemical is being put, therefore a new application of an existing chemical is
also not complete without new hazard and risk information.
4.3.7 Hazards, Risks and Truth
Allow me to digress briefly to discuss Responsible Care's views on risks and
truth.
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Risks are associated with hazards. Some hazards are worse than others, and
some risks are worse than others. Risks are at least approximately
quantifiable. Risk numbers are meaningful and worth measuring, controlling
and minimizing. Risk does not have to be eliminated. Some risks are
acceptable, while others aren't. Risks can result in injury or damage. Hazards
and risks are site specific.
Effects on humans and the environment are knowable. In fact, they are at least
partially knowable several years in advance. Potential hazards and potential
impacts are as important to know and document as actual hazards and
impacts. Companies should understand and evaluate potential and actual
hazards and risks as early as possible.
But not all information on hazards and risks is available. Hazards and risks
can change with time (either in reality, or the values calculated can change
thanks to new knowledge). Both potential and actual hazards and impacts
should be evaluated regularly.
Truth, such as required in risk assessment, is established by science and by
experts. As such, experts' opinions are highly valued. Knowledge and
understanding change constantly. Chemical companies must continually work
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Table 4.9 Responsible Care® Beliefs, Values and Assumptions concerning
Hazards, Risks and Truth
62 Some hazards and risks are worse than others.
63 Risks are at least approximately quantifiable, meaningful, and worth measuring
and controlling.
64 Risk does not have to be eliminated. Some risks are acceptable.
65 Effects on humans and the environment are knowable.
66 Potential hazards and potential impacts are as important as actual hazards and
impacts.
67 Companies should evaluate potential and actual hazards and risks as early as
possible.
68 Not all information on hazards and risks is available.
69 Hazards and risks can change with time, and should be evaluated regularly.
70 Truth is established by science and experts.
71 Knowledge and understanding change constantly.
72 Companies must continually work to improve their understanding, knowing that
complete understanding is unlikely.
towards improving their understanding, knowing that complete understanding
is unlikely.
4.3.8 Understanding and Managing Chemical Risks
Because of their inherent riskiness, chemicals, chemical products, their uses
and their applications must be understood and managed. Their associated
hazards and risks must also be understood and managed. And because
chemicals can pose hazards and risks at any point in their life cycles,
chemicals and chemical products must be managed throughout their life
cycles.
Chemical companies know about their chemicals, products and services and
can advise customers and end users who tend to know less. Companies
know about the wastes associated with their products, including which should
be considered hazardous, and where customers may find opportunities for
reduction, reuse, recycling or recovery. Companies consider and form beliefs
concerning which hazard information is vital to the health and safety of the end
user, though they are not certain.
A chemical company has some responsibility for its chemicals, and the
hazards and risks of its chemicals, at all points in their life cycles. Even at
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Table 4.10 Responsible Care® Beliefs, Values and Assumptions concerning
Understanding and Managing Chemical Risks
73 Chemicals, chemical products, and their uses must be understood and managed.
74 Chemicals' associated hazards and risks must be understood and managed.
75 Chemicals and products must be managed throughout their life cycles.
Companies have some responsibility for all points in chemical life cycles.
76 Companies know about their chemicals, products and services and can advise
customers.
77 Companies know about the wastes associated with their products.
78 Companies must protect people and the environment from their chemicals,
products, processes and operations.
79 Companies don't want to hurt society.
80 Companies must not pose unacceptable risks.
81 Companies must ensure risks and effects are acceptable to stakeholders.
82 Effects, hazards, risks, injuries and damages should be reduced and minimized.
83 Effects, hazards, risks can be controlled.
84 Human factors must be considered in risk reduction.
85 The impacts, potential emergencies, hazards, handling and disposal of
chemicals should be considered as early as possible.
points in chemical life cycles where the company does not normally legally
share responsibility for the chemicals, it must assume some moral
responsibility.
Chemical companies must protect people and the environment from their
chemicals, products, processes and operations, including hazardous waste
destruction, treatment, disposal or containment.
Companies don't want to hurt society. Companies must not pose
unacceptable risks. Companies are responsible for ensuring that the risks
and effects of their activities are acceptable to their stakeholders, including the
public. Safeguards should be taken to counter specific risks. For example,
companies should consider alternate transportation modes and routes.
Effects, hazards, risks, injuries and damages should all be reduced and
minimized.
And effects, hazards and risks can be controlled. Companies use several
techniques or strategies to reduce hazards and minimize risks. Technology,
design, procedures and emergency response can all control risks. Human
behaviour affects hazards and risks, so human factors must also be
considered in risk reduction efforts. Controlling risks is another reason for
considering things such as the impacts, potential emergencies, hazards,
handling and disposal of chemicals as early as possible.
4.3.9 Chemical Emergencies
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Table 4.11 Responsible Care® Beliefs, Values and Assumptions concerning
Chemical Emergencies
86 Emergencies can happen, and can happen anywhere
87 Emergencies will always happen; they cannot be totally eliminated.
88 Chemicals are especially important in emergency situations.
89 Companies should prepare for accidents.
90 Companies should consider compensating people dislocated by company
emergencies.
91 The number and consequences of incidents can be reduced (incidents can be
prevented).
92 Health and safety performance can be meaningfully measured.
93 Occupational safety will be an issue for the long term.
Despite efforts to reduce and minimize incidents, emergency situations such
as explosions, fires and releases can still happen, and can still happen
anywhere. In fact, these emergency situations, along with smaller accidents,
incidents, spills and emissions will always happen to a certain extent; they
cannot be totally eliminated. Likewise, the impacts and injuries that can result
from such incidents cannot be totally eliminated. (Even though total elimination
is not possible, the goal of total elimination may still serve as a useful
management tool.)
Chemicals are especially important in emergency situations. Their presence
and character, combined with how they are dealt with, can determine whether
the emergency has insignificant or enormous impacts. Thus accidents
happen sufficiently often and with sufficient consequences that companies
should prepare for them.
People may be dislocated and need money because of an emergency involving
company chemicals. In this case, the company should consider compensating
them for the short term, but not for the long term.
Accidents, incidents, injury and damages to humans or the environment can
also be prevented. Health and safety performance can be meaningfully
measured, and safety can be improved. The number and consequences of
incidents and their impacts can be reduced. Such efforts should be
undertaken, because occupational safety will be an issue for the long term.
4.3.10 Normal Chemical Operations
Table 4.12 Responsible Care® Beliefs, Values and Assumptions concerning
Normal Chemical Operations
94 Chemical facilities and hazardous waste sites tend to have finite lives.
95 Some adverse effects develop only after facilities are closed. Companies must
protect against future latent environmental effects.
96 Companies know the effects, hazards and risks of their operations.
97 Companies can determine which effluents and emissions should be monitored or
controlled.
Chemical company facilities and hazardous waste sites generally have finite
lives. Some adverse effects of company operations develop only after facilities
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are closed. Companies must protect against future latent environmental
impacts. Post-closure effects need only be assessed when a facility is closed.
Companies know the effects, hazards and risks of the operations they use to
manufacture and distribute their products. Companies can determine which
effluents and emissions should be monitored or controlled.
4.3.11 Chemical Wastes
There are two kinds of waste. Some wastes are "hazardous," while others are
not. Chemical companies should decide which wastes to treat as hazardous
based on their own knowledge, and not limit their attention to chemicals found
on regulatory lists. Non-hazardous waste is worthy of concern, but not as much
concern as hazardous waste. Companies are encouraged to apply the same
principles to the management of non-hazardous waste as for hazardous
waste, but it is their choice.
Hazardous wastes can be generated at different points in the life cycles of
chemicals and chemical products, so they must be managed throughout
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Table 4.13 Responsible Care® Beliefs, Values and Assumptions concerning
Chemical Wastes
98 Non-hazardous waste is not worthy of as much concern as hazardous waste.
99 Companies should classify waste as hazardous or non-hazardous based on
their own knowledge, not regulatory lists.
100 Companies are encouraged to apply the same principles to non-hazardous
waste as they do to hazardous waste.
101 Hazardous wastes must be managed throughout chemical and chemical product
life cycles.
102 Companies should look continuously for sources of waste, as these can
change.
103 There is a hierarchy of hazardous waste management options (see Chapter 2
for details). Companies should look for opportunities to move up the
hierarchy as early as possible and continuously.
104 Hazardous waste management and disposal technology improves continuously.
105 Companies should participate in efforts to improve hazardous waste
management technology.
106 Hazardous waste treatment and disposal facilities are desirable. Companies
should promote them.
107 Land should be useable after a hazardous waste treatment or disposal site is
decommissioned.
108 Companies should identify, study and characterize previously used treatment or
disposal sites.
109 Hazardous waste generation should be recorded.
chemical and chemical product life cycles. Waste sources - and the standards
for what makes a source significant - can change with time, so companies
should continuously look for sources of waste.
There is a hierarchy of preferred hazardous waste management options:
Reduction at source is preferred to recycling, recovery or re-use. Recycling,
recovery or re-use are preferred to destruction or treatment that renders the
waste non-hazardous. Destruction or treatment that renders the waste non-
hazardous are preferred to secure containment and monitoring of hazardous
wastes. This is because while landfills and geological formations can be
secure, hazardous waste containment may not stay secure indefinitely. Thus
some waste management processes are presumed to be inherently superior
to others.
Opportunities to eliminate, reduce, reuse or recycle wastes can also change,
so companies should look for opportunities to move up the waste
management hierarchy as early as possible in development, and continuously
thereafter.
Hazardous waste management and disposal technology improves
continuously. The rate of improvements can be increased by chemical
company participation, so companies should participate in technology
improvement efforts.
Notwithstanding the desirability of moving up the hazardous waste
management hierarchy, hazardous waste treatment and disposal facilities are
desirable. Companies should promote the establishment of such facilities.
Hazardous waste treatment or disposal sites can potentially have deleterious
effects on the land they occupy, but the land should be useable after the site is
decommissioned. As such, companies should consider in advance any
effects or land use restrictions that will manifest themselves after a facility or
site is closed.
Companies should identify previously used treatment or disposal sites and
characterize their involvement at these sites as completely as possible. The
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sites themselves should be studied. The nature and quantities of the
materials companies sent to sites is important to know. Hazardous waste
generation and previous hazardous waste disposal should be recorded.
Recovery, recycling or reuse need not be recorded.
4.3.12 Chemical Companv Employees
Employees and the company are different. Employees' behaviour will not
necessarily simply reflect company initiatives.
The work environment is important to employee safety and therefore is
important to monitor. It is different than the ambient environment.
Employees do not have to be isolated from risk, but companies must not pose
unacceptable risks to employees. Companies must protect employees and
others onsite from hazards and risks.
Employees and others onsite deserve information about hazards and risks,
including hazards and risks involved in chemical distribution. Employees
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Table 4.14 Responsible Care® Beliefs, Values and Assumptions concerning
Chemical Company Employees
110 Employee behaviour will not necessarily simply reflect company initiatives.
111 The work environment is important to monitor.
112 Employees do not have to be isolated from risk.
113 Companies must not pose unacceptable risks to employees, and must protect
them.
114 Employees deserve information about hazards and risks and should feel that
they know them.
115 Employee confidence in company activities is desirable.
116 Employees do not know hazards, the law, or how to behave responsibly
without information and training.
117 Employees can understand risk assessment information.
118 Companies should inform and train employees in hazards, the law, standards
and emergency response.
119 Employees may not behave as trained to; they should be assessed and re-
trained as necessary.
120 Individuals have freedom of action at companies and can affect outcomes.
They can help or hinder Responsible Care.
121 All employees must be involved in Responsible Care responsibilities.
122 Individual efforts deserve support and recognition.
123 Responsible Care is good for employee morale and pride.
124 Employees can affect community perceptions. Companies should encourage
them to speak out.
should feel that they know hazards and risks, and that they and the environment
are protected from them.
Employee confidence in company activities is desirable. Employees become
confident of company activities if companies manage them responsibly using
systems.
Employees do not know hazards, the law, or how to behave responsibly without
information and training. However, employees and others onsite can
understand risk assessment information if it is provided to them. Companies
should inform and train employees and contractors in subjects such as
hazards, the law, applicable standards and emergency response. In principle,
employees behave as they have been trained to. However they may not; they
must be assessed and re-trained as necessary.
Individuals have some freedom of action at companies and can affect
outcomes. Individuals can help or hinder Responsible Care. For example,
employees and contractors may be predisposed to ignore regulations.
Individuals should accept Responsible Care responsibilities. All employees
must be involved, share responsibility and act appropriately. Individual efforts
deserve support and recognition, in fact support for individuals will improve
results. Responsible Care is good for employee pride and morale. For
example, the CCPA gives the names of company contact people to the public.
These people take responsibility and have pride in their duties.
Employees and contractors can - and might be encouraged to - affect
community perceptions by speaking out in their communities. Companies
should encourage their employees and contractors to advocate on the
industry's behalf.
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,4.3.13 Communities Around Facilities, and the Public
There is a distinction between the public in general and the communities who
live around chemical facilities or along chemical transportation routes.
Communities around facilities and along transportation routes deserve more
attention from individual companies than the general public does.
Local communities should be treated as well as employees, partly because
they will be around for the long term. Companies want community support, and
want communities to have confidence in company activities. Companies'
standing with their communities and other businesses is important to them.
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Table 4.15 Responsible Care® Beliefs, Values and Assumptions concerning
Communities Around Facilities and the Public
125 Communities around facilities and along transportation routes deserve more
attention than the general public does.
126 Companies want community to have confidence in them. They want to be proud
of their standing with communities and other businesses.
127 Doing Responsible Care increases a company's standing with its community. If
communities understand company activities, they will perceive the company
more favourably.
128 Companies and communities can help each other, including with their images.
129 Public perception and confidence is important and arises from responsible
management using systems.
130 Communities have rights, responsibilities, concerns, needs, resources and
interests.
131 Community interests are sufficiently homogeneous to be represented by
organizations or individuals.
132 Community interests and representatives change over time.
133 Some community members have concerns. Some concerns are "legitimate;"
others are not.
134 Companies can and should understand community rights, concerns and needs.
Citizens and interest groups are worth listening to.
135 Companies should cooperate, coordinate and work with communities.
136 Companies should be open with public, telling it what they are doing if it asks.
Companies should prepare to answer questions.
137 Trade secrets are important to protect.
138 Unauthorized access to facilities threatens safety.
139 Communities and the public do not have to be isolated from risk.
140 Communities have the need and right to know the hazards and risks presented
to them by chemicals and transportation; and corresponding safeguards.
141 Members of communities and the general public are generally unaware and
ignorant of chemicals.
142 Companies should develop information to regularly provide unsolicited to the
community.
143 Communities want to understand and be proud of companies.
144 New areas of public concern arise over time and can grow into major issues.
Public demands change continually.
l
Companies want to be proud of their relationships with their communities.
Because communities and other businesses form perceptions specific to each
chemical company, doing Responsible Care will increase a company's
standing in its community.
Companies' and communities' images are tied to each other. The two can
help each other gain mutual benefits. Wider communities (i.e. the general
public) will judge companies by this relationship. Public perception and
confidence are also important to the chemical industry. The public will become
confident of industry activities if they are managed responsibly using systems.
Companies need to project their commitments to a wide audience in an
attempt to change perceptions.
Communities have rights, responsibilities, concerns, needs, resources and
interests. Community interests are sufficiently homogenous to be represented
by organizations or individuals. Community interests, representatives, and
recollection change over time.
Some people within communities are interested in chemical companies and
have concerns about all types of chemical operations and sites. Some
concerns are "legitimate;" others are not. Companies can and should
understand community rights, concerns and needs, and can determine who
represents the community. Citizens and interest groups are worth listening to.
Companies should cooperate, coordinate, and work with communities.
Companies should prepare for questions, responding to them with
information. Companies should be open with the public, telling it what they
know or are doing if asked. Generally, the onus is on the public to ask for
information; it is not on companies to provide it (some exceptions are
presented below).
Companies cannot be open with all information, however. Trade secrets are
central to companies' competitiveness, which is very important. Trade secrets
belong to companies. Not all company claims of "trade secret" are "legitimate,"
but the secrecy of the legitimate ones must be protected. Protecting trade
secrets and competitiveness is more important than being open with
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communities, except in the case of hazard information. Communities have a
right to know accurate hazard information regardless of trade secrets.
Notwithstanding all this talk of openness, unauthorized access to facilities is a
threat to safety. Facilities are safer if secure.
Communities and the public do not have to be isolated from risk. But
communities need to know the risks companies present it. Communities have
the right to know the hazards, risks and safeguards presented to them by
companies' chemicals, products and transportation. Communities along
chemical transportation routes have the right to know volumes shipped, risks,
and safeguards taken.
Members of communities and the public are generally unaware and ignorant.
Not only may they have questions, but they may need help in finding
information. Communities would not know health and safety information if
companies did not tell them. Companies should develop information to
provide unsolicited to the community on a regular basis to inform it about
chemicals. This communication has a purpose: communities should be
confident that they know the hazards and risks they face.
Communities should be confident that they and the environment are protected
from hazards and risks. Communities should help companies in informing
people and protecting people and the environment. But members of the
community do not know about company practices and standards, and could not
assist in the details of business.
Communities can and want to understand chemical companies. They want to
be proud of their relationship with companies. Communities should include
companies in their emergency response planning.
New areas of public concern arise over time and can grow into major public
issues. Public demands are always changing.
Communities should know about planned improvements in chemical
distribution. If communities understood industry standards, they would
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perceive the industry more favourably. Chemical industry efforts and
commitment deserve recognition; in some cases more than the industry has
received.
4.3.14 Other Parties (e.g. Contractors, Suppliers, Distributors, Customers, etc.)
Responsible Care addresses several other business parties, such as R&D
contract labs, onsite contractors, suppliers, transporters, distributors,
customers, end-users and waste management contractors. Many of the
cultural beliefs, values and assumptions regarding each of these types of
businesses are similar. I have tried to group them together in this section
under the label "other parties." Responsible Care pays particular attention to
some specific parties, notably transporters, distributors and customers. Where
appropriate I have singled out these businesses.
Other parties are handling company products. Because companies must
share responsibility for effects during the whole life cycle of their products,
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Table 4.16 Responsible Care® Beliefs, Values and Assumptions concerning
Other Parties (e.g. Contractors, Suppliers, Distributors, Customers, etc.)
145 Other parties are handling company products.
146 Companies are partly responsible for ensuring that other parties behave
responsibly, including policing them, within limits.
147 The actions of many different parties can affect safety.
148 Other parties are generally held to a subset of Responsible Care standards.
149 Other parties are still fundamentally responsible for their actions.
150 Other parties are only held to Responsible Care standards where company
products are involved.
151 Customers do not have to be isolated from risk; but companies must not pose
unacceptable risks.
152 Other parties' confidence is desirable. Responsible Care will increase
companies' standings with other parties.
153 Other parties may not behave as responsibly as they should.
154 Other parties might not know all hazards and risks.
155 Companies generally know a lot more than other parties.
156 Companies should carefully select the other parties they do business with.
157 Other parties can change their behaviour.
158 Companies should cooperate, coordinate, and work with other parties and
nudge them into responsible behaviour.
159 Companies would jeopardize sales for the sake of Responsible Care.
160 Other parties deserve information on hazards and risks (even potential new
customers).
161 Companies can police the actions of other parties, but only to a certain extent.
162 Companies must verify that other parties are behaving responsibly, but only to a
certain extent.
companies are partly responsible for ensuring that other parties behave
responsibly. Safety can be affected by many different parties, for example,
users, manufacturers, distributors, importers, operators of warehouses and
terminals, carriers, and agencies can all affect distribution safety. Companies
are responsible for policing others, within limits.
Other parties are generally held to some subset of Responsible Care
standards. For example, onsite contractors and toll manufacturers should
perform as employees would; distributors must meet minimum Responsible
Care standards; waste management contractors must be permitted and
behave according to Responsible Care. Because minimum standards are
different for different parties, they should be clearly defined.
Suppliers outside Canada are not subject to Responsible Care requirements.
Other parties are still responsible for their actions. For example, customers
decide whether or not to follow responsible practices. Except in special cases
(as defined by chemical companies), responsibility is fundamentally a
customer responsibility. And other parties are only held to Responsible Care
practices where company products are involved. For example, what waste
management contractors do with others' wastes is up to them.
Customers do not have to be isolated from risk, but companies must not pose
unacceptable risks to customers.
Confidence of other parties in chemical companies is desirable. Doing
Responsible Care will increase a company's standing with other parties.
Other parties, especially distributors and customers, may not handle chemical
products as responsibly as they should. Some transporters are better than
others. Other parties may behave irresponsibly because they do not know
better, or because they are not able to. For example, they may not know as
much about chemicals, products, or services as chemical companies do.
(Note that this assumption applies even to suppliers, who one might think
would know more about their products than their customers, the chemical
companies.) Other parties might not know all hazards and risks. Customers
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may not know how to manage waste or empty containers. Generally,
Responsible Care is built on the assumption that chemical companies know a
lot more than the other parties they deal with (including governments and
communities).
Companies should carefully select their suppliers, distributors, waste
management contractors and disposal sites.
Other parties can change their behaviour. They are equals worth working with.
Companies should cooperate, coordinate, and work with them. For example,
companies should tell customers how to manage wastes and empty
containers. Customers may need assistance in safe handling, use and waste
management, but once they have it they will behave appropriately. Companies
should help others and nudge them into responsible behaviour.
Companies value responsible use enough to jeopardize product sales, for
example by encouraging customer reduction, re-use or and recycling.
Other parties deserve information on hazards and risks. Even potential new
customers should be informed of hazards and risks.
Companies can, to a certain extent, police the actions of suppliers,
transporters, distributors, contractors and customers. Companies can control
policies, standards, analyses, protocols and methodologies at contract labs.
Companies can choose and pressure their suppliers and distributors,
because suppliers and distributors want companies' business. Companies
can control contractors who treat, destroy or dispose of hazardous wastes.
Companies can in some cases require customers to follow Responsible Care
Codes, but can only go so far, and can't force safety.
Companies must verify that other parties are performing responsibly. However,
companies only have to go so far (due diligence) in checking up on the
performance of other parties.
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Customers communicate within their organizations, but not necessarily to end
users. Companies should require customers to pass information along to
end-users.
4.3.15 Emergency Response Agencies
Table 4.17 Responsible Care® Beliefs, Values and Assumptions concerning
Emergency Response Agencies
163 Emergency response agencies may not know all they need to handle chemical
emergencies.
164 Chemical companies have information, expertise, equipment and media relations
skills that would be useful to first responders.
165 Emergency response agencies deserve more information than the public. The
onus is on companies to provide such information.
166 Authorities can help companies with emergency response. Companies should
cooperate.
167 In emergencies, companies are more generous with their people and
possessions than normally.
Emergency response agencies may not know all they need to know to handle
chemical emergencies. Local authorities may not have an integrated
emergency response framework.
Chemical companies have information, expertise, equipment, materials and
media relations skills that the community and first responders would find
useful. Emergency response agencies deserve more information than the
public or communities do. The onus is on chemical companies to provide
emergency response agencies with information.
Local authorities can help chemical companies plan and deal with
emergencies. Companies should cooperate, coordinate, and work with
governments, agencies and authorities. In the case of an emergency or
accident, companies are more generous with their people and possessions
than normally..
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4.3.16 Governments
The government plays an important role in society. Public polices and
regulation can legitimately govern chemical companies' activities and deserve
respect. In fact, some government regulation is necessary. Companies need
regulatory pushes from government, or else they might miss things. The law is
important, affects companies, and they should submit to it.
Laws and regulations can be met in letter, but they can also be met in spirit.
Laws and regulations can be exceeded.
But chemical companies choose whether to know, meet, and/or exceed
regulations, in letter and/or in spirit. And companies and other parties do not
always know or meet laws and regulations.
Regulation is always changing and is generally beyond the control of chemical
companies. But regulatory changes should not be so rapid as to cause
disorder and chaos in the chemical industry.
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Table 4.18 Responsible Care® Beliefs, Values and Assumptions concerning
Governments and Regulation
168 The government plays an important role in society.
169 Public policies and regulation can legitimately govern chemical companies'
activities. Some regulation is necessary.
170 Laws and regulations can be met or exceeded, in letter or in spirit. They are not
always met.
171 Regulations are always changing. But they should not change so fast as to
cause disorder.
172 Government decisions should recognize the views of everyone who is
affected.
173 Current distribution public policies, standards and regulations are out of touch.
174 Governments need help. Companies should proactively participate, assisting
and influencing public policies, standards and regulations.
175 Companies should advocate to governments. They should encourage their
employees to do likewise.
176 Governments should emphasize prevention and industry proaction in their policy
agendas.
177 Voluntary action ("self-regulation") is preferable to regulation. It is important to
demonstrate this.
178 The government deserves a say in determining voluntary industry actions.
179 Companies should tell governments what they know about old waste disposal
sites.
Government decisions should recognize the views of different groups.
Everyone who is affected deserves a say in regulatory development.
Standards, regulations and public policies should be fair, achievable and
based on truth. Current distribution public policies, standards and regulations
are outdated and out of touch.
Governments need help in setting standards. Companies should take the
initiative and work with and assist governments. Companies should
participate in developing standards. Companies should influence public
policies, standards and regulations.
Companies should advocate to, and assist, organizations, associations,
governments and customers in the effort to influence public policies, standards
and regulations. Companies can determine which organizations they should
advocate to. Companies should encourage their employees and contractors to
do the same.
In particular, companies should promote the establishment (and licensing) of
treatment and disposal facilities, and should push governments to emphasize
prevention and industry proaction in their policy agendas.
With Responsible Care, the chemical industry is trying to accomplish "self-
regulation." Voluntary action is preferable to, and can be more effective than,
external regulation. It is important that the industry demonstrate that it can
improve its performance voluntarily. The government deserves a say in
determining appropriate voluntary actions. Companies should check up on
themselves.
Old waste sites are primarily a government responsibility, but companies may
know more than government agencies about old disposal sites. Companies
should tell agencies what they know about old disposal sites.
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4.3.17 The Environment
Environmental protection will be an issue for the long term.
The environment does not have to be isolated from risk, but companies must
not pose unacceptable risks to the environment. Some areas are more
environmentally sensitive than others, and the company can determine which.
The emphasis on local communities means that environmental risks to
uninhabited areas are not explicitly considered by anyone other than chemical
companies themselves.
4.3.18 The CCPA
Table 4.20 Responsible Care® Beliefs, Values and Assumptions concerning
The Canadian Chemical Producers' Association (CCPA)
183 The CCPA represents companies to society and raises awareness.
184 Companies have obligations to the CCPA.
185 The CCPA helps companies. Companies should cooperate, coordinate, and
work with the CCPA.
The CCPA represents companies (as a group) to society and raises
awareness. The CCPA tries to anticipate and stay ahead of public reactions
and issues.
Companies have obligations to CCPA which should be respected. The CCPA
can tell companies what to do. The CCPA wants to be confident that all its
members are responsible.
The CCPA helps companies to meet its expectations. Companies should
cooperate, coordinate, and work with the CCPA. Companies should coordinate
with CCPA programs.
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Table 4.19 Responsible Care® Beliefs, Values and Assumptions concerning
The Environment
180 Environmental protection will be an issue for the long term.
181 The environment does not have to be isolated from risk, but companies must not
pose unacceptable risks to the environment.
182 Companies can determine which areas are more environmentally sensitive than
others.
Chapter 5
Assessing an Organization's Culture:
Methodology
"One belief that many researchers use...is this: Researchers choose a
method on purely rational grounds based on its suitability for the
research subject. In fact, we all develop rationales, almost always
reconstructive, for the methods we use... But researchers' choices of
methods are more complicated than this. Their choices are
conditioned by factors such as their habits of mind, their facility with
certain methods, the acceptance of those methods by the scholarly
community, and the ease with which their use can be explained, to say
nothing about present resources and researchers' own courage.
Sometimes the methods used yield tedious exercises in ersatz
researching. But as Kuhn and many others have made clear, the paths
to knowledge are by no means equivalent to pristine searches for truth,
wherever that may lead, and often peculiarities of circumstance are as
responsible for the form that research takes as any reconstructive
rationale provided by the researcher." (Adams & Ingersoll 1985 p. 229)
5.1 Organizational Culture Research Methodologies
Chapter 4 identified the beliefs, values and cultural assumptions that one
would expect to find at the hypothetical company that has completely and
totally adopted and internalized Responsible Care. The next question - that
addressed in this chapter - is how one would go about determining if (and to
what extent) these beliefs, values and assumptions have been internalized at
a real, actual, company.
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The organizational culture literature - so expansive on the subject of what
organizational culture is - is actually quite slim in regards to how
organizational culture should be 'measured' or 'characterized.' Several
different streams of organizational culture research methodology have
nonetheless arisen. Most prominent among them are ethnography, survey
research and 'clinical research.'
5.1.1 Ethnograph
As has been mentioned, the concept of culture originated in anthropology.
Anthropologists study cultures through the practice of ethnography. For
most social scientists, the ethnographic paradigm is symbolized by the image
of Franz Boaz "stepping off the boat in an [Inuit] village with his suitcase in
hand, preparing for a long stay in residence" (Sanday 1983 p. 19). An
ethnographer spends a long period of time living intimately with the
population he or she is studying. The purpose is to "feel what life is like for
the people in that situation" (Sanday 1983 p. 20).
A classic description of the ethnographic method comes from Conklin:
"...a long period of intimate study and residence in a well-defined
community employing a wide range of observational techniques
including prolonged face-to-face contact with members of local groups,
direct participation in some of the group's activities, and a greater
emphasis on intensive work with informants than on the use of
documentary or survey data." (Conklin 1968 p. 172)
In a sense, the ethnographer merely does the same thing a new member
joining a culture does - though presumably at a quicker pace:
"People everywhere learn their culture by observing other people,
listening to them, and then making inferences. The ethnographer
employs this same process of going beyond what is seen and heard to
infer what people know. It involves reasoning from evidence (what
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we perceive) or from premises (what we assume)." (Spradley 1979 p. 8)
(emphasis in original)
This process is difficult, but not impossible. After all, everyone does it several
times in his or her life.
Anthropological ethnographic studies typically take a year or more to
complete.
5.1.2 Survey Research
The opposite extreme to the ethnography methodology is survey research.
Some students of organizational culture propose that the culture of an
organization - or more to the point, of several organizations in a short period
of time - can be measured by having individual organization members
complete questionnaires concerning their values. Such approaches have
been especially popular in the "how-to" management literature.
The nature of a questionnaire is that the researcher decides which questions
are worth asking, and often also the list of acceptable answers. The researcher
pre-determines the dimensions along which culture will be measured.
Several different sets of "the dimensions of organizational culture" are
proposed in the literature, though they seem to share little in common.
5.1.3 Clinical Research
My selection of questions whose answers form the basis of cultural
assumptions in Chapter 4 was heavily guided by the work of Schein. Schein
(1991) advocates the use of a third methodology for studying the cultures of
organizations, a methodology he terms "clinical research." Using this
methodology, an organizational consultant observes organizational
phenomena as a byproduct of helping his or her client solve a specific
problem. The main advantage to this approach is that organization members
have an incentive to help the consultant researcher unearth their culture.
Another advantage is that in trying to solve a specific problem, the researcher
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"feels" the organizational culture at work in a dynamic situation, rather than
simply observing it.
5.2 The Case Against Survey Research
Measuring organizational culture by questionnaire offers the advantage that a
large number of respondents at a large number of companies can be surveyed
quite quickly. In addition, the data generated this way is easily quantifiable
and easily subjected to 'tried-and-true' statistical analyses. However, this
methodology also involves several drawbacks.
The first problem with surveys is simple to explain: people don't take them
seriously. I know how seriously I take the surveys that I am asked to
complete. If I fill them in at all, I do so with haste and without much
thought.
A second problem with surveys is that their intentions can be easily
misunderstood. Respondents can think that they are being tested in some
way, and may try to provide "right" answers instead of responding according
to their own beliefs. Such behaviour would be fatal for this thesis, because
the "right" answers are widely available to chemical industry employees in
the form of the document "Responsible Care: A Total Commitment" (CCPA
1992a) (this is the document that appears in the left hand column of Table
Al). Respondents might simply look for survey answers in this document.
And even if respondents did respond purely according to their own beliefs,
this might in itself invalidate the survey methodology as a means of
measuring organizational culture. If culture is a set of shared beliefs, values
and assumptions, then individual responses are unlikely to grasp the shared
essence of the culture.
A fourth objection to the survey methodology is based on the belief that
language and semantics are central to culture:
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"Both tacit and explicit culture are revealed through speech, both in
casual comments and in lengthy interviews. Because language is the
primary means for transmitting culture from one generation to the
next, much of any culture is encoded in linguistic form." (Spradley 1979
p. 9 )
If culture is encoded in linguistic form, as Spradley suggests, then preparing
questions for a survey in advance is impossible, because until the researcher
understands the culture, he or she cannot phrase his or her questions in the
terms of the culture: "until you know the question that someone in the
culture is responding to you can't know many things about the responses."
(Black & Metzger 1965 p. 144)
Subtle differences in language semantics from culture to culture can lead to
misunderstandings. The respondent can misunderstand the researcher's
intended question and therefore answer a different question. Or, the
respondent can translate either the question or the answer into terms he or
she thinks the researcher will understand. This also leads to distorted results.
Spradley (1979, pp. 18-19) uses the following example to illustrate the point: If
you ask a tramp: "Where do you live?", he will assume that you - as
someone from outside the tramp culture - really want to know something
like: "Do you have a room, a house, or an apartment with an address?" and
will answer: "I don't have a home." On the other hand, if you were to ask:
"Where do you usually make a flop?", you might get an answer referring to a
car, a mission, a place of work, or a bedroll. And with a little further
exploration, you might discover that in fact one of the most important
identity features of a tramp is the kind of homebase he has. The knowledge
to phrase the question in terms of "making a flop" would probably not be
gained via a survey with pre-determined questions.
On a level more general than semantics, surveys pre-determine the
dimensions along which culture is to be measured. This upsets scholars who
believe that cultures must be understood in their own terms, not the terms of
another culture. Mintzberg:
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"As soon as the researcher insists on forcing the organization into
abstract categories - into his (sic) terms instead of its own - he is reduced
to using perceptual measures, which often distort the reality... He gets
answers, all right, ready for the computer; what he does not get is any
idea of what he has measured." (Mintzberg 1983 p. 111)
Depending on their design, questionnaires can also pre-determine the
acceptable values that the answers to each pre-determined cultural dimension
are allowed to take on.
A final problem with surveying to determine cultural beliefs, values and
assumptions lies in the fact that the holders of taken-for-granted assumptions
are at best only dimly aware that they hold these assumptions. Bringing these
assumptions to the surface requires more probing than a survey can
accomplish.
Some of the problems given above - for example the problem of people not
taking surveys seriously, or the problem of people responding with "right"
answers - may be overcome by administering the survey verbally. But once
the researcher has the respondent in a "live" conversation, he or she may as
well try to overcome some of the other problems, for example, he or she
could probe to uncover new dimensions of the culture or taken-for-granted
assumptions. This would be a good idea, but could no longer be considered a
survey. It would take the researcher into the realm of ethnography, which is
discussed (and recommended in modified form) in the next section.
Because my objective is to look for specific aspects of companies'
organizational culture and assess their consistency with Responsible Care,
pre-determining the dimensions along which to measure organizational
culture may not be inappropriate for this thesis. But the remaining
disadvantages of the survey methodology easily outweigh the time and
volume advantages it offers, at least for my purposes. Therefore I did not use
surveys.
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Note that the problems associated with survey research do not all vanish
when using ethnography or 'clinical research.' However, these two
methodologies come closer to addressing and resolving these problems.
5.3 Qualitative vs. Ouantitative Research
By dismissing survey research, I have left myself with methodologies (such as
ethnography and clinical research) that require much more commitment on
the part of the individuals in the culture being studied than surveys do. This
means that only a small number of organizational cultures, and/or people
within those cultures, can be studied. This makes the use of statistical
techniques difficult or impossible. Indeed, one of the most difficult and
central problems with using qualitative data in the social sciences is that
methods of analysis are not well-formulated or widely-accepted:
"It is fair to say that by the best current standards, analysis of qualitative
data is a mysterious, half-formulated art." (Miles 1983 p. 122)
There are no clear conventions, and very few guidelines. In particular, there
is no well-developed method for comparing analyses at different sites, which
exacerbates the problem of small numbers (Miles 1983 pp. 122, 129).
In addition, some traditionally-held rules of research are deliberately ignored
in qualitative research:
"Certain kinds of reliability must be intentionally violated in order to
gain a depth of understanding about the situation (i.e. the observer's
behavior must change from subject to subject, unique questions must
be asked of different subjects...) ...there is an inherent conflict between
validity [meaningful results] and reliability [traditional rules for
research]..." (Sieber, in Miles 1983 p. 126)
Most culture researchers do not see this as a problem. For example,
Mintzberg (1983 p. 107) argues that small samples often yield more useful
results - results that are more significant than "statistically significant" data.
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In fact, there is probably more "unconventional" research into organizational
cultures in the literature than "conventional" research. Hofstede et al. (1990
p. 286) point to "a dearth of ordinary research as taught by standard behavioral
research methodology textbooks" in the organizational culture literature.
5.4 Schein's Recommendations
If the organizational literature is slim on the subject of general culture
research methodology, it is almost non-existent when it comes to
recommending specific methodologies to use in measuring organizational
culture. Only Schein does so (1984 1990 1991).
Schein would approve of my decision not to use'survey research. He believes
that culture surveys that purport to tell organizations what the important
elements of their cultures are, based on a set of individual interview or
survey responses, lead to superficial and possibly invalid data (1991 p. 14).
Regarding ethnography and clinical research, however, Schein's
recommendations have evolved over time.
In 1984 (p. 13), Schein prescribed four approaches, to be used in combination,
for deciphering an organizational culture. The first was to analyze the process
and content of new members socialization. By interviewing supervisors and
older peers of new members, as well as the new members themselves, the
researcher may learn what things are passed on to new members. The second
was to analyze responses to critical incidents, or crises, in the organization's
history. Such crises are often major periods of culture formation. The
researcher should look for major themes in the explanations organization
members offer for the actions taken during crises. The third was to analyze
the beliefs, values and assumptions of "culture creators or carriers". And the
fourth was to explore jointly with insiders the puzzling features uncovered in
interviews.
In this joint-inquiry (the fourth approach), selected members of the group
work with the researcher to uncover the unconscious assumptions that are
98
hypothesized to be the essence of the culture. To bring unconscious cognitive
processes back to awareness, the insider must represent the culture, and must
be interested in disclosing his or her own basic assumptions. The researcher
helps to uncover the assumptions by asking the right kinds of questions
(Schein 1984 pp. 4, 12-13).
By 1990 (p. 111), Schein had altered his recommendation to a combination of
ethnographic fieldwork methods and clinical and consulting interview and
observation methods. Open-ended interviews of the style used in
ethnography would be useful in trying to learn why certain observed
phenomena happen the way they do and trying to learn how people feel and
think. But because culture is a dynamic process within organizations, he
suggested, it would be best studied by action research methods, that is,
methods that attempt to "intervene" in the culture and get insiders involved,
like in clinical or consulting work.
Thus Schein (1991 pp. 4-5, 7) now advocates "clinical research," the
observation, elicitation, and reporting of data that are available when a
consultant is actively engaged in helping an organization. Someone in the
organization has requested some form of help. The researcher ("clinician")
comes into the situation in response to the needs of the organization (client),
not his or her own needs to gather data. The organization wants something,
is willing to pay for it, and, most important, lay itself open to being
questioned by the clinician on matters that may be regarded under other
circumstances as private or secret, or "dirty linen." The clinician is expected
to intervene, which allows new data about the organization to be surfaced.
Schein (1991 pp. 3-9) uses the following arguments to make the case for using
clinical research instead of ethnography.
First, Schein observes that the ethnographer has to gain entry to a site and
establish him or herself as "someone who will not be too great a pain to have
around." He contends that there is nothing in this situation that would
motivate an organization member to put much time or effort into helping
the ethnographer, and nothing in the situation that would motivate the
organization member to reveal some of his or her deepest observations or
99
attitudes. For example, if the subject refuses to answer the ethnographer's
questions because they are 'none of his or her business', little has been learned
and the ethnographer has no legitimate right to pursue the matter. The
clinician, on the other hand, is permitted and expected to continue probing.
Second, Schein cites Lewin's observation that one cannot understand a
human system without trying to change it, and argues that it is in attempting
to change a system that some of its most important characteristics reveal
themselves. Schein contends that even the most talented ethnographer -
who makes observations without disturbing the situation - would not
discover such phenomena unless he or she happened to be present when
someone else was trying to produce some change.
Specifically, Schein (1991 pp. 15-19) prescribes the following system for clinical
research of organizational culture:
* Do not agree to help an organization decipher its culture unless it has a
specific problem it is trying to solve.
* Get the group that wants to solve the problem to come together as a group
to learn to decipher its own culture. Explain organizational culture to
them.
* Ask the group to describe the organization's major cultural artifacts and to
record all of these on a set of flipcharts which are hung around the room.
It is important to start with concrete artifacts so that the group has plenty
of data to look at when it later tries to infer underlying assumptions. A
good way to start this discussion is to ask the people with the lowest
seniority to describe what it was like to enter the organization.
* Work in a group. This is essential because members stimulate each
others' thinking and we are, after all, seeking data about a construct that is
by definition shared. Shared things are easier to locate in a group than to
infer from individual interviews.
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* Discuss values, some explicit and espoused, some more taken-for-granted
and in need of surfacing. After a couple of hours some of the underlying
assumptions become quite obvious and, more importantly, the domains
in which important assumptions are held become obvious. Culture is
both extensive and intensive; not everything in a culture is relevant to the
specific problem at hand, so identifying the relevant domains of the
culture is important.
c Historical reconstruction is useful. Identify the values and attitudes of
founders, early leaders, and current powerful figures to make concrete
what members often feel only as vague abstractions. Ask the group about
major events, crisis or otherwise, to focus on how assumptions influence
what was perceived and learned at those times.
* There is no such thing as a good culture or a bad culture. Only by
referencing a particular problem is it possible to decide whether a given
cultural assumption aids, hinders, or is irrelevant. Make this
determination. Then discuss mechanisms by which aspects of the culture
might be modified.
Schein admits that this clinical process does not produce a complete
publishable account of the organization's culture, but he maintains that it
provides
"...a much better picture of culture dynamics than would have been
elicited from interviews or questionnaires, and possibly, even
participant observation [a technique of ethnography]. Most important,
it identifies fairly rapidly, often within one day, those cultural
assumptions that are salient and relevant to a particular organizational
problem. That is far more helpful to organizations than months of
interviewing and surveying, and important new data are revealed as
the clinician/consultant watches the organization deal with its own
cultural realities." (Schein 1991 p. 23)
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5.5 A Hybrid Approach
Schein's clinical research sounds appealing. However, a few issues prevent
its unmodified use in this thesis. Most obviously and most importantly, I am
not a management consultant. I cannot offer my services to an organization
to help them solve a specific problem. Thus I cannot establish the kind of
clinical relationship that Schein advocates. I can give no reason for being
present at a company, other than to conduct research.
The ethnographic approach is not perfectly suited to this thesis either. The
purpose of ethnography is to generate a set of instructions to a culture that a
stranger could use to anticipate the scenes of the society studied (Sanday 1983
p. 22). The entire culture is to be described. In this thesis, however, I am
looking for specific beliefs, values and assumptions at chemical companies.
There may be other parts of companies' cultures that I can ignore, although I
would be unwise to do so without first carefully considering their potential
relevance to Responsible Care.
A second problem with ethnography as normally practiced is that it is
tremendously time consuming. Although open-ended interviews are
recommended to avoid the problem of pre-determining the dimensions
along which culture is to be measured, Miles (1983 p. 119) warns of the danger
of gathering too much data:
"The risk is not that of 'imposing' a self-binding framework, but that an
incoherent, bulky, irrelevant, meaningless set of observations may be
produced, which no one can (or even wants to) make sense of."
Thus both ethnography and clinical research offer desirable characteristics in
measuring organizational culture, but neither is completely practicable in the
context of this thesis. What was required for this thesis was a methodology
that tried to focus person-to-person interviews while maintaining as much
'open-ended' ethnographic character to the interviews as possible, and tried to
create a researcher-organization relationship as close to the desirable clinical
relationship as possible.
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The methodology I used in this thesis is presented in this section, with
reference to each of the desirable and undesirable characteristics of survey
research, ethnography and clinical research. Hopefully my approach may be
useful for others in the future.
5.5.1 Basic Procedure
Entry to Canadian chemical companies was obtained by contacting the
Canadian Chemical Producers' Association (CCPA) and explaining the nature
of the research project. The CCPA then approached some of its members that
it felt might be interested in such a study. Three Canadian chemical
companies agreed to participate in this thesis. One was used solely to test out
my research methodology; results from the other two are presented in this
thesis.
I visited people at their place of work and interviewed them for anywhere
from 15 minutes to an-hour-and-a-half, though generally for about an hour.
The first people I spoke to would be the key people who had been involved in
Responsible C are implementation and diffusion since the beginning. They
would recommend to me other people who I should talk to; though I was free
to request different people. In the end I spoke to sixteen different people at
the two different companies. These people are listed in Table 5.1. As part of
the test-run of: my methodology, I also spoke to five people at a third
company.
I did not have a list of questions to ask during the interviews; instead I had a
list of subject areas I wanted to steer conversations through. These subject
areas corresponded to the cultural beliefs, values and assumptions implied by
Responsible Care, as presented in Chapter 4 (Tables 4.3 through 4.20). If,
during his or her interview, an interviewee affirmed a cultural element of
Responsible Care without my having asked directly for it, then I considered it
one piece of evidence suggesting conformance of the company culture to the
culture implied by Responsible Care. If an interviewee contradicted a
Responsible Care cultural element, then I considered it one piece of evidence
suggesting non-conformance. In an interviewee did not address an issue area
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of importance to the culture implied by Responsible Care, the result was
inconclusive. It could be that the company culture neither reflected nor
contradicted the cultural element. It could also be that I failed to steer the
discussion towards that issue area.
Table 5.1 Persons Interviewed 6
Company Person Position
ET Heinz Winnett Vice-President, Operations
Alan Williams Toronto 7 Plant Manager
Daryl Reed Vice-President, Corporate Accounts
Ron Cash Manager, Customer Service
Ken Kavon Manager, Sales
Larry Baker Environmental Manager, Plant Operations
Larry Thompson Varennes Plant Manager
Francine George Environmental Coordinator, Toronto Plant
Randy Nuse Senior Vice-President
Michael Law General Manager, Manufacturing
SM Charlie Woods President
Donald McNees Vice-President, Operations &
Environmental Affairs
Bob Claggett Minager, Sales
Angie Emmert Manager, Inventory & Customer Service
Mark Rutter Manager, Health, Safety & Environment
David Carter Senior Engineer
Each of the following subsections identifies an issue in the measurement of
organizational culture (including several that have been mentioned already),
and explains what measures (if any) I took to address the issue in the context
of this thesis.
6Individual names were randomly selected from TPP's own Greater Oklahoma City Telephone
Directory, 1986. The reader may draw his or her own conclusions about Oklahoma City. ET and
SM are also pseudonyms.
7Plant locations have been changed for this thesis.
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,.5.2 The Researcher
In their study of twenty different organizational cultures, Hofstede et. al. (1990
p. 290) used interviewers who were "deliberately naive about the type of
activity going on in the unit studied." Spradley, too, argues that the
researcher should be unfamiliar with the culture to be studied. If the
researcher shares taken-for-granted assumptions with organizational
members, he or she will miss those aspects of the organizational culture
because they do not catch his or her attention.
A corollary to this argument is that the researcher should come from a
culture that organization members do not understand, so that they cannot
translate their culture into different terms for the benefit of the researcher,
thereby handicapping the discovery of their organizational culture. (Sanday
1983 p. 20)
There is a tradeoff between such cultural independence and rapport. Sanday
(1983 p. 20) describes this as "the need [of the researcher] to identify with and
at the same time to remain distant from the process being studied."
Developing rapport is discussed separately below, but for now it is sufficient
to say that it may be easier for the researcher to gain entry, acceptance, and
willingness-to-talk, if organization members perceive him or her as 'one of
us.
A related requirement is that the researcher should have prior experience in
another culture, so as to be more sensitive to his or her own cultural
assumptions.
This thesis was mine; there was no choice of researcher. I have worked in an
industry very similar to the chemical industry (the industrial gas industry),
although in different geographic regions that the companies I studied for this
thesis. I did study chemical engineering at school, and presumably a
significant number of my interviewees at least partially understand the
culture of a graduate student. I do have experience in other cultures.
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Because, as Van Maanen (1983 p. 50) points out, "it is by and large the
differences from one's own world (and unexpected similarities) that find their
way into one's field notes," a different researcher, with different cultural
assumptions, would have arrived at a different interpretation of the cultures
at the companies I visited, as well as a different interpretation of the cultural
implications of Responsible Care.
5.5.3 Cultures and Subcultures
Louis (1985 p. 128) points out that it is important to know how widely the
taken-for-granted understandings of the culture are shared, that is, what the
boundaries of the culture are. An organization may house several cultures,
which could be homogeneous or heterogeneous (Schein 1984).
In this thesis I looked for evidence of the Responsible Care culture in the
cultures of chemical companies. Because I interviewed less than a dozen
people at each company, representing a wide variety of functional positions, I
did not look for distinct subcultures within each company, though some were
pointed out to me. I had no way of knowing if different people's different
beliefs, values and assumptions were the result of different individuals'
beliefs, values and assumptions, or the result of different organizational
subcultures. Thus I did not study subcultures, but I allowed the 'overall'
culture to be heterogeneous. The selection of interviewees reflected a bias
towards head office management.
5.5.4 Interviewees
According to Spradley, some of the most persistent problems in performing
ethnography come from failure to locate good "informants," i.e. interviewees.
Ideal interviewees have four characteristics. First, they are thoroughly
enculturated: they know the culture very well, and not just through formal
training or indoctrination. Second, they are currently involved in the
culture. This is necessary so that they still speak the language. It also avoids
the possibility that they have left the culture because they reject it. Third, they
have sufficient time to participate. And fourth, they don't try to translate
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their culture into the researcher's terms, and don't categorize their knowledge
in ways different than the ways most members of their culture do.
V'an Maanen adds that different informants know more or less about what
actually goes on. Those who profess and abide by the rules may actually know
the least about what actually happens. Thus it is important that the
researcher somehow establish the limits of an interviewee's expertise.
For the case of chemical companies and Responsible Care, organizational
culture has purportedly changed considerably in the last few years. If this is
indeed true, then years of experience with the existing culture is probably
impossible and irrelevant. The people I interviewed were all still involved
in their cultures. All had the time to participate. Because they knew of my
chemical engineering background, I believe they translated little for me. I
tried to gauge my interviewees' expertise based on what little I know about
companies such as theirs, but of course I could not do so with certainty.
5.5.5 Culture Champions
As mentioned previously, Schein (1984 p. 13) suggests analyzing the beliefs,
values and assumptions of "culture creators or carriers," such as founders,
early leaders, and current powerful figures. At both companies, I spoke to
people in charge of Responsible Care implementation, people who had been
involved with Responsible Care since its inception, and senior management
in charge of the company's operations. Those who had been involved with
Responsible Care since the start - the Responsible Care champions - offered
especially useful insights regarding the spread of the Responsible Care culture
through the company.
5-5.6 New Employees
Schein and Louis also suggest analyzing the process and content of the
socialization of new members, to learn what aspects of organizational culture
are passed on to new members.
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I interviewed one new employee at the two companies I studied. The
Canadian chemical industry has had little opportunity to hire new people in
the last few years; thus this avenue of organizational culture research was not
really available. I did speak to a plant manager about new employee training,
but he had only trained two or three new employees since Responsible Care's
inception.
5.5.7 Disruptions
Schein, Louis and Van Maanen all point to disruptions in normal patterns of
behaviour, such as major events, critical incidents and crises, as strategic
incidents to study for cultural insight. New management, reorganization, or
new members make old-timers more aware of their shared understandings
(Louis 1985 p. 133). Van Maanen points out that (1983 p. 47): "...it is the
empirical exception that often displays the analytic rule."
The Canadian chemical industry has certainly had its share of disruptions in
the last few years. In my interviews, I seldom had to ask about critical
incidents that formed - or were affected by - organizational culture vis-a-vis
Responsible Care. Interviewees probably couldn't retell the history of
Responsible Care without reference to several such incidents.
In addition, consider that the organizational culture of chemical companies
has purportedly changed considerably in the last several years regarding
issues such as those addressed by Responsible Care. If this is so, then
employees may still be aware of the differences between their new
organizational culture and the previous one. I certainly found this to be true.
5.5.8 Groups
Schein recommends working with a group of insiders when seeking data
about culture, a construct that is by definition shared. However, the
difficulties of scheduling meetings of several people, some of whom
(including myself) are based in different cities, are significant, particularly on
a small budget. In the end, I could schedule no such group sessions. I would
have liked to.
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5.5.9 Focus on a Specific Problem
Schein's clinical research methodology is based on not deciphering an
organization's culture unless it has a specific problem it is trying to solve.
This is very difficult for an inexperienced Master's student to accomplish. In
my initial correspondence with the CCPA and individual companies, I tried
to invoke the argument that companies could use the results of their
participation in my research to improve the effectiveness of their Responsible
Care efforts. (This argument was based on the presumption that their
participation would increase their awareness of the interplay between their
organizational cultures and Responsible Care.) I don't think any of them took
my argument seriously, however, and probably with justification - I found
several people within each company who were already acutely aware of this
interplay.
.5.10 Attempt Change
Schein's clinical research is also based on the belief that organizational culture
is best studied while trying to change it. He argues that an ethnographer
could only achieve equivalent insights if he or she was present when
someone else was trying to produce change.
Again, there is no way I would be enlisted to help change a chemical
company's culture. Fortunately, however, others within the companies - the
Responsible Care champions - are. Hopefully by talking to them, I gained at
least some of the insights available to someone trying to change the system.
Several referred to obstacles they had encountered.
5.5.11 Pre-determined Cultural Dimensions
One of the criticisms of surveys is that they pre-determine the dimensions
along which culture is to be measured, instead of understanding them in
their own terms. My "steered" interviews attempted to explore certain
domains of the organizational culture (those that correspond to the cultural
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elements implied by Responsible Care) more thoroughly than others, without
rigidly defining every topic and question to be addressed.
5.5.12 Individualism
Another criticism of surveys is that individual responses are unlikely to grasp
the shared beliefs, values and assumptions of organizational culture. In large
part, my individual interviews suffered from the same problem, although
moving from a solo written form to a two-person verbal interview did at
least take my interviews one step closer to a group setting such as those in
which organizational culture is played out. (Group interviews or sessions are
difficult to schedule, as mentioned previously.)
5.5.13 Joint Inquiry
Schein advocates joint exploration with insiders of the puzzling cultural
assumptions uncovered in interviews. I engaged in a little of this type of
questioning in some of my interviews, although not as much as would
probably be desirable. Interviews took place over such a short period of time
(to minimize travel costs) that no rigorous search for 'puzzling cultural
assumptions' was possible in time for the next interview. I only pursued the
ones that were evident to me during interviews.
5.5.14 Being Taken Seriously
My first criticism of surveys was that people don't take them seriously. For
my interviews, I found that by virtue of having flown in from another
country at MIT's expense, I was taken seriously. And as per Thomas (1993 p.
94), I found it relatively easy to frame my interest in terms that might pique
others' interests.
5.5.15 Motivating the Interviewee
Schein contends that there is nothing in an ethnographic interview situation
to motivate an organization member to reveal his or her deepest
observations or attitudes. In this regard, there was nothing I could do to elicit
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trust other than attempt to build rapport and come across as non-threatening.
Only someone within one of the companies will be able to judge for certain to
what depth I was able to learn about their organization's culture vis-a-vis
Responsible Care.
5.5.16 Rapport
Developing rapport with the interviewee is so important that Spradley
describes an ethnographic interview as having two purposes: developing
rapport and eliciting information.
According to Spradley (1979 pp. 78-83), rapport develops through the
following four steps: apprehension, exploration, cooperation, and finally
participation. At first, when the interviewee is apprehensive, the researcher
should get and keep him or her talking, perhaps by asking him or her to
describe something. The researcher should listen, show interest, and respond
in a non-judgmental fashion. As the interview progresses, both the
interviewee and the interviewer will relax and engage in exploration, to
become familiar with the new relationship. In this phase, the researcher
should repeatedly explain what it is he or she is trying to accomplish with the
interview. The researcher should restate (without re-interpreting) what
interviewees say in a non-judgmental way. Meanings (why things are) are
not yet solicited, only usage (how things are used). When the interviewee
reaches the point where he or she is comfortable asking questions of the
interviewer, then the interview has reached the cooperation step. When he
or she brings new information to the researcher's attention in an effort to
help the research, then it has reached the participation step.
Spradley (1979 p. 26) also points out that in some cultures, tacit rules (e.g.
respect for trade secrets) make asking or answering questions taboo, and that
in any culture, people often think the researcher has a hidden agenda and
don't trust him or her. He recommends a few minutes of easygoing talk
interspersed here and there throughout the interview - it pays enormous
dividends in rapport.
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In my interviews I paid a lot of attention to building rapport. Most of the
time I had no trouble getting people to talk at length about Responsible Care
and their feelings towards it. Sometimes I strayed off into unrelated
conversation (for example about one person's upcoming relocation to
Houston), and sometimes the interviewee would question me at length about
my research or my career plans. I even went for a beer with an interviewee
who clearly understood a lot about building rapport.
5.5.17 Tape Recorder Use
A tape recorder is the best way to get a verbatim record of interviews. In
Hofstede et. al.'s study (1990 p. 290) interviews were taped. Mirvis (1985 p.
213) taped his interviews, but allowed 'timeouts' and 'off-the-record.'
But Schein (1991 p. 1) warns of a story in which a culture researcher was
asked: "Do you want me to tell you the official story or do you want me to tell
you what really happened?" and when he answered that he wanted to know
what really happened, was told: "In that case you better turn that tape
recorder off."
Noting that tape recording may threaten or inhibit interviewees, Spradley
(1979 p. 74) proposes three general guidelines for tape recorder use: always
bring a tape recorder just in case; go slow, normally not introducing the tape
recorder until the second or third interview; and, watch for opportunities to
record even small parts of interviews.
He notes that
"It is possible to do good ethnography without a tape recorder; it is not
possible to do good ethnography without rapport..." (Spradley 1979 p.
74)
I did not tape - or ask to tape - any interviews. In almost all cases, I was
interviewing someone whom I had never met before. I felt that the presence
of a tape recorder would prevent my building rapport, alter the conversations
I had, and diminish my learning about the organization's culture. Note that
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both Schein and Spradley, representing the clinical research and ethnographic
perspectives respectively, would agree with this decision for an interviewee's
first interview.
5.5.18 Interview Notes
Whether or not the interview is being taped, the researcher must still take
notes. Spradley (1979 pp. 71-73) recommends two principles: First, the
researcher should identify the language (organizational culture or
researcher's culture) used for each entry in his or her notes. It is common to
fall into using an amalgamated language but this distorts cultural meanings.
Second, notes should be verbatim, without translations or distortions. A
partial verbatim record is better than a more complete summary.
As soon as possible after an interview, notes should be revisited to fill in
details and add things remembered. The final interview notes should be
understandable to someone other than the researcher. Spradley also
recommends keeping a journal in which the researcher's feelings and biases
are recorded - remember the ethnographer is a researcher him or herself.
Thomas (1993 p. 91) recommends sending an abbreviated transcript or a
summary to the interviewee to get clarification and prompt additional data.
He admits this can be laborious, but says it keeps lines of communication
open.
I took lengthy notes during interviews and tried to get direct quotes where I
could. I often fell behind the conversation in my notes - though my catch-up
time tended to encourage interviewees to elaborate on their last thoughts. I
believe that I filtered concepts from my notes too much. If the conversation
wandered from the Responsible Care topics I wanted to discuss, I tended to
take fewer notes. Also, as I heard the same stories for the second or third time
(from different people) I tended to take fewer notes. I suspect that I did use an
amalgamated language in my notes and in hindsight I should not have. I
have borne this in mind in my analysis of my results. I did not keep a
journal of my feelings. I did not send summaries to my interviewees for
clarification, though if I had had more time I would have liked to.
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5.5.19 Knowing the Language
A criticism of the survey methodology is that the researcher cannot
understand the responses until he or she knows that the questions mean in
the language of the culture studied.
I believe this was not a significant issue in this thesis. Before I began
conducting interviews, I had reviewed materials provided to me by each
company, and by the CCPA. I had also previously worked in a similar
industry. Thus I believe I knew at least some of the language before
beginning interviews, and as with all ethnographic interviews, one of my
tasks was to learn more of it.
5.5.20 Believability
Towards the end of my very last interview for this thesis, my interviewee
asked me: "How do you know I'm not feeding you a load of bullshit?"
There are a number of ways in which the researcher (or anyone else) can be
misled by the information interviewees tell him or her. Most obviously,
people can lie. Because people tend to lie about things that matter most to
them, people may lie about deeply-held cultural beliefs or assumptions, for a
whole variety of reasons. People can also avoid issues that the researcher
does not know to ask about. Interviewees can easily steer around items such
as hidden personal failings, "rotten apples" within the organization, or
collective secrets. Finally, interviewees can simply be wrong or misled
themselves, and unwittingly pass on incorrect information. For example,
people within a culture are sometimes totally unaware of certain aspects
underlying many of their own activities. It was Kluckhohn who pointed out
that "It would hardly be fish who discovered the existence of water."8
A distinction more subtle than simply "facts" vs. "lies" may be more useful.
The researcher's ability to derive cultural assumptions from what
8This quote is referred to frequently in the organizational culture literature, usually without
reference. It must be a taken-for-granted part of culture researchers' culture.
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interviewees say depends of course upon how much he or she believes the
directly observable "facts" he or she has found. These facts can be
"presentational" or "operational." The ethnographer must be able to
determine which are which, or else risk deriving faulty cultural concepts
(Van Maanen 1983 p. 42). Van Maanen defines operational and
presentational data as follows:
"...operational data deal with observed activity (behavior per se) and
presentational data deal with the appearances put forth by informants
as these activities are talked about..." (Van Maanen 1983 p. 42)
Presentational data are:
"...appearances informants strive to maintain (or enhance) in the eyes
of the fieldworker, outsiders and strangers in general, work colleagues,
close and intimate associates, and to varying degrees, themselves."
(Van Maanen 1983 p. 42)
Van Maanen likens the difference between operational and presentational
data to the difference between fact and fiction. He argues that the
ethnographer must continually attend to keeping operational and
presentational data separate.
"..ethnography (and everyday life) is as much 'believing is seeing' as it
is 'seeing is believing'... evaluating the believability of what one hears
and sees is critical..." (Van Maanen 1983 p. 44)
Of course, the fact that members of the culture strive to maintain these
appearances is part of the culture. But it is important not to interpret the
appearances as reality unless they are.
Thomas points out that executives, who speak in public often, may be
especially presentational:
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"...it is quite common to watch an executive mentally 'rewinding the
tape' in search of an appropriate phrase or monologue that appears to
accord to a particular question." (Thomas 1993 p. 89)
Both the companies I visited had already passed the Responsible Care
compliance verification process. Thus both companies had already been
subjected to scrutiny by interviewers with more sensitive "lie-detectors" than
mine. Also, because I interviewed several people and checked for
consistency, I can also discount the likelihood that I was told individual lies. I
was either treated to a co-ordinated show, or I was told the truth.
I was told of a few personal failings, rotten apples and collective secrets (most
of which do not appear in this thesis). This leads me to believe that the
picture I was painted was at least partially accurate.
An initiative with as much emphasis on relations with the outside world as
Responsible Care includes much presentational data. Plant managers and
others speak to the public regularly. I tried continually to distinguish between
operational and presentational data as suggested by Van Maanen. I also tried
to spot people 'rewinding the tape.' I believe I heard some well-practiced
schpiels on more than occasion; I also believe these were still instructive.
All in all, I must state that my gut feeling is that I was not told the whole
truth, but that I was told most of it, and that I was never fed a "load of
bullshit."
5.5.21 "Right" Answers
A problem with surveys is that respondents might think they are being tested
in some way, and might try to provide "right" answers from Responsible Care
documentation.
This is less of an issue in a personal interview, where there is opportunity to
stress that it is individual opinions that are sought, but still happens. Most of
the people I spoke to are well aware that Responsible Care prescribes certain
ways they are supposed to behave, and sometimes refer to Responsible Care
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documents when they are in doubt - including when being interviewed by a
student. By and large, however, I think the one-on-one format, including
probing follow-up questions, avoided the simple repetition of "right"
answers.
5.5.22 Listing Artifacts
Schein recommends describing the organization's major cultural artifacts
before trying to infer underlying assumptions. I did not make a deliberate
effort to discuss artifacts with my interviewees but several were necessary to
discuss before proceeding to a discussion of deeper beliefs, values and
assumptions.
5.5.23 Probing for Taken-for-Granted Assumptions
According to Schein, deciphering a culture is a matter of surfacing
assumptions that will not be too unfamiliar once they are uncovered. One of
the reasons I dismissed surveys above was because this requires more probing
than a survey can accomplish.
The heart of the ethnographic interview method is the art of drawing out the
interviewee's cultural assumptions, or "background expectancies," from
interview statements. Van Maanen describes this as
"...perhaps the most difficult yet most interesting goal of the
ethnographic enterprise...Even when dealing with directly observable
behavior, it is sometimes quite difficult for an observer to grasp its
contextual meaning to those whose behavior is being described." (Van
Maanen 1983 pp. 41,42)
As an example, he describes a situation in which
"...the meaning of 'call jumping' to an informant was self-evident and
in no need of explanation while to me its meaning was almost totally
obscured by my [initial] ignorance of police work." (Van Maanen 1983
p. 41)
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In addition, the researcher may find it difficult to see anything more than
what organization members can see and relate themselves:
"...[the] fieldworker may find it difficult to generalize...from specific
practices (operational data) without merely parroting back the
normative abstractions (presentational data) used by members of the
studied group to both describe and account for their behavior." (Van
Maanen 1983 p. 44)
I found my one-pass interview schedule, in which I normally did not see the
same person twice, and in which I did not revisit interviewees after having
analyzed my interview notes, to be a real hindrance in attempting to ferret
out cultural assumptions. I discuss this more in Chapter 7 (Conclusions).
Nonetheless, I believe I was able to surface a number of cultural assumptions.
5.5.24 Determining Relevance
Schein's clinical research focuses in on the parts of an organizational culture
relevant to a specific problem. By informing interviewees about my research
purpose and by steering the interviews towards areas of Responsible Care
cultural elements, I was able to focus my gathering of data about the
companies' cultures without predetermining exactly which dimensions were
relevant or irrelevant.
5.5.25 Avoiding Theories
As the researcher gathers data in the field, he or she inevitably starts to form
hypotheses in his or her mind about the culture being studied. This is
natural; it is how deeper concepts are elicited. If not careful, however, the
researcher can fall into a trap where the only things that he or she observes
and writes down in his or her notes are those that support these mental
hypotheses. Miles (1983 p. 124) calls this "self-delusion."
Van Maanen (1983 p. 37) argues that it is part of human nature that:
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"we tend...to theorize well in advance of our facts thus allowing for the
possibility that the facts that emerge from our studies are twisted to fit a
given theory."
This issue was very relevant for this thesis, because I derived the list of
cultural beliefs, values and assumptions that I looked for at companies from a
cultural analysis of the Responsible Care text, and not from information
gathered in my interviews. This analysis was very conducive to hypothesis
forming. In the effort to avoid taking pre-conceived theories into my
interviews, once I had determined the subject areas I wanted to cover, I did
not look at the list of cultural beliefs, values and assumptions that I would
eventually be analyzing my interview notes for.
5.5.26 Testing Hypotheses
In ethnography, each inference regarding a deeper concept is at first simply a
hypothesis, which must then be tested over and over (in subsequent
ethnographic interviews) before it is accepted (Spradley 1979 p. 8). For this
thesis, travel and time considerations by-and-large prevented repeat
interviews. Hypotheses were not tested over and over.
5.5.27 Peripheral Vision
The researcher should spend time discovering aspects of the organizational
culture that he or she had not anticipated: "Peripheral vision, poking around
in relevant places, a good dose of creativity - that is what makes good
research, and always has, in all fields" (Mintzberg 1983 p. 109). "Ethnographic
research is guided as much from drift as design..." (Van Maanen 1983 p. 38).
Within the limited time available to me, I explored issues that caught my
attention. Some appear in Chapter 6.
5.5.28 Miscellaneous
Interviewing depends on a cluster of interpersonal skills (Spradley 1979 p. 46):
asking questions, listening instead of talking, taking a passive rather than an
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assertive role, expressing verbal interest in the other person, showing interest
by eye contact and other non-verbal means.
Spradley lists the following components of an ethnographic interview:
* ethnographic explanations
* ethnographic questions
* asymmetrical turn taking
* expression of interest in interviewee's world
* expression of ignorance of interviewee's culture
* repetition of same questions and endless clarification
* restatement of interviewee's terms
* incorporation of interviewee's terms into questions
* creation of hypothetical situations
* asking of friendly questions
* encouragement of expansion of every concept into more and more detail
The researcher should make it clear that it is the individual, not the position
or the organization, who is being interviewed (Thomas 1993 p. 85). And
questions can be phrased personally ("what do you do?") or culturally ("what
do most people do?"). Either may be appropriate at different times.
Schein recommends systematically covering all of his problems of external
adaptation and internal integration at some point.
5.6 Ethics
Mirvis (1985 p. 212) points out that "In some research disciplines, workers are
encouraged to 'go underground,' and deception is accepted as simply one of
the rules of the game." But ethnography is no such discipline. Spradley (1979
p. 34) presents the following ethical principles:
* consider interviewees first
* safeguard interviewees' rights, interests, and sensitivities
* communicate research objectives
* protect the privacy of interviewees
* don't exploit interviewees
* make reports available to interviewees
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Different people I spoke to criticized colleagues, told me of activities of
questionable legal status, or said things that portrayed their company or
industry in a bad light. To protect the privacy and the interests of the
individuals who were so candid with me, I do not provide summaries of my
interviews in this thesis. Only individual quotes are given. I realize that this
does not provide the reader with sufficient information to verify my analysis
or my conclusions. I do not feel that the academic objectives of this thesis
have been hindered by this decision. Fundamentally the reader must trust
the integrity of myself, my supervisors and MIT.
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Chapter 6
Analysis of Interviews for Responsible Care®
Beliefs, Values and Assumptions
6.1 Analysis Procedure
Analysis of interview notes proceeded in a straightforward, albeit time-
consuming, way. Using an enormous matrix (598 rows by 185 columns), I
examined my interview notes to find evidence supporting or contradicting
each of the Responsible Care cultural beliefs, values and assumptions
identified in Chapter 4 (Tables 4.3 through 4.20). For each of the 185
Responsible Care beliefs, values or assumptions, I examined the evidence I
had gathered and determined:
1) if I had sufficient evidence to form a hypothesis regarding the presence of
the belief, value or assumption in ET's culture,
2) what that hypothesis should be,
3) if I had sufficient evidence to form a hypothesis regarding the presence of
the belief, value or assumption in SM's culture, and
4) what that hypothesis should be.
Based upon my interview notes (and my memory), I drew inferences about
the organizational cultures at ET and SM. As Spradley (1979 p. 8) has pointed
out, "At first, each cultural inference is only a hypothesis about what people
know. These hypotheses must be tested over and over..." The cultural
inferences I drew about ET and SM were normally based upon just one
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interview with each person, and were not tested over and over. Thus they
are best thought of as hypotheses, not conclusions.
6.2 Analysis Results
Each of the following subsections (6.2.1 through 6.2.18) addresses one of the
eighteen areas of Responsible Care culture, as given in section 4.3. This
arbitrary categorization made writing this thesis tractable, but does
occasionally obscure common threads that arise in different of the eighteen
areas. Each subsection has two components: a summary table, and a
discussion of hypotheses.
Each summary table lists all of the Responsible Care cultural beliefs, values or
assumptions for that subsection (given in the corresponding table in section
4.3). For each one, it also provides a quick hint of the hypothesis (if any) that
can be advanced regarding that belief, value or assumption at each of the two
companies I visited.
Please bear in mind that generating hypotheses regarding whether a
Responsible Care cultural belief, value or assumption is or is not present at a
company is a much more complex process than can be captured in a table
entry such as 'yes,' 'no,' 'not yet,' or 'in part.' For this reason, the summary
tables include only the hypotheses about which I am most confident. Blank
entries in these tables imply that I did not gather sufficient evidence to
confidently generate a hypothesis regarding the particular belief, value or
assumption. Some of the most interesting observations I made arose from
too few interviews to report in my summary tables. Perhaps one of the most
difficult aspects of writing this thesis was resisting the urge to hypothesize
based on little gems of intriguing but unrepresentative information.
If I had done a perfect job of steering interview conversations through my list
of Responsible Care beliefs, values and assumptions, then they would all be
fully addressed - at least implicitly - in my interview notes. Time, attention to
rapport, and my own inexperience prevented such perfection, however, and
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some Responsible Care beliefs, values and assumptions remain incompletely
explored.
I believe it is interesting to make a distinction between aspects of Responsible
Care culture that are new to the chemical industry, and aspects that reflect
pre-existing chemical industry culture. I think it is interesting to observe
which aspects of each type were affirmed or contradicted at ET and SM. For
this reason, in Tables 6.2.1 through 6.2.18 I have italicized Responsible Care
beliefs, values and assumptions that I believe represent relatively new
concepts for the chemical industry. I have no personal expertise nor body of
knowledge to justify the distinctions I have made; the reader who rejects my
qualifications to make such distinctions should ignore the italics.
The discussions that follow each summary table focus in on the beliefs,
values and assumptions within that section for which I gathered the most - or
the most interesting - data. Some of these discussions start with phrases like
"I got the impression that..." or "People seemed to imply that..." I suspect that
these phrases do not sound very convincing to the reader who wasn't there.
These cultural inferences were based on people's conversations regarding
general subject areas, instead of talk about specific actions, incidents or
decisions. Even though they are difficult to report or explain convincingly, I
believe that they are still valid.
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6.2.1 Chemical Companies Within Society
The company is the basic autonomous unit of action
Everyone I spoke with seemed to focus their attention on company activities.
For example, all plans, budgets and actions consider company activities only.
The people I interviewed certainly took for granted that most important
decisions are made at the company level. As interviewees spoke, I was often
left with the impression that larger issues were interesting to them only
insofar as they affect the company (either ET or SM). Sales managers at both
companies displayed pride when speaking of their Responsible Care customer
relations being ahead of the "rest of the industry."
125
Table 6.1 Chemical Companies and Society
Responsible Care Cultural Belief, Value or Is it Reflected in the Culture at:
Assumption (blank means insufficient data)
ET? SM? Comments
The company is the basic autonomous unit of yes yes
action. Things are controlled by each company.
Chemical companies have the right to exist. no no should exist, yes
Companies should consider long term effects.
CCPA companies help each other in some matters. in fact they do
All companies are subject to the same societal yes yes regulation
pressures.
Companies should all approach the management of sort industry initiative
chemicals similarly, and take similar positions on of
issues.
Companies' performance need not be consistent. performance is not
consistent
Companies are distinct from the public. yes yes
Companies have a role in society to play. yes yes
Companies are part of, and should be in harmony not beginning are there
with, their communities. yet at ET
Companies have obligations to several stakeholders. yes
Stakeholders' views may differ from those of yes
companies.
Companies should consult with, and understand the beginnings are there
needs and concerns of, all stakeholders. at ET
Companies must consider stakeholder concerns and some evidence at ET
needs. Stakeholder interests must be addressed.
Chemical companies have the right to exist
I found considerable concern at both companies that they might not survive
if onerous regulation were to make them uncompetitive. Responsible Care
was seen as a strategy for survival. Interviewees believed that companies
should exist, that companies will fight hard to exist, but not that companies
have the right to exist.
Companies' performance need not be consistent
As interviewees described different practices and events at different
companies (customers, neighbours, etc.), they cannot help but acknowledge
that companies' Responsible Care performance is not consistent. Some
seemed to feel that it would be preferable if performance were consistent
across companies; however others seemed to enjoy their leadership role.
Companies are distinct from the public
Interviewees' talk thoroughly reflected the assumption that those who work
for chemical companies are very different from the general public, and vice
versa. For several examples see the different assumptions people made about
chemical companies capabilities, employees and the public (subsections 3, 12
and 13).
Companies have a role in society to play
Several people I spoke with at both companies cited contributions that their
companies and the industry have made to society. Through Responsible Care
they credited themselves with showing that voluntary initiatives can work.
Winnett pointed to ET's participation in the development of Canadian
Standards Association and International Standards Organization standards, as
well as ET's objections (which were ignored) to plans for low-density housing
in the vicinity of its Toronto plant due to safety concerns. People at both
companies described with pride their consultations with community
representatives. Law cited with approval ET's efforts during the design phase
to "build a social foundation" for its recently-constructed plant at Edmonton.
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Rutter at SM pointed with pride to the chemical industry's leadership of other
industries in the area of responsible business practices. SM's Woods referred
to the federal Conservative government's Green Plan, which mentioned
Responsible Care as a model for other industries.
Companies are part of, and should be in harmony with, their communities
[nterviewees at both companies acknowledged that they are supposed to be
fully involved with their communities, but said that opening up to the
community is difficult and does not come naturally. People spoke highly of
the initial actions that have been taken. Law described ET's public
consultations during the design of its Edmonton facility, as well as its decision
to maintain the land outside the fence in such a way as to fit in the area.
Carter said he was just warming to his visits to schools on behalf of SM when
he was moved to another project. The belief that companies should be in
harmony with their communities seemed to be beginning to penetrate the
company cultures.
Companies have obligations to several stakeholders
The people I spoke with at both companies identified several stakeholders,
such as unions, communities, society, shareholders, the public and
government inspectors. Actually, ET plant manager Williams argued that
"Just about everybody is a stakeholder if you think about it." People also
seemed to acknowledge at least partial obligations towards stakeholders.
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6.2.2 The Responsible Care Initiative
Responsible behaviour is a necessary part of doing business
The people I spoke to believed that Responsible Care is a necessary part of
their business, though the purpose they had in mind seemed to be nowhere
as altruistic as "to respond to and address public and community concerns,
needs and expectations." Responsible Care was seen as necessary to ensure
competitiveness, both directly and indirectly by avoiding regulation.
Increased environmental, health and safety performance was seen as carrying
a return on investment through avoided costs. SM's McNees said that
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Table 6.2 The Responsible Care Initiative
Responsible Care Cultural Belief, Value or Is it Reflected in the Culture at:
Assumption (blank means insufficient data)
ET? SM? Comments
Responsible behaviour is a necessary part of doing yes yes
business.
The CCPA knows what actions are necessary to
gain public and employee confidence.
Responsible Care has clear intent, expectations, no
and meaning.
Responsible Care is a manifestation of deeper not not also to avoid costs
ethics, values, beliefs, and attitudes. fully fully and regulation
More and tougher generally-understood standards
for acceptable behaviour in the chemical industry are
necessary.
Companies should go beyond the literal yes yes
requirements of the law, regulations, chemical lists,
traditional definitions, even Codes of Practice.
Responsible Care includes all activities, no matter not not much more than
how central or peripheral to the business, even fully fully before,not
those not traditionally thought of as risky, and even completely yet
those proceeding on a small scale.
Activities within and outside Canada are equally
subject to Responsible Care.
Responsible Care applies to all facilities.
There are some limits to Responsible Care's
applicability, e.g. small scale test marketing,
foreign suppliers, community awareness for offices.
Activities that cannot be done according to not in the short term
Responsible Care must be done at all.
Community awareness is desirable but not essential. yes yes community
awareness not in
place yet
without Responsible Care, a company will put "more effort into patches and
quick fixes, and that will hurt competitiveness." ET's Baker concurred: "The
amount of resources you have to devote to spills is flabbergasting." More
prevalently, it was seen as necessary to avoid accidents that can cause a
regulatory reaction: "Mississauga-style incidents hurt." (ET's Cash) "Too
much regulation and litigation is very costly." (ET's Nuse) 'Addressing
public and community concerns, needs and expectations' seemed to be
desirable only insofar as it would lead to a more favourable regulatory
climate.
Responsible Care has clear intent, expectations and meaning
Most everyone I spoke to could articulate an intent and meaning of
Responsible Care. But I would not characterize the intent, expectations and
meaning of Responsible Care as clear, because I heard several different
versions, from 'improve performance then go to the public to change their
minds,' to 'avoid regulation,' to 'avoid costs associated with accidents.' There
was also a feeling that the purpose of Responsible Care had evolved over
time and that the definition of acceptable behaviour had also evolved, and
would continue to evolve.
Ambiguity in the requirements and purpose of Responsible Care was seen as
both good and bad. McNees of SM pointed out that on the one hand it makes
implementation harder: "The clarity of purpose was not there, and that's
difficult." But Baker of ET pointed out that on the other hand it allows
standards of behaviour to change. Baker said that people at ET try to invoke
Responsible Care when arguing for specific projects, but are really just using it
to imply rightness:
"People don't say 'In the good old days...' anymore. Now they say
'According to Responsible Care...' What they're really saying is 'What I
think is best is...' Now people extend Responsible Care beyond its
original boundaries. And that's good. Any new idea that's the right
thing to do, people call it Responsible Care."
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Woods of SM pointed out that when companies first signed on to
Responsible Care, they had no idea what it would entail. Thus I hypothesize
that the intent, expectations and meaning of Responsible Care are not clear at
SM or ET.
Responsible Care is a manifestation of deeper ethics, values, beliefs, attitudes
ET plant manager Williams said that "Responsible Care is not a program, it's
an initiative, a culture, with no start or end." At SM, the people I spoke with
acknowledged that the deeper ethics, beliefs, values and attitudes of
Responsible Care were not present at SM when it first signed on to the
initiative. Cash of ET pointed out that there are also "very fundamental
business interests at stake" (through avoided regulation) that can motivate
responsible behaviour: "That's why business is in." At both companies,
interviewees spoke of the Responsible Care "message," and said that it had
not yet permeated every aspect of company operations, especially at the plant
level. SM's Rutter said that plant workers have "the ethic," but don't tie it to
the larger picture of Responsible Care.
At both companies, people cited with approval numerous examples of their
company incurring costs despite their yielding virtually no return. For
example, ET's Winnett said "We've spent $3.1 million on reinforcing the
chlorine tanks. There's no payback there." The implication was that the
companies took actions just because they thought it was the right thing to do,
and interviewees approved. At SM, several people referred to morals and
ethics in describing the effects of Responsible Care at the company.
It is very possible that Responsible Care practices were adopted for one reason
- the largely self-serving motivation of avoided regulation, but that as they
are increasingly practiced, they take root in the culture for other reasons. I
hypothesize that in SM's management levels, Responsible Care is a
manifestation of deeper ethics, values, beliefs and attitudes. At ET, the
actions are taken, but they do not seem to have achieved "deeper ethics"
status yet.
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Companies should go beyond literal requirements
At both companies, it was clear that people believed in going beyond the
literal requirements of the law or regulations. After all, most of Responsible
Care is beyond law and previous common practice. ET's customer
assessments, which are even beyond Responsible Care, are described by its
employees with pride. McNees of SM refers to (unwritten) standards for
acceptable Responsible Care practices as becoming more and more stringent
all the time. Several examples of spending extra money on safety,
environment or community relations, where strictly speaking the company
could have avoided the expense, were quoted with approval by interviewees
at ET. People at both companies spoke of wanting to do Responsible Care
better than the competition.
Responsible Care includes all activities
People at both companies pointed out with approval that Responsible Care
has them considering several things that they would never have otherwise
considered. ET's Williams: "Responsible Care has triggered a lot of thought
and action in areas where there's been no treading before." Interviewees
mentioned attention to such not-traditionally-thought-of activities as office
safety, sales, start-up, and land use. ET's Williams also pointed out that
procedures help to ensure that Responsible Care is always considered.
Interviewees still thought of some activities as not relevant to Responsible
Care, such as SM's suppliers' contaminated drums, or ET's non-regulatory
raw materials, but from their standpoint it seemed that these days
Responsible Care was relevant to just about everything. People at both
companies seemed to assume that Responsible Care addresses a lot more
activities than have traditionally been addressed, even if it did not yet assume
that it addresses all activities.
Activities within and outside Canada are equally subject to Responsible Care
People at ET spoke of their site assessments at US customers with pride,
supporting the assumption that Responsible Care applies within and outside
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Canada. On the other hand, at SM, Emmert spoke of shipping expired
product to its US parent in a way that seemed to assume that once the product
left the country, it was no longer worth thinking about.
There are some limits to Responsible Care's applicability
At ET, there was definitely the feeling that there are limits to Responsible
Care. Kavon spoke of "massaging" the customer business discontinuance
policy because it was "too cavalier" with customers. Reed hinted that
responsibility is in the eyes of the beholder: "Balancing the initiative is most
difficult. Different people have different levels of safety." He also spoke of
being "careful not to overkill." Winnett felt that the communication of
'worst-case scenarios' to the public was beyond Responsible Care: "Nowhere
in the blue book does it say 'worst-case scenario."' But, with regard to what is
actually written in the 'blue book,' V.P. Nuse affirmed: "...there's nothing in
Responsible Care that shouldn't be there."
Activities that cannot be done according to Responsible Care must be done
Interviewees did not seem to believe that activities should be ceased if
Responsible Care implementation proves difficult, at least not in the short
term. People felt that companies should improve as quickly as they can, and
that companies had been improving as quickly as they could. Carter argued
that products that SM drops will simply be made and sold by another
company. Thus in his mind, shutting down activities that - though not up to
the standards of Responsible Care - are safer than usual for that activity, may
actually defeat Responsible Care's purposes.
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6.2.3 Chemical Companies' Current Status and Capabilities
Table 6.3 Current Status and Capabilities
Responsible Care Cultural Belief, Value or Is it Reflected in the Culture at:
Assumption (blank means insufficient data)
ET? SM? Comments
Some companies would be inclined to behave yes yes
irresponsibly were it not for Responsible Care.
Not all companies would or could behave yes yes
responsibly without industry support.
Companies' performance is not yet up to the yes
standards of Responsible Care.
Past company actions may have been yes yes
unacceptable.
The industry must improve, and in a timely manner. yes yes "timely" only at ET
Ongoing progress must be reported to the CCPA.
Companies only have to do what's practicable. not not
fully fully
Collectively, CCPA companies have the expertise yes ET feels it has the
necessary to behave responsibly. expertise itself
Generally, companies control their products, uses, yes
processes, equipment, services and facilities,
though sometimes not releases or risks.
Companies are generally capable of doing the yes yes with difficulty
things demanded of them by Responsible Care.
Companies can communicate Responsible Care to
others and assist them.
Companies do need help from others, especially in no
dealing with emergencies.
Companies can be trusted to make difficult yes yes calls have to be
judgement calls. made, with or
without trust
Companies only have to do what's practicable
At both companies there was conflicting evidence regarding the belief that
companies only have to do what's practicable for Responsible Care. At ET
there was controversy over how far to take the responsibility to ensure proper
customer handling of chemicals. Some felt Responsible Care had been taken
too far, while others (those who took things that far) would clearly disagree.
At SM, Woods spoke of pushing improvement even though it was becoming
harder and harder, while Carter set the clear limit of improving as fast as
economically practicable, arguing "better that we stay in business and
improve as fast as economically practical. Someone else will make it if we
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don't." My sense was that at SM, the assumption was that SM can only do
what's practical, but the belief was that it should try its best.
Collectively, companies have the expertise to behave responsibly
Interviewees at ET displayed clear optimism that they could figure out how to
do the things required by Responsible Care themselves. At SM, on the other
hand, McNees admitted: "We learned as we went. We didn't really know
what we were doing."
Companies can communicate Responsible Care to others and assist them
There was uncertainty surrounding the belief that companies can
communicate Responsible Care to others and assist them with it. ET felt that
its customers were happy with Responsible Care, but admitted
communicating with the community was difficult. SM had to bully some of
its customers into participating in Responsible Care assessments.
Companies need help from others, especially in dealing with emergencies
ET interviewees never spoke of needing help from others, whether
concerning emergencies or anything else. This can probably be attributed to
senior V.P. Nuse's leadership style. He told me the story of how in 1989,
when he asked his managers if they could achieve Responsible Care
compliance by 1992, they answered 'We'll need help.' His answer to them:
"No, we're going to provide help. We're going to become leaders."
Companies can be trusted to make difficult judgement calls
Interviewees at both companies cited with pride several examples of difficult
judgement calls they and their companies had had to make. For example,
Winnett pointed to 70 acres adjacent to ET's Toronto site that the company
could sell for a half-million dollars an acre, but that ET has refused to sell.
SM's McNees described a decision to stop producing a product that was
already on backorder, in order to more fully investigate a runaway
polymerization (the investigation was not strictly necessary, just cautious).
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He pointed out that "The plant didn't complain. These things [Responsible
Care decisions] are very well established."
My impression was that Responsible Care's assumption that companies can
be trusted to make difficult judgement calls was replaced with the assumption
that companies really have no choice but to make difficult judgement calls,
but that they do a better and better job of it each time. SM's Carter: "It's not
the easiest thing to do; for example, choosing more expensive carriers, or
turning business away because the customer looks shady, especially when
you're paid on commission. Putting your money where your mouth is is
difficult."
6.2.4 Management for Responsible Care
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Table 6.4 Responsible Care Management
Responsible Care Cultural Belief, Value or Is it Reflected in the Culture at:
Assumption (blank means insufficient data)
ET? SM? Comments
Senior management commitment to Responsible yes yes "true" internal
Care is important. commitment
Acceptance or adoption of Responsible Care are yes yes
insufficient without implementation and performance
of specific practices.
Clear assignment of Responsible Care line responsibilities,
responsibilities is necessary. not a single leader
Responsible Care must be part of planning and yes yes
business processes and operations.
Management systems are necessary, Activities yes
should be "procedurized."
Writing policies, standards and procedures down yes
makes them more effective and responsible.
Programs should be kept active and up-to-date; they yes yes
should change over time.
Programs, plans, procedures, policies and standards external
should be tested and audited regularly. verifications praised
Responsible Care programs are not always perfect yes yes
at first; sometimes they need correction.
Companies must improve continuously. yes yes
Chemical companies will never be perfect.
What might be "satisfactory" today will not be
satisfactory in future.
Changes in company activities can cause new
hazards or risks. They should be recorded and
managed.
I __
Senior management commitment to Responsible Care is important
At both companies, people said that senior management commitment made
the difference, made Responsible Care happen. It is important to note that
the commitment they were referring to is "true" commitment, felt internally
within the company. They also spoke of "lip service," which could take the
form of an official commitment, but lip service should not be confused with
"true" internal commitment.
Implementation and performance of specific practices is necessary
People at both companies took for granted that without implementation and
performance of specific practices, Responsible Care would amount to little
more than lip service, and would not accomplish its objectives.
Responsible Care must be part of planning and management processes
Interviewees at both companies pointed to the incorporation of Responsible
Care into planning and management processes as good. Kavon spoke with
pride of how in ET's reorganization of the sales force, the first question being
addressed was how to handle Responsible Care. Baker believed in his
attempts to create Responsible Care initiatives that could not be perceived by
employees as "just another program." Similarly at SM, Rutter stressed the
necessity of making Responsible Care part of line functions. McNees: "It
should be natural to the business." Emmert approved of SM's decision to
change the way its sales people were compensated because the old
compensation scheme conflicted with Responsible Care.
Management systems are necessary; activities should be procedurized
Several interviewees were actively working on procedures. They reflected a
belief in procedurizing activities to slow them down and control them. ET
plant manager Williams: "Responsible Care slows things down, but that's
what you want to do, so that no one fucks up." On the other hand, he said
that there was little in Responsible Care that was actually new, rather
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"Responsible Care is really just the formalization and continuous
improvement of the procedures that were in place." ET's Cash described
sessions at which ET managers "kick around hypothetical scenarios so that
policy doesn't have to be made up on the spot. That's the worst time to make
policy." When asked, people at ET said that their companies had avoided
becoming too bureaucratic.
Writing policies, standards and procedures down makes them more effective
Similarly, people at ET seemed to support the idea of writing everything
down. They said that it was difficult sometimes, but that it was part of the
accepted process of procedurizing manuals, job descriptions, goals, records,
etc. One exception was ET's minimization of the paper trail following
discovery of a potential regulatory infraction at a customer's site. "Written"
included computer-based systems.
Responsible care programs are not always perfect at first
Interviewees at both companies said they found holes in their Responsible
Care efforts thanks to verifications, unfortunate incidents, and ordinary
learning during implementation. People such as SM's McNees said that a lot
of learning is taking place along the way, and that sometimes it takes a few
tries to get things right. Recall McNees' "We learned as we went." People
believed that they learn from their mistakes. Thus they believed that
Responsible Care efforts are not always perfect at first and need correction.
ET's Kavon pointed out that ET's business discontinuance policy had been
revised about ten times: "That's the beauty of Responsible Care. You can
spend hours changing and revising - you don't have to get it right the first
time... Responsible Care is a learning process."
Companies must improve continuously
People at both companies believed in continuous improvement. President
Woods of SM and Senior V. P. Nuse of ET both saw Responsible Care as
consistent with total quality management. They were able to quote with
approval many planned and actual performance improvements.
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What might be satisfactory today will not be in future
I saw some evidence of the belief that what is satisfactory today may no longer
be satisfactory in future. I think primarily most efforts are still focused on
trying to get up to the standards people define as satisfactory for today.
Companies are still catching up. But SM's McNees did mention that the
standards being used for the CCPA's Responsible Care compliance
verifications seemed to be getting more stringent with time, and ET's Baker
said that people were starting to expand their conception of Responsible Care
to include new practices. He also said that they "try to do something new
every year to keep the thing going."
6.2.5 Chemical Companies' Effects on Others
Companies' decisions and actions affect others
When people at ET described the company's incidents at its Toronto plant, its
consultations with the community of Edmonton, and its rerouting of carriers
around the town of Kingsville, there was no doubt in their minds that
company decisions and actions affect others.
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Table 6.5 Companies' Effects on Others
Responsible Care Cultural Belief, Value or Is it Reflected in the Culture at:
Assumption (blank means insufficient data)
ET? SM? Comments
Companies affect others through their actions and yes
decisions.
Companies should think about how their actions and yes
decisions affect others.
Companies should try to characterize how they yes
affect others.
Many operations could be hazardous or risky to the yes yes
public or the environment. Many are inherently
hazardous or risky.
Companies should think about, and characterize, how they affect others
ET's George pointed out that Responsible Care forced people at ET to think
about how the company affects others when reacting to its Toronto incidents.
ET also uses risk assessments to characterize how it affects others.
Many activities could be hazardous or risky; many are inherently so.
When people at ET spoke about the incidents that occurred at Toronto, it was
clear that they believed that their company's activities can be hazardous and
risky. Their presentation of non-zero risk assessment results also showed this
belief. Emmert cited SM's procedures for sales samples carried in
salespeople's cars as evidence that SM believes that even seemingly trivial
activities can be risky. People at both companies also spoke of some of the
risks of their company's operations in terms that revealed their belief in the
inherent riskiness of some activities.
6.2.6 Chemicals
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Table 6.6 Chemicals
Responsible Care Cultural Belief, Value or Is, it Reflected in the Culture at:
Assumption (blank means insufficient data)
ET? SM? Comments
Chemical compounds are born of R&D and SM undertakes no
proceed through test marketing to manufacturing. R&D in Canada
Chemicals have linear lives: they are
manufactured, distributed and used, then they
become wastes.
New applications for chemicals can arise.
Chemicals are inherently hazardous and can harm each chemical is
humans and/or the environment. different
Hazards and risks are part of a chemical's character.
Chemical products are not complete without hazard
and risk information.
Chemicals are inherently hazardous
Some interviewees at both companies did not seem to subscribe to the belief
that chemicals are inherently hazardous. This issue tended to arise in
discussions of the issue of blanket bans of chlorine compounds. Some people
believed instead that all chemicals are different: some are hazardous and
need management; others don't. They believed that chemicals' hazard
properties can be characterized and thus chemicals should not all be treated
alike. For example, SM president Woods praised an agreement with
governments that promised "no blanket bans; we will look at individual
chemicals."
Notably, ET senior V. P. Nuse acknowledged that "Chlorine is
deserves the attention" it has received.
6.2.7 Hazards. Risks and Truth
a product that
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Table 6.7 Hazards, Risks and Truth
Responsible Care Cultural Belief, Value or Is it Reflected in the Culture at:
Assumption (blank means insufficient data)
ET? SM? Comments
Some hazards and risks are worse than others. yes yes
Risks are at least approximately quantifiable, yes
meaningful, and worth measuring and controlling.
Risk does not have to be eliminated. Some risks are yes
acceptable.
Effects on humans and the environment are
knowable.
Potential hazards and potential impacts are as in within limits
important as actual hazards and impacts. part
Companies should evaluate potential and actual
hazards and risks as early as possible.
Not all information on hazards and risks is available.
Hazards and risks can change with time, and should
be evaluated regularly.
Truth is established by science and experts.
Knowledge and understanding change constantly.
Companies must continually work to improve their
understanding, knowing that complete
understanding is unlikely.
Some hazards and risks are worse than others
When people at either company spoke of risk, they spoke in inherently
comparative terms, for example: 'We're just as risky as airplanes,' or 'We
chose hydrochloric acid instead of chlorine even though there's more in-
plant risk.' Clearly people believed that some risks are worse than others.
Risks are quantifiable, meaningful, and worth measuring and controlling
ET had quantitative risk assessments performed on its plants. It was clear that
both Winnett and Baker respected the quantitative results of these
assessments. Winnett implied that quantitative risk assessment results may
be used as a decision criterion in choosing between different processes: "I'm
doing a QRA [quantitative risk assessment] for chlorine even though we
don't use it, because one day someone might suggest it."
On the other hand, Winnett objected to the use of 'worst-case scenarios' in
risk assessment. He argued that they were not meaningful and that 'most
likely scenarios' were more appropriate. I believe this to be the proverbial
exception that proves the rule that he believes most risk data are meaningful.
Risk need not be eliminated; some are acceptable
ET's Cash summarized it well when he said: "There are many things you can
do to reduce risk, but you can't eliminate it." In fact, he approved of the trend
towards ET providing carriers (instead of ET's customers), thereby taking on
more risk, because it allowed ET to better control the risks involved: "The
carrier risk is ours. But we can control it." And Law pointed approvingly to
ET's decision to take on more in-plant risk at Edmonton for the sake of
community relations. As I spoke to several people at both companies about
communicating risk to the public, it seemed quite clear to me that they
assumed that simply eliminating the risks was not an option. I was left with
the impression that managing risks is a fundamental competence of the
chemical industry. Thus people believed that some risks are acceptable.
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Potential hazards and impacts are as important as actual hazards and impacts
Winnett approved a quantitative risk assessment for a potential design
change, and spoke of the risk ramifications of different potential transport
and storage alternatives. His rejection of 'worst-case scenario' risk data,
however, implied that he saw limits to just how 'potential' hazards should be
in order to be taken seriously.
6.2.8 Understanding and Manaing Chemical Risks
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Table 6.8 Understanding, Managing Risks
Responsible Care Cultural Belief, Value or Is it Reflected in the Culture at:
Assumption (blank means insufficient data)
ET? SM? Comments
Chemicals, chemical products, and their uses must
be understood and managed.
Chemicals' associated hazards and risks must be
understood and managed.
Chemicals and products must be managed in in
throughout their life cycles. Companies have some part part
responsibility for all points in chemical life cycles.
Companies know about their chemicals, products
and services and can advise customers.
Companies know about the wastes associated with
their products.
Companies must protect people and the lack of evidence is
environment from their chemicals, products, puzzling
processes and operations.
Companies don't want to hurt society. ,,
Companies must not pose unacceptable risks. ,,
Companies must ensure risks and effects are
acceptable to stakeholders.
Effects, hazards, risks, injuries and damages should yes community concerns
be reduced and minimized. may take
precedence
Effects, hazards, risks can be controlled. yes
Human factors must be considered in risk reduction.
The impacts, potential emergencies, hazards,
handling and disposal of chemicals should be
considered as early as possible.
Companies share responsibility for chemicals throughout their life cycles
ET's Baker explained that the company had not undertaken life-cycle analyses
yet, partly because ET's processes' raw materials are fairly benign. However, as
several at ET described their efforts to require responsible use of products by
customers, assess customers, and change transportation routes, it was clear
that they accepted some responsibility for other steps in the life cycles of ET's
chemicals.
Several at SM told me the story of a customer who had received
contaminated drums. It was determined that the source of contamination
was actually at SM's drum supplier. Emmert chastised the sales organization
for passing blame along and not taking responsibility vis-A-vis the customer.
(She issued a credit note to the customer over the sales department's heads:
"Even if it's technically our customer's responsibility, we incur the cost.")
Woods was disappointed that no-one had thought about the potential
environmental impacts of the problem, but were instead worrying about
blame and liability. This story left me with the impression that different
people at SM had different beliefs about how much responsibility SM shares
for other steps in the life cycles of its products.
Effects, hazards, risks, injuries and damages should be reduced
ET has undertaken several projects to reduce hazards or risks. Such
engineering projects were actually not mentioned much by interviewees.
ET's George pointed out that "A plant full of engineers will naturally focus
first on the hardware. Responsible Care forces that community concerns be
looked at too." Thus it was community relations that people spoke about to a
researcher who asked about Responsible Care. The technical effort to reduce
risk was taken for granted.
Law's approval of ET's decision to use hydrochloric acid instead of chlorine at
the Edmonton facility is interesting. For this decision did not minimize risk
(at least in a technical sense), but it did address stakeholder concerns. Law's
approval would seem to suggest internalization of some of the deeper values
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of Responsible Care regarding stakeholder concerns - even though it
apparently contradicts the initiative's stated belief in minimizing risks.
Human factors must be considered in risk reduction
Human factors were not mentioned much, but Woods of SM offered one
shining piece of evidence in support of the importance of human factors
when he described the increasing difficulty of implementing Responsible
Care now that implementors are "really trying to climb inside people's
heads."
6.2.9 Chemical Emergencies
Emergencies can happen and can happen anywhere
There had been a sufficient number of accidents at locations "close" to ET and
SM, such as neighbours and customers, even recently, that it was very
evident in people's minds that emergencies can happen and can happen
anywhere. In addition, people at ET believed they knew from experiences at
Toronto, and from risk assessment results, how accidents could happen to ET.
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Table 6.9 Chemical Emergencies
Responsible Care Cultural Belief, Value or Is it Reflected in the Culture at:
Assumption (blank means insufficient data)
ET? SM? Comments
Emergencies can happen, and can happen yes yes
anywhere.
Emergencies will always happen; they cannot be yes
totally eliminated.
Chemicals are especially important in emergency yes
situations.
Companies should prepare for accidents. yes
Companies should consider compensating people
dislocated by company emergencies.
The number and consequences of incidents can be yes yes
reduced (incidents can be prevented).
Health and safety performance can be yes
meaningfully measured.
Occupational safety will be an issue for the long
term.
Emergencies will always happen; they cannot be totally eliminated
The assumption that emergencies will always happen (and can't ever be
completely eliminated) has probably existed in the chemical industry for
years. It certainly seemed implicit in everyone's talk. George's approval of
ET's efforts to improve emergency response at its Toronto plant (after two
emergencies in 1994) showed an acceptance that more emergencies will
happen.
Chemicals are especially important in emergency situations
SM's Emmert told the story of an explosion at a customer's site. People at SM
contacted the customer to determine if any of SM's chemicals were involved.
It turned out that none were, nonetheless the story shows the belief that SM's
chemicals could be important to the emergency situation.
Companies should prepare for accidents
As a logical extension of the "accidents happen" assumption, interviewees at
ET believed that companies should prepare for accidents. George described
ET's actions after its accidents at Toronto, citing not only attempts to avoid
accidents, but also preparation to deal with the next accident: "If it weren't for
Responsible Care continuous improvement, we might not have done so
:much after the June incident." And Law spoke approvingly of ET's
emergency drills at Edmonton in preparation for emergencies.
'The number and consequences of incidents can be reduced
The declining number of safety incidents at both companies had everyone
convinced that safety can be improved. Engineering work as well as
procedures and human factors were seen as capable of improving safety.
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Health and safety performance can be meaningfully measured
Most interviewees seemed to believe that improvements in safety numbers
represented true improvements in safety. (Only SM's Woods added the
caveat that "Performance has improved, to the extent that we're measuring
it.") Thus safety numbers were seen as meaningful. This assumption may
have been partially externally imposed by the attention paid by the public and
governments to the number of reportable incidents ("That's all anyone looks
at," said Baker). But people believed, and were proud of, their safety
numbers.
6.2.10 Normal Chemical Operations
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Table 6.10 Normal Chemical Operations
Responsible Care Cultural Belief, Value or Is it Reflected in the Culture at:
Assumption (blank means insufficient data)
ET? SM? Comments
Chemical facilities and hazardous waste sites tend
to have finite lives.
Some adverse effects develop only after facilities are
closed. Companies must protect against future
latent environmental effects.
Companies know the effects, hazards and risks of yes
their operations.
Companies can determine which effluents and
emissions should be monitored or controlled.
6.2.11 Chemical Wastes
Table 6.11 Chemical Wastes
Responsible Care Cultural Belief, Value or Is it Reflected in the Culture at:
Assumption (blank means insufficient data)
ET? SM? Comments
Non-hazardous waste is not worthy of as much
concern as hazardous waste.
Companies should classify waste as hazardous or
non-hazardous based on their own knowledge, not
regulatory lists.
Companies are encouraged to apply the same
principles to non-hazardous waste as they do to
hazardous waste.
Hazardous wastes must be managed throughout
chemical and chemical product life cycles.
Companies should look continuously for sources of
waste, as these can change.
There is a hierarchy of hazardous waste
management options (see Chapter 2 for details).
Companies should look for opportunities to move up
the hierarchy as early as possible and continuously.
Hazardous waste management and disposal
technology improves continuously.
Companies should participate in efforts to improve
hazardous waste management technology.
Hazardous waste treatment and disposal facilities
are desirable. Companies should promote them.
Land should be usable after a hazardous waste
treatment or disposal site is decommissioned.
Companies should identify, study and characterize
previously used treatment or disposal sites.
Hazardous waste generation should be recorded.
I gathered very little data concerning cultural
described ET's waste reduction efforts, which
attitudes towards wastes. Baker
included efforts to reduce non-
hazardous emissions. People at both ET and SM cited instances of redesign,
reduction and reuse, but also still pointed to scrubber and containment
projects with pride. ET's Baker's statement that "It makes no sense to reduce
for the sake of reducing" showed his disbelief in Responsible Care's hazard-
ous waste management hierarchy, which professes inherent superiority of
elimination and reduction, recycling, or reuse over other alternatives.
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6.2.12 Chemical Company Employees
Employees will not necessarily simply reflect company initiatives
Interviewees clearly believed that employees are different from the
companies they purportedly serve. They spoke of employees affecting
outcomes; some helping Responsible Care, some hindering it. Several spoke
of the need to encourage and train employees in the hopes of securing their
service to Responsible Care. ET plant manager Williams summed up the
view from the front lines:
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Table 6.12 Chemical Company Employees
Responsible Care Cultural Belief, Value or Is it Reflected in the Culture at:
Assumption (blank means insufficient data)
ET? SM? Comments
Employee behaviour will not necessarily simply yes yes
reflect company initiatives.
The work environment is important to monitor.
Employees do not have to be isolated from risk. yes
Companies must not pose unacceptable risks to
employees, and must protect them.
Employees deserve information about hazards and
risks and should feel that they know them.
Employee confidence in company activities is
desirable.
Employees do not know hazards, the law, or how to yes yes
behave responsibly without information and
training.
Employees can understand risk assessment
information.
Companies should inform and train employees in yes yes
hazards, the law, standards and emergency
response.
Employees may not behave as trained to; they yes yes implicitly
should be assessed and re-trained as necessary.
Individuals have freedom of action at companies yes yes
and can affect outcomes. They can help or hinder
Responsible Care.
All employees must be involved in Responsible Care yes yes
responsibilities.
Individual efforts deserve support and recognition. yes
Responsible Care is good for employee morale and yes yes
pride.
Employees can affect community perceptions. yes
Companies should encourage them to speak out.
"A certain percent of the population [employees] are naysayers:
anything from the company must be bad, must be a plot. No amount
of education will help. Then there are the fence-sitters. Then there are
the people who believe it's [Responsible Care is] right."
Others at ET also pointed to the union-business relationship as a source of
employee independence: "At first, the union looks at it [Responsible Care] as
'something new for management to screw us with."' (ET's Cash)
Employees need not be isolated from risk
Underlying interviewees' descriptions of efforts to improve safety for
employees and others was the acceptance that employees may be exposed to
risks greater than zero. In fact, Law pointed with pride to ET's decision to take
on more in-plant risk at Edmonton for the sake of community concerns.
Employees do not behave responsibly without information and training
At both companies, Responsible Care champions and people in charge of
Responsible Care training repeatedly implied that employees do not know
what Responsible Care is and means unless it is drilled into their heads over
and over: "...just keep hammering away until people realize all the things
they're doing are really Responsible Care" (ET's Williams). This
indoctrination was described as difficult and as requiring perseverance,
though ET's Varennes plant manager Thompson said it was a little easier in
the case of new employees: "New people have never done anything else."
Plant managers and others also said that plant employees have difficulty
seeing how what they do fits into a bigger picture.
Emmert pointed out an interesting exception at SM. To be hired as a
customer service representative, she said, these days one must have a
knowledge of Responsible Care. Thus the new employee brings Responsible
Care knowledge to his or her job.
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Individuals affect outcomes and can help or hinder Responsible Care
Interviewees overwhelmingly believed that individuals affect outcomes at
chemical companies. This was why they felt that employees must be trained,
empowered and motivated. Recall ET's Williams' description of the
procedurization of activities as slowing things down so that "no one fucks
up." SM's Carter praised strong senior management commitment as another
way to limit negative individual decisions. SM's president himself admitted
that "It will take some time for sales to internalize Responsible Care."
Individuals deserve support and recognition
At SM, people spoke a lot about supporting employees with resources,
organization, encouragement and senior management back-up. Support for
individuals was seen as necessary to ensure appropriate individual actions.
Carter clearly felt that this had been achieved at SM:
"It's [Responsible Care is] comfortable. In any moral or ethical
compromise, I have the authority to make the right decision and I feel
comfortable that management will back me up."
Responsible Care is good for employee morale and pride
Several saw Responsible Care as empowering people, making them feel good
about where they work and what they do. Apparently morale was not always
so good. ET's Nuse and Winnett described Responsible Care as providing an
opportunity for people within the industry to do what they (had presumably
always) wanted to do. Winnett: "Responsible Care has provided a vehicle for
doing things that people wanted to do." Nuse credited Responsible Care with
creating "a tremendous pride in the industry, that was waning." SM's Carter
gushed: "It's morally good. It's righteous. It's great. It was a lot of fun
working on it... Responsible Care breeds happier people."
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Employees can affect community perceptions
Especially at SM, interviewees expressed the belief that employees who feel
good about their work become ambassadors. Emmert said that Responsible
Care has "allowed people to promote SM to the public and promote the safety
of the industry. Ten years ago, people couldn't respond to the criticisms."
Both ET and SM spoke with pride of sending employees out to the
community. It was assumed that their enthusiasm could affect the public.
6.2.13 Communities Around Facilities, and the Public
Responsible Care Cultural Belief, Value or Is it Reflected in the Culture at:
Assumption (blank means insufficient data)
ET? SM? Comments
Communities around facilities and along focusing on
transportation routes deserve more attention than communities
the general public does.
Companies want community to have confidence in yes yes to get favourable
them. They want to be proud of their standing with regulatory climate
communities and other businesses.
Doing Responsible Care increases a company's yes yes
standing with its community. If communities
understand company activities, they will perceive the
company more favourably.
Companies and communities can help each other,
including with their images.
Public perception and confidence is important and yes yes no mention of mgmt.
arises from responsible management using systems. systems
Communities have rights, responsibilities, concerns,
needs, resources and interests.
Community interests are sufficiently homogeneous in
to be represented by organizations or individuals. part
Community interests and representatives change
over time.
Some community members have concerns. Some yes
concerns are "legitimate;" others are not.
Companies can and should understand community not beginnings at ET
rights, concerns and needs. Citizens and interest yet
groups are worth listening to.
Companies should cooperate, coordinate and work yes
with communities.
Companies should be open with public, telling it not not
what they are doing if it asks. Companies should yet yet
prepare to answer questions.
Trade secrets are important to protect.
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Table 6.13 Communities and the Public
-
I
Communities deserve more attention than the general public
The distinction between communities around facilities (and along
transportation routes) and the general public was present in interviewees
talk, but not strongly. It seemed that people focused all efforts towards
communities. Interviewees saw the public at large as influenced by the
opinions of local communities. I got the impression that it was not so much
that interviewees believed that the public deserves less attention; rather that
their efforts had up to that point been focused primarily towards the
community, and so it was the community that they spoke of.
Companies want community confidence and standing
Interviewees believed that community confidence in the activities of their
companies was desirable. They saw community confidence as a key to good
public opinion, and good public opinion as a prerequisite for a favourable
regulatory climate. People seemed interested in their company's standing in
the community fundamentally for the purpose of avoiding onerous
regulations, rather than because of any inherent desire to please the
community. ET's Cash: "We want to bring the public around so we don't get
regulated into the ground, basically." People spoke approvingly of ET's
actions after incidents at its Toronto plant and of employee visits to the
community. Thus they took community confidence seriously.
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Unauthorized access to facilities threatens afety.
Communities and the public do not have to be yes yes
isolated from risk.
Communities have the need and right to know the not not
hazards and risks presented to them by chemicals et et
and transportation; and corresponding safeguards.
Members of communities and the general public yes yes
are generally unaware and ignorant of chemicals.
Companies should develop information to regularly not not it's happening, but
provide unsolicited to the community. fully fully some are hesitant
Communities want to understand and be proud of yes
companies.
New areas of public concern arise over time and can
grow into major issues. Public demands change
continually.
Doing Responsible Care increases companies' standing with communities
People such as ET's Nuse and SM's Carter outlined their belief that once
members of the community know about Responsible Care and their
company's practices, they will become confident in the company. Carter said
the two community members on SM's compliance verification teams were
"blown away." He said they "called lots of community people [who had seen
an SM display at a community event] and received glowing reports."
Public confidence is important and arises from responsible management
Public perception was seen as important because it was seen as driving
regulation. However, interviewees believed that public relations or
advertising would not sway a skeptical public, but rather that only evidence of
responsible management practices would. People expressed dismay that
public perception had not yet improved; I took this as evidence that they
valued public perception.
Community interests are sufficiently homogeneous to be represented
People at ET believed that seeking community representatives was a
worthwhile endeavour, but cautioned that the community may not be easily
represented. Law seemed to feel that in the design of the Edmonton plant,
the community was adequately represented; on the other hand, Toronto plant
manager Williams described his community as having "such a diversity of
agendas," that a community advisory panel may not adequately represent the
community.
Companies should understand community rights, concerns and needs
Communities are worth listening to
Be open with the public, telling it what the company is doing
Develop information to provide unsolicited to the community
Communities have the need and right to know hazards and risks
Interviewees at both ET and SM were candid about the difficulties of instilling
the Responsible Care community awareness culture at their companies. The
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story was similar for several Responsible Care cultural elements, such as
"companies should understand community rights, concerns and needs,"
"communities are worth listening to," "be open with the public, telling it
what the company is doing," and "develop information to provide
unsolicited to the community."
Interviewees pointed out that the natural tendency of chemical companies
was not to deal with the community, but argued that people were learning.
ET plant manager Williams pointed out traditional chemical industry
symbolism: "...fences, barbed wire, 'KEEP OUT.' No care crossed the fences
either way. Now we invite people in. We never used to ten years ago." ET's
Winnett: "It's difficult for industry to talk to the public." People at ET spoke
highly of its several open houses during the design of its Edmonton facility
and its addressing of community concerns after its incidents at Toronto. But
Law described some of the objections at the time: design people saw open
houses as "more opportunity to get left-field questions. If you poke at the
public, you'll find one of them who isn't happy." People said that in general,
employees were still scared of the public and still needed encouragement.
SM's Carter: "We want to tell them we're a dangerous plant, but we don't
want to scare the hell out of them."
Interviewees said entrepreneurial plants saw no need to share information,
and design engineers saw community involvement as an unnecessary
interference and complication. ET's Williams spoke of the need to "condition
the local authorities before going to the public" with risk information. There
did seem to be a recognition that companies should (or have to) do
community awareness, but it was clear that people weren't fully comfortable
doing it yet.
Companies should cooperate, coordinate and work with communities
Winnett and Williams of ET spoke with pride of their efforts to cooperate
with community governments and agencies before communicating the
results of the Toronto plant risk assessment to the community. Law pointed
to cooperative efforts at Edmonton and Cash mentioned cooperating with a
request from the town of Kingsville to divert carriers around the community.
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The feeling at ET was that the company should cooperate and work with
communities.
Communities and the public need not be isolated from risk
In general, interviewees believed that risk cannot be eliminated (see
subsection 6.2.7), and specifically seemed to take it for granted that
communities and the public do not have to be isolated from risk. I took the
attention paid to risk communication as evidence that no one seriously
thought communities would ever face zero risk.
Communities have the need and right to know hazards and risks
The belief that communities have the right to know the hazards and risks
posed to them by companies seemed to have only partially penetrated the
cultures at ET and SM. Winnett objected to the suggestion that the
community needed to know 'worst-case scenario' data from ET's Toronto
plant risk assessment, but nonetheless he seemed to accept that ET had to
communicate the information anyway. ET's Edmonton design team thought
community consultation was excessive, and yet they did it anyway. At SM,
Carter described an evolution in attitudes towards providing information to
the community at their Sarnia plant, but admitted that "We haven't broadcast
it [the risk associated with our plant] even now. We'd tell someone who
asked."
I hypothesize that the belief that communities have the need and right to
know hazards, risks and safeguards is not quite yet embedded in the culture at
ET or SM, but that Responsible Care is making people think about it.
Members of communities and the public are ignorant of chemicals
Interviewees believed that the general public knows very little about
chemicals, doesn't understand risk, is unduly afraid, and is prone to knee-jerk
reactions. SM's Carter: "We're still scared of the public's low level of
education. People don't realize what goes into shampoo, what it takes to
make food..." He said that in his dealings with the public at schools and
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community events, he was "shocked by the level of ignorance... The general
public's knowledge of things is crappy." ET's Winnett argued that the public
doesn't understand 'worst-case scenario' risk assessment results. Baker
questioned how to communicate 'worst-case scenario' risks to the public
knowing that "People will go nuts!"
Companies should develop information to provide to the community
SM's Carter spoke glowingly about visits to community schools to educate
people about chemicals and risks. The design of ET's Edmonton facility,
which I have referred to several times already, involved the provision of
much unsolicited information. ET's Law believed that "We're proactive
about letting people know about our problems. We don't believe in hiding."
People at both companies showed me information they had used at
community events to raise awareness. At both companies, people spoke of
ensuring that their information is perceived as credible, and not as
advertising.
6.2.14 Other Parties (e.g. Contractors, Suppliers Distributors, Customers, etc.)
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Table 6.14 Other Parties
Responsible Care Cultural Belief, Value or Is it Reflected in the Culture at:
Assumption (blank means insufficient data)
ET? SM? Comments
Other parties are handling company products.
Companies are partly responsible for ensuring that yes
other parties behave responsibly, including policing
them, within limits.
The actions of many different parties can affect yes
safety.
Other parties are generally held to a subset of yes
Responsible Care standards.
Other parties are still fundamentally responsible for yes not SM takes on extra
their actions. fully responsibilities
Other parties are only held to Responsible Care
standards where company products are involved.
Customers do not have to be isolated from risk; but risky products mean
companies must not pose unacceptable risks. risk for customer by
definition
Other parties are still fundamentally responsible for their actions
Sales and marketing people spoke as if customers and others were
fundamentally responsible for their behaviour. But at SM, Emmert spoke
very highly of times when SM had taken on financial responsibilities even
though it was technically not responsible. Cash pointed out that ET may also
be taking on new responsibilities, by being so strict with its carrier
requirements that it normally now provides the carriers (instead of its
customers doing so). It seemed to me that some people's conceptions of their
companies' responsibilities had broadened even beyond Responsible Care's
intentions.
Customers do not have to be isolated from risk
As a result of the belief that some chemicals and products are risky, people
almost by definition assumed that their customers - who buy these products -
do not have to be isolated from risk.
157
Other parties' confidence is desirable. Responsible in in desirable, yes; will
Care will increase companies' standings with other part part increase standings,
parties. 
___no consensus
Other parties may not behave as responsibly as they yes yes
should.
Other parties might not know all hazards and risks.
Companies generally know a lot more than other yes yes
parties.
Companies should carefully select the other parties yes yes
they do business with.
Other parties can change their behaviour.
Companies should cooperate, coordinate, and work yes
with other parties and nudge them into responsible
behaviour.
Companies would jeopardize sales for the sake of not not sales people tend to
Responsible Care. fully fully disagree
Other parties deserve information on hazards and
risks (even potential new customers).
Companies can police the actions of other parties, yes
but only to a certain extent.
Companies must verify that other parties are yes
behaving responsibly, but only to a certain extent.
Responsible Care will increase companies' standings with other parties
Interviewees at ET said that site assessments had been well received by their
customers. They cannot have been all that well received, however, because
Reed called for more a careful "balancing" of Responsible Care, and Kavon
explained how they had "massaged" their business discontinuance policy
because its "initial approach was too cavalier." Clearly everyone believed that
customer confidence was desirable, but they were divided over how zealous
Responsible Care practices would affect ET's standing with customers.
Other parties may not behave as responsibly as they should
Interviewees described several instances of irresponsible behaviour by several
different other parties. For example, Winnett told the story of ET's Varennes
plant, which stopped sending solid waste to a provincially-regulated dump
because it found a hazardous contaminant in the waste, only to have the
dump ask ET why it bothered, given the tiny chances that anyone would ever
find out. SM's Claggett said that he tries to convince his customers to fill out
assessment surveys "using the 'right' arguments, but for the ma & pa's it
usually comes down to 'do this or we'll suspend business."' When I pressed
ET's Cash, he admitted "I guess the customer isn't always right." The people I
spoke to clearly had learned to assume that other parties may not be as
responsible as they should be.
Companies would jeopardize sales for the sake of Responsible Care
People at both companies spoke with determination about how they had put
customers on probation. Unlike at ET, McNees at SM said that SM had even
lost sales due to Responsible Care. He said the lost sales did not go over well
with SM's parent company. And ET's Reed said that "With customers, we
have to be careful not to go too far." Similarly, ET's Kavon warned: "You
have to be realistic about things such as discontinuing business with
customers." He also pointed out that customer verification goes against a
salesperson's instincts: "You just want to peddle." I hypothesized that some
at SM and ET were willing to jeopardize sales for the sake of Responsible
Care, but that these values had not yet permeated the companies' cultures.
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Interestingly, though neither company had yet to make a sale based solely on
its responsibility, Cash at ET, and Rutter and Claggett at SM, looked upon
customer auditing and training as a value-added service that one day might
enable them to charge more for their products. This might have been a way
of reconciling Responsible Care values with the traditional belief that sales
should not be jeopardized.
Companies can police the actions of other parties, but only to a certain extent
After their experiences checking and pressuring customers and other parties
into taking responsible actions, people at ET believed that they could police
others. But in their calls for 'balance' and 'massaging,' I saw that they also
believed that they could only go so far in doing so.
Companies must verify other parties' behaviour, to a certain extent
Especially at ET, people were very proud of their assessment protocols. In fact,
Cash worried that this expertise was concentrated in one individual, implying
that it was too important to leave so vulnerable Again, people hoped that
assessment would become a value-added service, or competitive advantage,
for their company.
6.2.15 Emergency Response Agencies
Table 6.15 Emergency Response Agencies
Responsible Care Cultural Belief, Value or Is it Reflected in the Culture at:
Assumption (blank means insufficient data)
ET? SM? Comments
Emergency response agencies may not know all
they need to handle chemical emergencies.
Chemical companies have information, expertise,
equipment and media relations skills that would be
useful to first responders.
Emergency response agencies deserve more yes
information than the public. The onus is on
companies to provide such information.
Authorities can help companies with emergency yes no mention of
response. Companies should cooperate. authorities helping
In emergencies, companies are more generous with
their people and possessions than normally.
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Emergency response agencies deserve more information than the public
Winnett and Williams of ET both accepted that emergency response agencies
deserve more information than the public as they described how ET has
shared its Toronto plant risk assessment information with local authorities
(recall Williams' "condition the local authorities before going to the public"),
but is only slowly determining how to share the same information with the
community. It is also important to note that the agencies themselves have
asked ET not to "go too quickly" to the public with the information.
6.2.16 Governments
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Table 6.16 Governments and Regulation
Responsible Care Cultural Belief, Value or Is it Reflected in the Culture at:
Assumption (blank means insufficient data)
ET? SM? Comments
The government plays an important role in society. yes yes implicitly
Public policies and regulation can legitimately govern no no
chemical companies' activities. Some regulation is
necessary.
Laws and regulations can be met or exceeded, in yes laws are not always
letter or in spirit. They are not always met. met
Regulations are always changing. But they should
not change so fast as to cause disorder.
Government decisions should recognize the views of in should recognize
everyone who is affected. part companies' views
Current distribution public policies, standards and
regulations are out of touch.
Governments need help. Companies should assisting
proactively participate, assisting and influencing governments is in
public policies, standards and regulations. companies' best
interests
Companies should advocate to governments. They
should encourage their employees to do likewise.
Governments should emphasize prevention and
industry proaction in their policy agendas.
Voluntary action ("self-regulation") is preferable to yes yes
regulation. It is important to demonstrate this.
The government deserves a say in determining Memoranda of
voluntary industry actions. Understanding with
governments
praised
Companies should tell governments what they know
about old waste disposal sites.
Governments play an important role in society
Interviewees did not specifically address the importance of governments in
society, but based on their fear of regulation and their enthusiasm for
Memoranda of Understanding (see below), I hypothesized that they assumed
that governments do play an important role in society, in a positive (as
opposed to normative) sense.
Regulation of the industry is legitimate and necessary
The people I spoke with rejected regulation more categorically than any other
Responsible Care cultural belief, value or assumption. Interviewees believed
that regulations were undesirable. They saw regulations as the result of
government overreaction, as costly, onerous, bureaucratic, inefficient and
ineffective, as treating symptoms only, as putting the industry at a
competitive disadvantage, in short, as "trampling the business" (SM's
Rutter). ET's Cash was most blunt:
"Typically governments overreact. Onerous regulation doesn't really
achieve what it's supposed to do, and it's costly as hell... All the EPA
regulations [which exports to the US must meet] provide us nothing.
For example, by the EPA, chlorine in water is a pesticide, but in a pulp
mill it's not."
No one suggested that existing regulations should be ignored, but it was clear
that interviewees believed that a world with less regulation would be a better
world.
In fact, I learned that if ET finds a regulatory violation on a customer's site
during an assessment, ET's policy is to minimize the paper trail and inform
the customer only (not authorities), despite the potential legal liabilities this
discovery exposes them to.
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Government decisions should recognize the views of all affected
Conversations about relations with governments during regulatory
development and negotiation of Memoranda of Understanding
demonstrated that interviewees clearly believed that government decisions
should recognize the views of chemical companies. No mention was made
regarding recognizing the views of others.
Voluntary action is preferable to regulation; this should be demonstrated
I found widespread agreement that voluntary action, or self-regulation, is
preferable to government regulation. ET's Reed: "We can do a better job than
governments." Voluntary actions were believed to have bought the chemical
industry a tremendous amount of credibility with governments. ET senior
V.P. Nuse said that Responsible Care "has to a large extent convinced
government that we are serious." SM president Woods:
"At the industry level, Responsible Care has had a tremendous impact
upon relations between the CCPA and the federal and provincial
governments. It has built up credibility... [federal Minister of the
Environment] Sheila Copps herself is fully supportive of MOU's
[Memoranda of Understanding] and the CCPA's approach on chlorine."
In fact, ET's Baker boasted: "We don't even have to lobby. The government
will give us a copy of the draft... It will ask the company what it should do."
6.2.17 The Environment
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Table 6.17 The Environment
Responsible Care Cultural Belief, Value or Is it Reflected in the Culture at:
Assumption (blank means insufficient data)
ET? SM? Comments
Environment will be an issue for the long term.
The environment does not have to be isolated from
risk, but companies must not pose unacceptable
risks to the environment.
Companies can determine which areas are more
environmentally sensitive than others.
6.2.18 The CCPA
The CCPA represents companies to society and raises awareness
Interviewees seemed pleased with the CCPA's efforts to negotiate
Memoranda of Understanding with governments. ET's Nuse also praised the
wisdom of the Responsible Care founders for recognizing the effect that
industry voluntary actions would have on regulators.
Companies have obligations to the CCPA
There was some hint that other companies were not happy with the
aggressive role of the CCPA. ET and SM, on the other hand, seemed pleased
with the efforts of the CCPA to make others behave responsibly. They said
that they would do most of what they do anyway, even without the CCPA,
but not everything.
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Table 6.18 The CCPA
Responsible Care Cultural Belief, Value or Is it Reflected in the Culture at:
Assumption (blank means insufficient data)
ET? SM? Comments
The CCPA represents companies to society and
raises awareness.
Companies have obligations to the CCPA.
The CCPA helps companies. Companies should
cooperate, coordinate, and work with the CCPA.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
7.1 Purpose
This thesis set out to answer the question:
How would one assess if Responsible Care were part of the
organizational culture of a chemical company?
so that future researchers might be able to answer the question:
Do the cultures of chemical companies reflect Responsible Care?
After brief overviews of both the Responsible Care initiative (Chapter 2) and
the organizational culture literature (Chapter 3), I analyzed Responsible Care
for its implied culture (Chapter 4). Then, using the literature on
organizational culture research, I devised a methodology for determining if
the organizational culture of a chemical company did in fact reflect the
culture of Responsible Care (Chapter 5). Finally, I applied this methodology at
two Canadian chemical companies and analyzed the results I obtained
(Chapter 6).
Thus I am in a position to draw two types of conclusions, corresponding to
the two research questions presented above. In section 7.2, I present
conclusions concerning the success of my methodology for assessing if
Responsible Care is part of organizational cultures. In section 7.3, I offer
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preliminary conclusions concerning whether the cultures of ET and SM
reflect Responsible Care.
In section 7.4 I offer some creative leaps, generalizing well beyond my data.
7.2 Assessing Organizational Cultures
Now that I have finished this thesis, and only now, I feel qualified to do it.
The purpose of this section is to pass on some of my learning to the next poor
Responsible Care culture researcher, so that he or she may avoid my
mistakes, and may instead find new ones of his or her own.
7.2.1 Recommended (Modified) Methodology
As a result of my experience in doing this thesis, I recommend the following
revised methodology for Responsible Care culture research:
· Limit the study to a dozen or two cultural beliefs, values and assumptions.
* Try to get as unbiased a sample of companies as possible.
* Describe the study as a study of the subject area (e.g. community relations),
not of Responsible Care culture per se.
* Schedule two rounds of interviews of about an hour each with people in
all different functions of the company, at all different levels, including
both Responsible Care champions, people who seldom deal with
Responsible Care, and new hires if possible.
* Research the major actions, incidents and decisions the company has
made relevant to the subject area (perhaps the first couple of interviews
can be used for this purpose).
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* Bring someone else along for the express purpose of taking notes; take
very prolific notes, and clearly marked whose language is being used
(interviewer or interviewee). Do not tape record.
* Steer interview conversations around the cultural beliefs, values and
assumptions to be studied. Use the company's major actions, incidents
and decisions where necessary to stimulate discussion.
* Allow enough time between the first and second rounds to fully analyze
the first round's notes in detail.
* At each person's second interview, probe specifically into questions that
arose during the analysis of his or her first interview, including why some
issues never arose. Questions can be more explicit in probing for cultural
beliefs, values and assumptions.
The following sections explain my reasons for making such
recommendations.
7.2.2 Limit the Study's Breadth
The reader who has already slogged through Chapters 4 and 6 has probably
already anticipated my most significant conclusion regarding my
methodology: too much breadth, not enough depth! Responsible Care is a
very broad initiative, including literally hundreds of implied behaviours and
beliefs. I really had no idea what I was getting into when I decided to look for
the cultural implications of Responsible Care (nor did many of the chemical
executives who signed onto the initiative know what they were getting into).
Unfortunately the sheer volume of cultural beliefs, values and assumptions I
was looking for prevented me from investigating each one in sufficient depth
in my analysis (recommendations aimed at greater depth are presented in
subsection 7.2.8). It also meant that each story I was told seemed relevant to
several different Responsible Care beliefs, values and assumptions - and each
probably was. It would have been better to study a much smaller set of
cultural beliefs, values and assumptions, for example, only those pertaining
to communities, or only those regarding risk.
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7.2.3 Sample Bias
By going through the Canadian Chemical Producers' Association (CCPA) to
contact companies to study, I guaranteed myself a biased sample of
companies. It is unlikely that the CCPA referred me to companies with
cultures that reject Responsible Care. They also did not refer me to the
companies widely known for their Responsible Care leadership (I do not
know why not). It is important to remember that the companies I visited
were self-selected: they volunteered.
A biased sample was not a serious problem for this thesis, because my aim
was largely to try out my methodology, refine it, and gather some preliminary
data about Responsible Care and chemical company cultures. And anyone
with a sample size of two would be hard-pressed to avoid bias. But in any
serious attempt to determine the level of penetration of Responsible Care
into the cultures of chemical companies, more attention should be paid to
company selection.
A more subtle form of bias resulted from my mode of entry into individual
companies. Because I was researching Responsible Care, I was always
welcomed into the company by a "Responsible Care champion." It would be
this person who would introduce me to other people. Anyone who met me
would form pre-conceived notions about the things I was there to hear, based
on my research topic and who had introduced me. Perhaps if sales managers
had introduced me as someone studying the impacts of environmental
initiatives on revenues, I might have been told different stories with different
slants, even in response to the same questions.
In addition, the Responsible Care champions would make recommendations
to me regarding whom to speak to. Without enough time to speak to
everyone, I followed their advice most of the time. This meant that I spoke
mostly to people who had been fairly heavily involved with some aspect of
Responsible Care. These people can offer many more insight into
Responsible Care than others at the company, but they may not offer a
representative picture of the company as a whole. And again, it is unlikely
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(though not impossible) that I would be sent to speak to someone who
despised Responsible Care.
7.2.4 Description of Study
Sometimes I was introduced to interviewees as a researcher "sort of doing his
own verification of Responsible Care." In these cases, I found it took me
much longer to move the conversation beyond presentational data to deeper
cultural beliefs, because my introduction had raised public relations flags in
my interviewees' heads. If I had had a better pretext for being at the
company's site, people's pre-conceived notions and tendency to provide
"presentational data" (appearances people strive to maintain) might have
been reduced, and I might have been able to get closer to cultural beliefs,
values and assumptions faster.
In my case, because I was studying the whole Responsible Care initiative, I
had little choice but to introduce myself as someone interested in the
Responsible Care culture. But for someone focusing on a narrower set of
beliefs, values and assumptions (as I recommend above), I would recommend
introducing oneself as someone interested in that particular subject (say,
employee relations), rather than someone interested in the culture per se. Of
course, the new pretext cannot be deceptive or incorrect, but it might be
phrased so as to elicit fewer 'stock' responses. The researcher should still be
allowed to ask probing questions about the culture; they would still be
relevant to study of the subject itself.
7.2.5 Interview Several People Across the Company
Based on the sixteen people I spoke to, I conclude that at this point in
Responsible Care's history, assuming cultural homogeneity within chemical
companies would be inappropriate. Different people held very different
beliefs, values and assumptions in different subject areas of Responsible Care.
To try to circumvent the problems of a biased selection of interviewees and
heterogeneous cultures, I recommend interviewing more people at each
company. I especially recommend talking to more people who are less
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directly involved in Responsible Care management, for example plant-level
employees or financial people. It is likely that conversations with these
people would be shorter and more difficult. "So tell me about Responsible
Care," would no longer work as an interview question; more crafty questions
would have to be developed, such as "Do you ever have to deal with the
community? What's it like?"
7.2.6 Actions, Incidents and Decisions
Motivated by the presumption that only deep changes in a company's culture
can approach permanence (see section 4.1), in this thesis I looked only for the
'deeper' levels of culture: beliefs, values and assumptions. However,
concentrating exclusively on 'deeper' culture is less possible than I had
envisaged. I found that beliefs, values and assumptions were relatively easily
deduced from the ways that interviewees spoke about things, but they still
had to have something to talk about. Actions, incidents or decisions taken by
the company in the recent past were not only indicative of company beliefs in
themselves, but the explanations my interviewees offered for them were rich
with cultural beliefs, values and assumptions. But because I intended to focus
on 'deeper' levels of culture, I had not deliberately collected stories of such
actions, incidents or decisions. Some arose naturally in interviews, and I
used them subsequently to get interviewees talking about such culture-rich
subjects. The astute reader may have noted that my analysis of the cultures at
ET and SM (in Chapter 6) was based on the way interviewees described and
explained a relatively small number of actions, incidents and decisions. If I
had known more, I might have elicited more culture-rich explanations. In
future, I would recommend spending some time gathering as many of these
"artifacts" of culture before proceeding to elicit deeper levels of culture
through interviews.
In addition, I found that some cultural artifacts can replace deeper cultural
assumptions. Consider the following example. In a company where the
number of accidents is not measured, a valid cultural assumption might be
that the number of accidents could be reduced. People might just assume this
is possible. So probing to find out if people believe that the number of
accidents can be reduced would be a reasonable research exercise. On the
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other hand, in a company where the number of accidents has been measured
for years and the number has been steadily declining, the numbers speak for
themselves. The researcher who has studied the company's artifacts will
know this and will be able to move right away to probing other cultural
assumptions such as "Is the way accidents are counted valid?" or "Do you
think you'll reach a point where the number of accidents will no longer be
reducible?"
Of course, one should not become over-reliant upon artifacts. During my
analysis I often had to stop myself from jumping to conclusions such as:
"They consulted the community at Edmonton; they must believe the
community has a right to know." Just because an action was taken does not
mean that it was taken for reasons the researcher understands. The action
does not itself tell culture. But the researcher should ask interviewees to
explain the action - cultural insight will probably ensue.
I also found that while I could sometimes determine cultural beliefs, values
and assumptions from people's talk around general subject areas (instead of
talk about specific actions, incidents or decisions), such inferences were
difficult for me to report or explain convincingly. My descriptions of such
inferences in this thesis tend to start with phrases like "I got the impression
that..." or "People seemed to imply that..." These statements cannot be very
convincing to the reader who wasn't there. Inferences based upon
explanations of specific incidents are both easier for me to explain, and more
convincing to the reader.
7.2.7 Taking Notes
I found that during interviews I fell so far behind on my note-taking that I
was continuously writing. This was both good and bad. On one hand, it
prevented me from steering the conversation or asking clarification or
probing questions as much as I would have liked to. On the other hand, it
also prevented me from hypothesizing on the spot and unwittingly biasing
my notes.
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I also felt that I did not take as complete notes as I would have wanted to. Too
many notes, not enough notes: clearly a problem! It is the practice of some
management consultants to bring a second person to interviews, whose
primary purpose is simply to take notes. Unfortunately this option was not
available to me due to travel costs, but I would recommend it be tried where
possible. Of course, the second person would make rapport-building slightly
more difficult, but probably not unduly so.
The optimal short-run solution would be a hidden tape recorder. Tapes could
be destroyed as soon as transcribed. However, I doubt that the short term
benefits of a better research project would outweigh the long term harm of
distrust between industry and academia were this practice to be found out.
7.2.8 Probe at a Second Interview for More Depth
When the problem of having such a large number of beliefs, values and
assumptions to investigate was combined with the problem of having all
interviews scheduled close together to minimize travel costs, I felt like I was
just scratching the surface of the real story of Responsible Care and the
cultures at ET and SM.
In the realm of Responsible Care, a shallow study is a dangerous one.
Responsible Care explicitly promotes communication to audiences outside
companies. Thus it involves much of Van Maanen's "presentational data,"
that is, information that has been designed for public consumption and may
or may not reflect reality. In the context of Responsible Care, presentational
data abounds. The culture researcher must delve sufficiently deep to get
beyond the presentational data. By spreading my research attention out over
so many beliefs, values and assumptions, over such a short period of time, I
believe I came dangerously close to gathering little more than presentational
data in my interviews.
All in all, I do believe what I was told (and what I present in this thesis), but
there is one episode that nags at the back of my mind: one of my
interviewees told me that he used to work in the same group as some of the
people I had already interviewed, and he found the group to be so unethical
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that he would never work with it again. I had detected no tremendous evil
in my conversations with members of this group, and in fact, some of their
quotes supporting the idea that Responsible Care is reflected in their
company's culture appear in Chapter 6. It is possible that the group has
changed, it is possible that my informant was disgruntled and not truthful,
but it is also possible that my methodology did not penetrate the group's
veneer of presentational data. Thus I recommend future studies of this type
focus in on a narrower set of cultural beliefs, values and assumptions and
investigate them more deeply.
I think the cultures of companies could be investigated significantly more
deeply by introducing a second round of interviews (with the same people)
into my methodology. This second round should take place after a significant
cultural analysis of the first interviews has been performed. In the second
interview, the interviewer would test hypotheses (such as those presented in
Chapter 6) derived from interviewees' comments in their first interview.
Questions could take forms such as: "You said 'Risk training for employees is
good.' Is that because employees deserve risk information?" This second
interview would be much more focused that the first, and the interviewer
would pre-determine the dimensions to be studied much more. The
interview could even include direct cultural questions, so long as they were
derived from, and used language from, the interviewee's own first interview.
The interviewer could also attempt to cover ground that was somehow
missed in the first interview, or probe to find out why certain subjects did not
come up. Spradley and Schein both recommend approaches such as this in
interviews subsequent to the first; the lesson is: more than one interview per
person is required.
7.2.9 Subtle Distinctions
Several of the cultural beliefs, values and assumptions I derived from
Responsible Care tended to come in clusters of similar but slightly different
concepts. For example, consider: employees deserve risk information;
employees can understand risk information; and managers should tell
employees risk information. Each of these has a distinct meaning, and the
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distinction could in some cases be important. One could imagine a manager
who believed he should tell his employees information to cover his behind,
but did not actually believe they deserved the information; one could also
imagine a manager who believed her employees deserved the information,
but believed they should find it themselves.
But in practice, these distinctions become very difficult to distinguish. If an
interviewee says that risk training for employees is a good thing, is it because
he or she thinks employees deserve the training, because he or she thinks the
company should train the employees, or both? The best way for the
researcher to make this determination is to ask "Why is it a good thing?" But
too much such interruption disrupts the conversation and can also hurt
rapport. Or, as in my case, the researcher may be too busy frantically taking
notes to perceive the need to jump in. A second interview with the same
person could offer the opportunity to probe so as to be able to make subtle
distinctions.
7.2.10 Criterion for Cultural Presence
A final problem with my methodology is that I establish no criterion for
'cultural presence.' Say seven of ten people interviewed seem to confirm a
cultural assumption. Is that assumption in the company culture? What if
nine confirm it and one contradicts it? I do not feel qualified to establish any
such rules; I doubt anyone could.
7.3 Is Responsible Care Reflected in the Cultures at ET and SM?
Tables 7.1 and 7.2 summarize the hypotheses of Tables 6.1 through 6.18. Table
7.1 lists the Responsible-Care-implied beliefs, values and assumptions that I
hypothesize to be supported, and those that I hypothesize to be contradicted,
by ET's organizational culture. Table 7.2 does likewise for SM.
Note that if a Responsible Care belief, value or assumption does not appear in
one of these tables, it could be because I did not gather sufficient information
to determine the status of the particular belief, value or assumption vis-a-vis
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the company's culture; or it could be because the company's culture neither
supports nor contradicts it. Because I spent more time at ET and interviewed
more people, I was able to generate more hypotheses regarding ET's culture
than regarding SM's culture. Comparison between the two companies is
meaningless except in the cases of beliefs, values and assumptions for which I
was able to generate hypotheses at both companies. As explained in section
6.2, the italics in Tables 7.1 and 7.2 reflect my unsupported distinction between
beliefs, values and assumptions that are probably new to the industry, versus
those that were probably already present.
The first thing that can be said about Tables 7.1 and 7.2 is that far more
Responsible Care beliefs, values and assumptions were supported at ET and
SM than were partially-supported or contradicted. In fact, only three were
contradicted at each of the two companies. It is safe to conclude that the
organizational cultures at ET and SM do not contradict much of Responsible
Care.
Based on the hypotheses listed in Tables 7.1 and 7.2, I draw the following
preliminary conclusions about the organizational cultures at ET and SM.
Chemical Companies and Society
The cultures at both companies reject the assumption that the companies
have a right to exist. Furthermore, both company cultures acknowledge that
they are part of a larger society, which can impose regulation upon them.
ET's culture acknowledges obligations to several different stakeholders, some
of whom may hold views quite different from the company's. Some people
at ET are beginning to believe that the company should seek harmony with
its stakeholders, especially the communities in which it operates, though this
feeling has yet to take root in ET's culture.
The Responsible Care Initiative
Both companies' cultures accept Responsible Care as a necessary strategy to
avoid regulation. Both believe in moving beyond the traditional boundaries
and definitions provided in laws, regulations, traditional practices, and even
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Responsible Care Codes of Practices. At both companies, people assume that
Responsible Care thinking applies to a much broader range of company
activities than they ever assumed before, but there are still some activities
they think of as irrelevant to Responsible Care.
The culture at SM rejects the idea that Responsible Care has a clear intent or
meaning, though some see its vagueness as an advantage. At both companies
there is some evidence that Responsible Care reflects people's deeper values
about what is "right," however, right or wrong, Responsible Care also serves
some hard-headed self-interested purposes.
Chemical Companies' Current Status and Capabilities
Both companies' cultures admit that at least some companies would be
inclined to behave irresponsibly without Responsible Care, that past actions
may have been unacceptable, and that the industry's behaviour must
improve. But they see themselves as possessing the capabilities and
judgement necessary for improvements. In fact, ET rejects the idea of
needing help from anyone. At both companies, some people are moving
away from assuming they can only do the "practicable," and are beginning to
take more risks. This makes others uneasy.
Responsible Care Management
The cultures of both companies accept many of Responsible Care's
management prescriptions. Of course, several of these are not exclusive to
Responsible Care. People believe that senior management commitment
Responsible Care is critical, that it must be accounted for in planning and
business processes, that specific practices are necessary to back up Responsible
Care ideals, and that programs may need correction and revision and so
should be kept active and up to date. They also believe that companies'
Responsible Care performance should improve continuously. ET's culture
includes Responsible Care's call to "procedurize" everything in written
policies, standards, procedures and management systems.
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Companies' Effects on Others
The culture at both companies accepts that company operations are hazardous
and risky. People at ET also feel that they should think about, and attempt to
characterize, the ways in which their company affects others.
Hazards, Risks and Truth
Both companies' cultures believe that different risks can be compared. At ET,
the belief is that risks can be quantified and - though they need not be
eliminated - they are worth measuring and controlling.
Understanding and Managing Chemical Risks
Both ET's culture and SM's culture partially accept responsibility for company
chemicals or products at points in their life cycles where the company would
not be legally responsible. But this type of thinking has not fully taken root in
either company's culture. ET's culture affirms that risks can be controlled and
should be reduced.
Chemical Emergencies
Both companies' cultures suggest that chemical emergencies could happen to
their companies, but also believe that the number and consequences of
incidents can be reduced through prevention efforts. At ET, people also
believe that a certain number of emergencies are inevitable, and thus that the
company should prepare to deal with them.
Chemical Company Employees
According to the cultures at both ET and SM, employees would not know
how to behave responsibly without information and training, and therefore
the companies should provide such training. People also believe that their
company should assess employees to determine if training has been
successful.
188
Both cultures also assume that individuals may not necessarily reflect
company initiatives, but can instead choose their actions. They can help or
hinder Responsible Care. For this reason, both cultures believe all employees
must be involved in Responsible Care.
People at both companies believe that Responsible Care is good for employee
morale and pride.
Communities and the Public
Several Responsible Care beliefs, values and assumptions concerning
communities and the public are present in the ET and SM cultures, while
several others are only beginning to penetrate them. People at both
companies assume that companies want the confidence of communities and
the public, and that Responsible Care practices will increase companies'
standing with communities. They also believe that members of communities
and the public are generally ignorant of chemicals and their business.
The cultures at both companies are beginning to reflect the idea that
communities have the need and right to know hazards and risks presented to
them by company activities, and therefore that companies should not only
openly answer public questions, but also seek out the community to provide
it information unsolicited. These beliefs do not come naturally, however,
and they have not yet taken hold in the companies' cultures.
People at SM assume that community members want to understand their
company. ET's culture assumes that some members of the public have
concerns, and that believes that ET should cooperate and work with
communities. The belief that ET can and should understand community
concerns and needs is beginning to infiltrate the ET culture.
Other Parties (e.g. Contractors, Suppliers, Distributors, Customers)
People at both companies are culturally predisposed to assume that they
generally know a lot more about managing chemicals and risks than the
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other parties they do business with, and that therefore they should select
these other parties carefully.
At both companies there is division over whether doing Responsible Care
will increase company standing with other parties. Both company cultures
are moving towards the idea of jeopardizing sales for the sake of practicing
Responsible Care, and both have experienced cultural backlash against this.
Interestingly, at SM, some even challenge the traditional cultural assumption
that other parties are responsible for their own behaviour: they approve of
SM assuming new responsibilities.
ET's culture holds that other parties can affect safety, and therefore should be
held to a subset of Responsible Care standards. And though it assumes these
parties are fundamentally responsible for their actions, it believes that ET
shares some responsibility for ensuring responsible behaviour from these
parties. Thus people at ET believe in verifying, cooperating with, nudging,
and if necessary, suspending business with other parties to ensure responsible
behaviour.
Emergency Response Agencies
The culture at ET assumes that emergency response agencies should be
cooperated with and deserve more information about company activities
than the public does.
Governments
At both companies, people acknowledge that the government plays an
important role in society, but their culture rejects outright any suggestion that
regulation is desirable. Regulation is seen as undesirable. Voluntary industry
initiatives are seen as preferable to government regulation.
At ET, people believe that government decisions should recognize the views
of the industry.
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One interviewee told me that
"All the good stuff is thoroughly inculcated,"
while another told me that
"The last 3,000 years of history have not been washed away in ten
years."
(these quotes are deliberately unreferenced)
I conclude that large parts of the Responsible Care culture are reflected in the
organizational cultures of both ET and SM. Some of the less-traditional
components of Responsible Care culture are beginning to become part of the
organizational cultures at ET and SM, but have not taken root yet. Only
Responsible Care's respect for regulation seems strongly at odds with the
organizational cultures of both companies.
7.4 Creative Leaps
"The second step in induction is the creative leap. Selye cites a list of
'intellectual immoralities' published by a well-known physiology
department. Number 4 reads 'Generalizing beyond one's data.' He
quotes approvingly a commentator who asked whether it would not
have been more correct to word Number 4: 'Not generalizing beyond
one's data.' The fact is that there would be no interesting hypothesis to
test if no one ever generalized beyond his or her data. Every theory
requires that creative leap, however small, that breaking away from the
expected to describe something new." (Mintzberg, 1983, p. 109)
The purpose of this thesis was to develop and test a methodology to use in
investigating if Responsible Care is reflected in the organizational cultures of
chemical companies. It is hoped that this methodology may prove useful in
working towards answers to larger questions, such as: Is Responsible Care
changing the chemical industry? Is Responsible Care working? Is
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Responsible Care better than regulation? There is nothing in this thesis that
can even pretend to answer these questions, but I cannot resist. Permit me to
generalize beyond my data:
Responsible Care is explicitly cultural. Its authors and champions describe it
not as a set of practices or requirements, but as "an ethic, an attitude, a way of
thinking..." They often talk about "doing the right thing." And yet just what
exactly the "right thing" is is hardly explicit. SM President Woods told me
(and others confirmed) that when executives first signed onto Responsible
Care, they really had no idea what it meant. But, he said, "Now they know
what it means." Do they? I am not so sure.
I spoke to twenty-one different people at the three companies I visited, and
although I did not keep track, I suspect I heard at least ten different
explanations of Responsible Care. Responsible Care is a program to avoid
accidents and the extra costs they entail; Responsible Care is a system to gain
better control of employees so that they do not make disastrous mistakes;
Responsible Care is a credo that gets the company playing an active role in the
community; Responsible Care is a CCPA initiative that allows smaller
companies to establish leadership roles and gain recognition within the
industry; Responsible Care is a calculated strategy to avoid regulation that
would trample the industry; Responsible Care is a new image around which
companies sell themselves and their products; Responsible Care is a culture
for "doing the right thing" - Responsible Care is all things to all people.
And do not think that the text of the initiative offers clarification. It covers
everything. It took me three weeks to boil its thirty-seven pages down to
some 185 cultural beliefs, values and assumptions. And some of these 185
beliefs, values and assumptions seem to contradict one another. Consider
ET's decision to take on more in-plant risk at Edmonton because the
community was more comfortable with hydrochloric acid than chlorine.
Addressing stakeholder concerns, yes. Minimizing risks? Protecting
employees? Well...
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Things that are all things to all people are usually dismissed as fluff: nice
idea, no real results. How could anyone actually know what they are expected
to do? But Responsible Care is producing results. Emissions are lower; safety
accidents are less frequent; company employees are visiting their
communities; governments are impressed. Why is Responsible Care
working?
Free trade was coming, public opinion was horrible and the threat of new
regulation was rearing its ugly head. Senior management in the chemical
industry saw nothing but doom in the crystal ball and decided it needed to
turn public opinion around to forestall onerous regulation. It was either
astute enough or broke enough to shun advertising and seek some way of
attacking the root of the problem.
"Look. The root of the problem is that the public doesn't understand.
They never hear the word 'chemical' without hearing the word 'toxic'
first. They hear that we've had a spill and they get these knee-jerk
reactions. Never mind that it's the same stuff that's in their shampoo.
Next thing we know we've got regulation."
"No, the root of the problem is that we keep having spills. We need to
stop having spills. If we improve our performance, the public will
respect us."
Improve performance, demonstrate the new ways to the public, and it would
no longer clamour for regulation. But how to improve performance?
Somebody, somewhere, fell upon the idea of management systems:
"Procedurize everything. Almost like writing our own regs. But let
each company write its own regs."
It must have seemed very comprehensive and very nonspecific. All that had
to be done was to create a whole bunch of management systems. Granted,
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that wouldn't be that easy, but presumably it wouldn't affect business too
much.
Responsible Care requires the establishment of some fairly specific
management systems. It does not say what should be in those management
systems, but it is quite specific about what topics they must address, and what
they must accomplish. Consider: seventy different chemical companies are
each told to come up with a written procedure to provide their customers
'that information which they believe to be vital to the health and safety of
end-users' of their products.
On the surface of it, this seems quite benign. There are no stipulations as to
what the procedure has to prescribe. What executive would object? But
something funny happens when you give people the power to create their
own management systems. They start thinking about "doing the right thing;"
or at least some of them do, not because they think it increases shareholder
value, but because their eight-year-olds have been asking them about
chemicals. And so some pretty rigorous management systems get written -
not everywhere, but at one or two companies.
Now, in addition to management systems, somebody else, somewhere else,
also fell upon the idea of Responsible Care executive seminars.
Consider what happens when several months later, several executives from
different companies meet at a CCPA meeting to compare notes on how their
Responsible Care implementation is proceeding. One executive describes his
company's mediocre procedure. Another, whose responsible underling has a
curious eight-year-old, describes a much more rigorous procedure. The end-
user-safety-information procedure begins to become a source of executive
pride. A third executive - whose company hasn't really taken this all that
seriously - begs off until the next meeting, returns home and the next
morning demands a more rigorous procedure from his underlings, whether
they have eight-year-olds or not.
And thus the standards for the seemingly benign end-user-safety-information
procedure rise.
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Now, a third somebody, somewhere else again, fell upon the idea of
compliance verification. Every CCPA company will at some point have a
verification team, consisting of enthusiastic individuals from other chemical
companies, come through and verify its management systems. They will
then write a report, which the company is supposed to share with the public,
on the company's management systems. The question is, will they think that
the company is "doing the right thing?" Remember, Responsible Care is all
things to all people...
Through wisdom or through luck, the founders of Responsible Care created
something that would snowball.
Note that the continuous improvement mechanism that I suggest is at work
within the Canadian chemical industry could only continue to work so long
as there were people within the industry who sought to increase standards of
behaviour (people with eight-year-olds, if you will).
But Responsible Care management systems are more than just betting chips
in an industry-wide game of one-upmanship. They are also practiced. At first
they are merely cultural artifacts. Observable and concrete, they could be gone
tomorrow as fast as they appeared yesterday. But as they are used more and
more, and as they are perceived to work for the company (i.e. to solve
problems), their implicit beliefs, values and assumptions may slowly become
ingrained in the company culture. It matters little if a community awareness
program was originally written to stave off regulation, if it implies that
community concerns are worth responding to, then that is the belief that will
ingrain itself in the culture. Motivation may not affect eventual culture.
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The organizational cultures of chemical companies are changing. New
beliefs, values and assumptions are externally "suggested" by Responsible
Care. Responsible Care standards are not static, but are changing with time.
The wants and needs of governments and society in general are changing.
The organizational cultures of chemical companies are also fragmented. The
external forces of change interface with specific individuals within
companies. Different individuals within chemical companies are exposed to
different beliefs, values and assumptions. Some individuals have never
heard of Responsible Care. Others participated in the drafting of the Codes.
Students of organizational culture could find no better research grounds than
the chemical companies of Canada.
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Sentence-by-Sentence Analysis of the Responsible Care® Text
for Cultural Beliefs, Values and Assumptions
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